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1.1 
Foreword 
This is your opportunity to discover how the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville 
District, came to be. These pages detail the 
fascinating history of the Corps of Engineers in 
Florida and Puerto Rico tracing significant 
contributions to the growth of each. 
More importantly it lets you capture the 
spirit of the men and women of the Corps who 
built this district and established the high 
standards for professional competence, 
personal service and human warmth which we 
sustain today. Here is their story and ours in a 
single volume. I invite you, your family and 
friends to enjoy and share its many treasures. 
JAMES w. R. ADAMS 
Colonel, Corps of Engineers 
District Engineer 
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CHAPTER 1 
Early History 
THE PosmON OF CHIEF ENGINEER for the newly created Grand 
Army was enacted by the Continental Congress on 16 June 1775 in 
order to provide military engineering for the nascent movement to-
ward independence. The position was created as a reaction by Con-
gress to the worsening situation between the colonists and the 
mother country. 
Less than a month later, General George Washington, who 
had recently arrived in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to assume com-
mand over the Continental forces, appointed Colonel Richard Grid-
ley to the post of Chief of Engineers. In all probability, Gridley was 
offered this position because he was serving in that same capacity 
for the local militia under a commission from the Massachusetts 
Provisional Congress. 
Richard Gridley had an excellent background for his engineer-
ing duties. He had served in the Provincial units of the British Army 
where he had drawn up the plans for the fortification of Lake George 
in the New York colony. He had also participated in the construction 
of Fort William for the same colony.ln 1 7 46, Gridley had worked on 
his hometown defenses in Boston for the British and had served on 
expeditions against the French at Louisburg in 17 45, Crown Point in 
1755, and Quebec in 1759. 
As chief engineer for the Massachusetts militia, he oversaw the 
creation of the breastworks on Breed's Hill. He took his place in the 
line at Bunker Hill where he was wounded. Gridley, 64 years old 
when he was injured, accepted Washington's appointment as Chief 
Engineer of the Continental forces although he retired from further 
active combat operations; however, he continued to act as the engi-
neer general of the Eastern Department until 1780.1 
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in the necessary branches of mathematics," and that noncommis-
sioned officers "write a good hand."3 Unfortunately, the resolution 
was so poorly worded concerning matters of pay, rank, and prece-
dence with other branches of the Continental Army, that considera-
ble confusion existed among members of the Engineer Depart-
ment as to their proper place in the military hierarchy. Congress had 
to correct this vagueness. 
On 11 March 1779, Congress formally established the Corps 
when it resolved: 'That the engineers in the service of the United 
States shall be formed in a Corps and styled the 'Corps of Engi-
neers,' .... "4 Two months later, it appointed General du Portail 
commandant of the Corps of Engineers. After much trial and error, 
the Continental Congress seemed to have created a proper organi-
zation to handle the duties of the military engineer. 
After General Charles Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown in 
1781, combat operations in the United States ceased, although it 
was 1783 before the peace treaty with Great Britain officially ended 
the American war for independence. Shortly after the Treaty of Paris 
was signed, Congress, as part of its military cutback program, dis-
solved the Continental Army's Corps of Engineers. The immediate 
need for military construction was over; the Corps was declared 
dispensable. 
Between 1783 and 1789, the newly created United States of 
America turned to the immediate task of forming a viable govern-
ment There appeared to be no need for the military engineer. But, 
in 1789, the French Revolution broke out and all of Europe was in 
flames. When the French and the English renewed their age-old 
struggle, the United States had a treaty of friendship and aid with 
France. The possibility of Americans having to fight again was a 
valid assumption. Secretary of War Henry Knox wrote a letter to 
President Washington, calling for a small corps of artillery and engi-
neers. There the matter stood while war clouds rolled back and forth 
across Europe. 
Four years later, when President Washington turned to Con-
gress for the funds and authority to fortify the nation's coast, there 
were no engineers in the military establishment. As an immediate 
measure, on 20 March 1794, Washington divided the coast into a 
number of districts, making a series of temporary appointments to 
provide each district with an engineer. 
By 9 May 1 794, Congress was ready with an act creating a 
Corps of Artillerists and Engineers. The Corps had an authorized 
strength of 992 men and a legal life of 3 years. A year later, Congress 
extended the life of the Corps of Artillerists and Engineers indefi-
nitely. At its peak, in 1 799, the Corps consisted of two full regiments; 
but, in spring of 1800, the numbers were reduced once more by Act 
of Congress. · 
3 
West Point classroom. 
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Two years later, the Military Academy at West Point was estab-
lished and Johnathan Williams was appointed its first superintend-
ent. (West Point was the first engineering school in the United 
States; Rensselaer Polytechnical School was not founded until 
1824, and its first graduates were not sent forth until the 1830's.) 
Williams was a merchant, jurist, and respected scientist who had 
worked on some of the nation's fortifications. He was not a profes-
sional military man. Under William's guidance, West Point became 
the preeminent engineering and scientific school in America. The 
Military Academy represented the concept of the citizen-soldier, 
trained by the military to pursue both civil and military functions. 
From its inception until1866, West Point drew its superintendents 
from among the officers of the Corps of Engineers; thereafter, the 
command was opened to all branches of the Army.5 
The same Congressional Act of 16 March 1802 which estab-
lished the Military Academy, discontinued the Corps of Artillerists 
and Engineers and created two separate organizations; the Corps of 
Engineers and the Regiment of Artillery. 
In addition to establishing a separate Corps of Engineers 
charged with educating all of the Regular Army officers, President 
Thomas Jefferson sent his engineer officers throughout the nation 
to survey, explore, erect fortifications, and build military roads. 
These tasks were considered both military and civil because it was 
necessary for the country to know its territory before the land could 
be protected, settled, and developed. 
By 30 April 1824, the need of the civil sector for trained engi-
neers was so great, and the source of these technicians so restricted 
to the Corps of Engineers, that Congress established for the Corps 
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the mission of performing civil functions for the nation at large. That 
mission, many times modified, has continued. Today, in Florida, the 
Jacksonville District is still engaged in carrying out this charge. 
Aorida, first touched by Juan Ponce de Leon in 1513, was the 
last territory on the Atlantic coast to become a part of the United 
States. Following several centuries under Spanish control, the pe-
ninsula was terra incognito to the Americans when it was ceded to 
the nation in 1821. 
Early Spanish explorers hurriedly tramped over Las Floridas 
chasing Indian myths, seeking the fountain of youth, the Seven 
Cities of Cibola, and wealthy native empires to conquer. Ponce de 
Leon was followed by the Pimfilo de Narvaez-Aivar Nunez Cabeza de 
Yaca expedition of 1528 and the Hernando de Soto undertaking of 
1539. The conquistadors found two elements in Aorida; hostile In-
dians and inhospitable swamps. Spain turned its back upon the 
peninsula until the French expressed an interest in the land. 
At first, the French Huguenots were intent upon founding colo-
nies to escape religious persecution at home. Then, temptation to 
attack the wealth-Iadened Spanish ships, sailing slowly up the Aor-
ida coast in the gulf stream toward the higher latitudes where the 
prevailing westerly winds could carry them back to Spain, proved 
too much for the Frenchman to ignore. First, Jean Ribault visited 
Aorida and, then, Rene de Laudonniere attempted to establish a 
settlement and fort on the St Johns River in 1564. When Philip II 
learned of Fort Caroline, he sent Admiral Pedro Menendez de Aviles 
the following year to drive off the Huguenots and to build a military 
outpost to protect outgoing Spanish ships. Pedro Menendez carried 
out both missions by virtually wiping out all Frenchmen in Aorida 
Explorers surveying. 
5 
6 
and founding St Augustine, the first permanent European settle-
ment in present-day United States. 
In the seventeenth century, it was the English who put pressure 
on Spain. After the founding of Jamestown in 1607, the English 
settlers gradually moved southward. Georgia became a no-man's 
land between the two European rivals and their Indian allies. By the 
time Spain lost Aorida to Great Britain in 1763, there were few of the 
indigenous Amerindians left on the peninsula. White man's war and 
disease had decimated the ranks of the Cal usa, Timucua, and Apa-
Iachees. When the Spanish departed for Cuba, the few surviving 
Indian allies went with them. The English moved into a nearly de-
serted peninsula. 
The English were not the only newcomers to Florida. The land, 
nearly desolate of humans, had an appeal to various bands of In-
dians from the Creek Confederation. Throughout the eighteenth 
century, they drifted south from their tribal lands in Alabama and 
Georgia. These Indians became known as Seminoles, meaning 
"wild people," or "out-settlers," because of their separation from the 
Creeks.6 During the English period in Florida, 1763-83, there was 
comparative harmony between the two races. The British were nei-
ther numerous nor aggressive. 
Great Britain created two colonies, East and West Florida, out 
of the newly acquired land. When the American Revolution broke 
out, both Aoridas cast their lot with the mother country. During the 
war, Spain became an ally of the United States at the urging of 
France, but primarily to recapture her lost territory of Florida. The 
Spanish succeeded and in 1783 East and West Florida returned to 
the flag of Spain. Once again, European settlers were uprooted as 
the English left and the Spaniards returned. 
By this time, Florida was not a necessary military outpost in 
Spain's colonial organization. The Amerindian empires had been 
looted of their precious metals and the treasure ships no longer 
sailed from the Spanish Main along the Gulf Stream to the Iberian 
peninsula. It had been a matter of national pride for Spain to retake 
Aorida, but once this had been accomplished, there was little incen-
tive for white settlements. The result was that most Spaniards in 
Aorida lived in the two small villages of St. Augustine and Pensacola 
in the extreme eastern and western portions of the territory. Spanish 
control over middle Florida was therefore minimal, and the penin-
sula became a haven for the Seminole Indians and the runaway 
slaves from Georgia, Alabama, and the Carolinas. 
Americans living continguous to Spanish Florida were greatly 
disturbed by the lawless conditions along the frontier region sepa-
rating the two countries. Cattle rustling was a way of life on both 
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5 along the frontier region sepa-
stling was a way of life on both 
sides of the border. American slaveowners were convinced the 
Seminoles were encouraging and even carrying off slaves to the 
safety of their villages under the Spanish flag. The Seminoles and 
runaway slaves owned cattle and lived a relatively free existence 
away from white man's control, which was not the proper life·to 
flaunt before the American plantation system. As a further affront, 
Spain stationed black troops in Florida, an example fraught with 
danger for the institution of slavery.7 
The international situation in 1812, with Americans and British 
at war again, provided further sanctions to violent acts on both sides 
of the line. The Governor of Florida encouraged the Seminoles to 
attack Georgia. American troops retaliated by marching into Span-
ish territory. Meanwhile, the English began taking advantage of the 
situation by recruiting Indian allies in Spanish Florida to be used 
against the United States. Regardless of the provocative actions of 
England and Spain, the Americans looked to the Seminoles as the 
primary cause of their border problems. 
The end of the War of 1812 did not stop the border strife. 
British merchants continued to operate in Spanish Florida, encour-
aging the Seminoles and former slaves to harry and harass nearby 
Americans. These frontier depredations, local in nature, took on the 
aspect of a national problem when southern planters considered 
the future acquisition of Florida a necessary policy forth~ expansion 
of the plantation system and the protection of the institution of slav-
ery. The rest of the nation was beginning to accept as inevitable the 
eventual expansion of the United States from Canada to the Gulf of 
Mexico and from coast to coast. a 
Two Seminole chiefs 
captured w ith 
Alexander Arbuthno~ at 
SL Marks, when Gen. 
Andrew Jackson used 
the ruse of flying the 
English flag. 
April, 1818. Courtesy 
State Photographic 
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7 
8 
Plan of Fort Gadsden, 
1818 
Courtesy National 
Archives. 
Under such assumptions, the situation deteriorated to the 
point where General Andrew Jackson, at the head of an army, was 
sent by President Monroe into Spanish Florida to punish the Semi- . 
noles. The action became known as the First Seminole War, 1817-
18. General Jackson exceeded his orders calling upon him to re-
spect all posts flying the Bourbon flag. Indian villages were burned; 
the Spanish settlements of Pensacola and St. Marks were occupied; 
and two British subjects were captured, tried, and executed. The 
South was jubilant, Spain and Britain outraged, and the Seminoles 
impressed. 
Lieutenant James Gadsden, an engineer accompanying Jack-
son, was ordered to build a fort on the east bank of the Apalachicola 
River in Spanish West Florida. Jackson was so pleased with his 
engineer's results that he named it Fort Gadsden. At the end of this 
border skirmish, Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun advised Gen-
eral Edmund P. Gaines that the President intended to return 
Jackson's conquests to Spain, but he added that "Fort Gadsden ... 
appears to be a very commanding position, and ought not to be 
evacuated. Should you think so, you will retain it, and garrison it with 
a sufficient force." Apparently, the fort remained in American hands, 
because when the exchange of Florida did take place, Andrew Jack-
son, as Territorial Governor of Florida, ordered Major Alexander 
C.W. Fanning, who was commanding at Fort Gadsden, to take pos-
session of St. Marks.9 
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President Monroe promptly returned Jackson's other con-
quests to Spain, but the Spanish crown was well aware of its inability 
to restrain the dynamic, aggressive Americans. The following year, 
the Adams-Onis Treaty ceded Aorida to the United States, although 
the formal transfer did not take place until July 1821. 
Thus was the territory of Florida obtained by the United States . 
But, even before the Adams-Onis Treaty took place, Captain Hugh 
Young, Corps of Topographical Engineers, who had accompanied 
General Jackson during the First Seminole War, submitted a de-
tailed report to the War Department entitled "A Topographical 
Memoir on East and West Florida with ltineraries."10 Young de-
scribed minutely and distinctly the theater of General Jackson's op-
eration which were bounded by the Georgia border in the north, the 
Gulf of Mexico in the south, the Sahwanne [Suwannee] or St. Juan 
River in the east, and the Apalachicola River in the west. In a~dition 
to topography, Young provided one of the earliest accounts of the 
Seminole Indians, their tribes, customs, and manners. He,also in-
cluded a brief description of the Spanish and Negro settlements, 
and some pertinent remarks on the status of trade and commerce. 
He admitted that his material was collected on the march during an 
active campaign; however, he was able to draw valuable information 
from a resident who had lived for some time in Florida. Young 
,.. . 
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our own views of beneficial result."ta Young's memoir was more 
than a topographical report of a theater of operations; it was an 
expression by an Army engineer of the American expansionism 
which resulted in the acquisition of Florida. 
It was a long time after Florida became a part of the United 
States before the creation of the Jacksonville District could take 
place. Prior to the Civil War, the Corps of Engineers was not orga-
nized along district and divisional lines. Engineers were assigned, 
either individually or in groups, to specific projects. When the task 
was finished either by completion or the exhaustion of funds, the 
officers concerned were reassigned. Often, if the task took a long 
time, the original engineer would be succeeded by other officers. 
After the war, permanent offices were established, consisting of 
a small staff of civilian engineers, clerks, and others, working under 
the direction of an officer in charge. Generally, this was the case in 
the larger coastal and river cities or at the headquarters for a major 
project. Gradually, lesser jobs in the local area were given to that 
office. All of this development led to the creation of divisions and 
districts. Today, the divisions cover broad geographic regions; the 
districts are confined to river basin areas for their civil works activi-
ties. 
Captain Hugh Young and Lieutenant James Gadsden were 
among the first engineers in Florida. Both were attached to General 
Jackson's forces during the invasion of Spanish Florida in 1818. 
Young's tenure in Florida was confined to the short period of occu-
pation under Jackson. Gadsden returned to the peninsula after it 
had become a territory of the United States. 
During the 1820's, Gadsden performed numerous engineer-
ing services for the Corps in Florida in a civilian capacity. In keeping 
with contemporary custom, Gadsden's assignments were directed 
to him as an individual. His orders gave no indication that would lead 
one to assume that the Chief Engineer had organizational designs, 
similar to district functions, in mind when he instructed Gadsden. 
It must be remembered that the Corps of Engineers first be-
came a major force in internal improvements through an Act of 
Congress on 30 April 1824. The Board of Engineers for Internal 
Improvement was established under the direction of General Simon 
Bernard to carry out these new responsibilities. From 1824 to 1829 
there was a tremendous increase in improvement projects. There 
was some indication that regional decentralization was contem-
plated when Engineer Orders No.9, of 1 August 1828, designated 
Captain William H. Chase commanding engineer of the Gulf of 
Mexico. Chase was charged with constructing defensive fortifica-
tions at Pensacola and harbor improvements at Pascagoula, Missis-
sippi.t9 
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River and harbor improvements were resumed when Con-
gress appropriated some $2 million for over 100 projects in 1852. 
Most of the allocations were small amounts intended for surveys to 
prepare plans for future works. In Florida, a grant was given to sur-
vey the St Johns River. 
There were no general river and harbor bills passed after 1852 
until near the end of the Civil War, but there were several large pro-
jects funded by individual congressional acts. The mounting ten-
sions brought on by the country's sectionalism over the institution 
of slavery caused the legislators to be wary of providing funds and 
projects to rival regions. By 1860, almost all civilian activities had 
been stopped and they remained idle throughout the war.24 During 
the conflict, military matters were the concern of the day. The only 
tasks performed in Florida were for the furtherance of the Union 
cause. 
In the midst of the war, the Topographical Corps was merged 
with the Corps of Engineers. The military engineers were once 
again under one corps. 
In retrospect, it is easy to see that the pent -up demand for inter-
nal improvements would swell to a flood tide after being dammed 
up for nearly a decade and a half. The first year of peace saw more 
works undertaken, with larger appropriations, than in any prewar 
year. The period from 1866 to 1880 was one of expansion. The 
startling growth peaked about 1881, but there were annual in-
creases of funds from 1881 to 1901, even during the Spanish-
American War.2s These years provided the climate for organiza-
tional changes to match the growth of appropriations and projects. 
The regional concept of engineering works may be discerned 
through the various headings used in the annual reports of river and 
harbor projects in the 1870's and 1880's. Immediately after the war, 
such projects were assigned individually to engineering officers and 
noted as such in the annual report For example, the report for 1869 
listed the Florida project under the heading of "Survey of the Mouth 
of the St. Johns River, Florida." Major General Quincy Adams 
Gillmore was listed as being in charge of the project. The wording 
was changed the following year to "Atlantic Harbors and Rivers 
South of the Cape Fear." The heading was again changed in 1873 
to "Improvements of Rivers and Harbors on the Coast of South 
Carolina, Georgia, and the Atlantic Coast of Florida."26 This termi-
nology remained consistent throughout the annual reports for over 
a decade. During this period, Gillmore was the officer in charge, with 
his headquarters in New York City. 
It is difficult to assess Gillmore's position with respect to the 
issue of district engineer during this decade and a half. His area of 
operations corresponded more to the present day division than to 
district status. Gillmore was also the officer in charge of projects on 
13 
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the east coast of Florida only. Key West and the west coast projects, 
both part of the present Jacksonville District, were under the direc-
tion of another engineer. 
Captain Andrew N. Damrell might well hold the honor of being 
the precursor of a district engineer in Florida. On 7 April 1873, he 
became the officer in charge of the "Improvement of the Harbor of 
Mobile- ... Removal of Bar at the Entrance of the Harbor of Cedar 
Keys, Florida." Throughout the following decade, Captain Damrell's 
description varied in the annual reports as more Florida projects 
were assigned to his control. By 1884, his description of Florida 
works listed "Pensacola Harbor, ... Key West Harbor, ... Appalachi-
cola [sic] River, ... Suwanee [sic] River, ... Caloosahatchee River, ... 
Peas [sic] Creek, ... Manatee River, Fla .... "27 
Regardless of what view one takes with respect to Gillmore and 
Damrell, the annual report of 1885 introduced a major change in 
the organization of the river and harbor groupings. It was the harbin-
ger of the divisional and district structure presently in use. Colonel 
Gillmore's area of concern was reduced and it was so indicated in 
the report under the title of "Improvement of Rivers and Harbors on 
the Coast of South Carolina and Georgia and part of the Atlantic 
Coast of Florida." This was followed by a numerical listing of his 
projects. Items 13 and 14 set the southern boundary for his respon-
sibility at the "Entrance to Cumberland Sound, Georgia and Flor-
ida," and the "Inside passage between Fernandina and the St. 
Johns River, Florida."2a 
Captain William T. Rossell relieved Colonel Gillmore of his 
southernmost region. Rossell's duties read, "Improvement of Rivers 
and Harbors in the State of Florida."29 In the same paragraph listing 
Rossell as the officer in charge, there was a new term stating that 
Ueutenant Colonel David C. Houston was Rossell's supervising en-
gineer. In another part of the report, Houston's duties were enumer-
ated, including his position as "supervising engineer of the districts 
embracing works in charge of ... Russell [Rossell]. "30 This was the 
first mention of a supervising engineer and of districts. Therefore, 
Captain William T. Rossell was the first district engineer in Florida, 
and, unlike Gillmore, Rossell's station was Jacksonville. 
Florida was in the vanguard of the movement during the 
1880's which saw the conception and development of the present-
day organization of divisions and districts. Colonel David Houston 
was appointed supervising engineer of districts under the charge of 
Major Andrew N. Damrell, and Captains Thomas Turtle, Richard L. 
Hoxie, and William T. Rossell.31 These officers were in command of 
fortifications and river and harbor projects from the St. Johns west 
to Mobile, Alabama. They were also the Corps of Engineers incho-
ate division. There were two supervising engineers listed in the 1888 
annual report; Colonel William P. Craighill, for the districts from Vir-
ginia to Florida, and Colonel George H. Mendell, for the west coast 
from San Diego, California, to the State ofWashington.32 lt is evident 
that this regional and district organization proved satisfactory, for 
under new regulations approved by the Secretary of War on 4 Feb-
ruary 1889, the country was divided into five divisions. For the first 
time, Colonel Craighill was called the division engineer for the 
Southeast Division.JJ 
Today, the establishment or disestablishment of a district 
would be carried out by a general order, but in 1884 when the con-
cept of a district was first utilized, special orders to the officers con-
cerned were used. Thus, in order to observe the creation of the 
Florida District, it is necessary to consult the special orders issued to 
Captain Rossell. He was instructed to go to Jacksonville, Florida, to 
relieve Colonel Gillmore, Major Andrew N. Damrell, and Captain 
Thomas Turtle of such river and harbor works and fortifications 
under their supervision, as the Chief of Engineers shall designate.34 
Rossell's district ultimately covered all of Florida from the St. Johns 
River to, and including, Apalachicola Bay. 
Ueutenant William M. Black relieved Captain Rossell in April 
1886. The following April, Apalachicola River was removed from 
Captain Black's control to be placed under Captain Richard L. 
Hoxie. His district, entitled "Improvement of Certain Rivers in the 
States of Florida, Georgia, and Alabama," is today part of the Mobile 
District3s This shift in territory was reflected in the title of Black's 
district from 1887's "Improvement of Rivers and Harbors in the 
State of Florida," to 1888's "Improvement of Certain Rivers and 
Harbors in the State of Florida."36 
It was during Captain Black's tenure that the district headquar-
ters was moved from Jacksonville to St. Augustine. It has been a 
long-held belief in the Jacksonville District that the move was made 
because of an epidemic of yellow fever. However, Black received 
orders dated 22 December 1887 to move to St. Augustine. He had 
completed his transfer by 14 January 1888, several months before 
the yellow fever epidemic in Jacksonville in July 1888.37 The epi-
demic obviously had no bearing upon the district's change of loca-
tion. 
Moving the district headquarters to St. Augustine and creating 
the Southeast Division seemed to be the beginning of a period of 
trial and error with respect to the size of the Florida District. In 1898, 
First Ueutenant Charles H. McKinstry was ordered to relieve Ueu-
tenant Colonel William H. H. Benyaurd of his duties at Key West.38 
Florida was now divided into two districts. The Key West District 
consisted of the fortifications at Fort Taylor, as well as the harbor 
and entrance improvement projects for the island. Key West did not 
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Maine and New Hampshire." More complex, using the names of the 
rivers concerned, was the region covered under "Improvements of 
Falls of the Ohio River, of White River, Indiana, of Wabash River, 
Indiana and Illinois, and of certain Rivers in Kentucky." Florida's title 
was "Improvement of Certain Rivers and Harbors in Florida."42 
All of this changed in 1908 when the various regions became 
designated by the headquarters' city within the district. Northern 
New England became the "Improvement of Rivers and Harbors in 
the Portland, Maine, District"; the Falls of the Ohio River became the 
"Improvement of Rivers and Harbors in the Louisville, Kentucky, 
District"; and Florida became the "Improvement of Rivers and Har-
bors in the Jacksonville, Florida, District."43 As a result of this new 
terminology, Lieutenant Colonel Lansing H. Beach had the distinc-
tion of being the first district engineer of the Jacksonville District. 
On 3 September 1935, when President Roosevelt set aside the 
first construction money for a ship canal across Florida, the Chief of 
Engineers was ready with a reorganization to create the Ocala, Flor-
ida, District, under Lieutenant Colonel Brehon B. Somervell, to 
serve the canal area. After Congress refused a year later to allocate 
funds for the canal, the Ocala District was absorbed by the Jackson-
ville District. 44 
With the outbreak of conflict in Europe in 1939, the United 
States began gearing up its defenses. The first activity to feel the 
change was construction. The burden of building, added to the 
other tremendous supply problems dumped upon the Quarter-
master Corps, was overwhelming. The Corps of Engineers, with a 
nationwide engineering organization of trained specialists in con-
struction, found its work dwindling as the nation shifted from peace-
time civil river and harbor projects to wartime military tasks. The 
answer was to utilize this pool of talent-in-being immediately. In No-
vember 1940, all Air Corps construction was shifted to the Corps of 
Engineers, relieving the quartermasters of a sizable job and freeing 
them to perform their supply functions. This was only the beginning. 
A year later, on 1 December 1941, the House of Representatives 
passed, and the President signed into law, the transfer of all military 
construction and maintenance work of the Army from the Quarter-
master Corps to the Corps of Engineers.45 
The effect of this law was significant Lieutenant General Bre-
hon B. Somervell wrote that the consolidation of military construc-
tion represented "the greatest change of activities of the Corps in its 
entire history."46 This massive transfer of engineering projects in all 
stages of work, from planning to near-completion, was effected on 
16 December 1941, 9 days after Pearl Harbor. Lieutenant General 
Eugene Reybold noted that this consolidation of construction activi-
ties "had become the first unified command in World War 11."47 
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Arecibo Harbor, San Juan Harbor, and Mayaguez Harbor, all in 
Puerto Rico. Later, the South Atlantic Division transferred the mili-
tary construction and maintenance functions of the Panama District 
to Jacksonville.49 
The district received more overseas territory when Kindley Air 
Force Base, Bermuda, was placed under its responsibility on 1 No-
vember 1958. This addition was not just a military construction as-
signment. Harbor improvement dredging operations were also 
conducted. 5° 
The tide of acquisitions turned in 1963 when the Cape 
Canaveral space construction works were withdrawn from the Jack-
sonville District by the creation of the independent Canaveral Dis-
trict. Changes in district functions occurred 30 June 1970 when, in a 
consolidation program within the Corps, Jacksonville turned over 
all of its military responsibilities to the Mobile District.51 At the same 
time, the Bermuda area was transferred to the Navy. The canaveral 
District was disestablished in June 1971, and the Jacksonville Dis-
trict reached its present status. 
Today, the Jacksonville District labors in civil areas. Yet, the 
earlier days of military tasks, the harbor defenses in the Spanish-
American War, the massive fortifications in the 1840's and 1850's, 
and the Indian wars against the Seminoles, are all part of the warp 
and woof of the history of the Jacksonville District Corps of Engi-
neers. 
The Federal Building in 
Jacksonville, where 
district headquarters 
have occupied the top 
three floors since 1967. 
Courtesy General 
Services Administration. 
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CHAPTER2 
The Territory 
of Florida 
WHEN PRESIDENT THOMAS JEFFERSON received the Louisiana Terri-
tory from Napoleon in 1803, he immediately sent out survey 
teams to study the land so that it might be protected, settled, and 
developed. In his Annual Message to Congress in 1806, he clearly 
expressed his belief that the nation must develop its roads, rivers, 
and canals to promote national economic harmony.1 The transfer 
of Florida to the United States in 1821 placed upon the Corps of 
Engineers these same tasks. The first requirement was for a basic 
knowledge of the terrain and its inhabitants. 
Some prospective settlers perferred to wait for first-hand re-
ports on Florida before embarking upon an enterprise which 
would cut them off from the life they knew. Still others, with no 
intention of moving, were eager to read about the newly gained 
territory and to bask in the glory of the dynamic expanding country 
of which they were citizens. The result was a spate of books on 
Florida. It was unfortunate that Captain Young's earlier informative 
memoir was buried somewhere in the War Department away from 
the eyes of an interested public. 
In the first two years after the transfer, books about Florida 
were published in New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston. Their 
lengthy descriptive nineteenth century titles provide the essence of 
their contents: James Grant Forbes, Sketches, Historical and 
Topographical of the Florid as; William Darby, A Memoir on the 
Geography and Natural and Civil History of Florida; and William H. 
Simmons, Notices of East Florida with an Account of the Semi-
nole Nation of Indians. Before the decade was over, John Lee Wil-
liams and Charles Vignoles added their works to the list of books 
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anew. 
Gadsden remained in the territory for the next 16 years, main-
taining continual communication with the Chief of Engineers in 
Washington, proposing engineering undertakings,supervising as-
signed projects, or recommending competent individuals in Flor-
ida to act for the Corps. James Gadsden is better known in Ameri-
can history texts for his Mexican activities and for the Gadsden 
Purchase than he is for his role in Florida. This is unfortunate, be-
cause his services to the Corps of Engineers and the State of Flor-
ida are equally deserving of historical notice.4 
James Gadsden. 
Courtesy Ladies 
Hermitage Association. 
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While Gadsden was surveying along the east coast, Captain 
Isaac Clark, Jr. was in command of a detachment doing the same 
task on the west coast. Clark had been ordered to lay out a road 
from the Suwannee River south to Cape Sable. He got as far as 
Charlotte Harbor before giving up. The captain found the route 
almost impassable, reporting that the whole countryside was inun-
dated and crisscrossed with "innumerable streams and bayous." 
Although he did find several establishments in Charlotte Harbor 
which supported about 50 Spaniards and Indians who fished for 
the Havana market, he concluded: "A road through that country 
would be, at this time, of little value in a military point of view, .... "7 
It was over a decade before white men became acquainted 
with the interior portion of the southern extremity of Florida, the 
Everglades. Even the land in the upper-center of the peninsula was 
unknown wilderness. Lieutenant Charles Despinville of the 4th Ar-
tillery stationed at Savannah was assigned in 1827 to Joshua A. 
Coffee, the commissioner for running the Indian boundary in Flor-
ida. While in the field, Despinville became separated from the sur-
vey party. The commissioner tried for 3 days to find the lieutenant. 
Neither the Indians with the survey group nor those encamped 
nearby would aid in the search, even though Coffee offered a $1 0 
reward. As time passed, Coffee became more desperate. He kept 
raising the reward. On the third day, when it reached $100, 90 
warriors turned out to search. The second day of this massive hunt 
brought results; two braves returned the lost officer. Mr. Coffee 
submitted a claim to Washington for an extra $1 00 to cover the 
cost of his reward. s 
The territory of Florida was not the only part of the United 
States to need the technical engineering services that the Corps of 
Engineers could provide. The whole nation was bursting with pro-
jects to develop communications systems, open transportation 
routes (both roads and canals), and tame rivers- in a few words-
to promote progress! The hue and cry from all parts of the country 
was for government participation in these sectional projects; the 
local resources were not enough to carry the cost nor supply the 
technical talent. Congress reacted in April 1824 to the demand of 
its constituents by passing a Rivers and Harbor Act and a Canals 
and Road Act which put the Corps of Engineers into the midst of 
the nation's expanding civil programs. Henceforth, the Corps per-
formed civil and military tasks with equal facility. The civil features 
of West Point's education were so unique and desirable that many 
young men accepted appointments to the Military Academy not to 
become Army officers, but to become civil engineers. 
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uis de Portail, who became 
commandant of the Corps of Engineers; Major Pierre Charles 
L'Enfant, who later laid out the site of Washington, D.C.; Major 
Stephen Rochefontaine, who served as commandant of the Corps 
of Artillerists and Engineers, and who designed many of the sea-
coast fortifications. Ia 
Long after the Revolutionary War, the idea persisted in Ameri-
can circles that the French trained engineers were outstanding in 
their field. Thus, in 1816, when Congress and the Administration 
were casting about for a foreign engineer to plan and construct an 
up-to-date system of fortifications, the French General Simon 
Bernard was chosen. General Lafayette and the American Minister 
to France, Albert Gallatin, had highly recommended Bernard to 
President Madison. 
General Bernard, after graduating from the Ecole Polytechni-
que, entered the Engineers as a lieutenant in 1 797. During 181 0-
12, he designed and built the fortifications at Antwerp. In 1813, as a 
colonel, he became the aide-de-camp to Napoleon. He remained 
with the Emperor to the end of Napoleon's career. 
Simon Bernard was given the pay and courtesy title of briga-
dier general when he was assigned to the Corps as an assistant 
engineer. He sat as a member of the Board of Engineers for F ortifi-
cations. With the passage of the Civil Functions Act, Bernard be-
came a member of the Board of Internal Improvements, which 
supervised an extensive program to develop the interior commun-
ications system of the nation by roads and canals. When Louis 
Phillipe became King of France after the July Revolution of 1830, 
Generq.l Bernard resigned his position so that he might return to 
his homeland. II 
By the time Bernard left the United States, the civil functions 
of the Corps of Engineers were in full swing, and the greater need 
was for civil engineers. The bent for civil engineers in America less-
ened the influence and the desire for French trained military engi-
neers. Of course, military fortifications were needed still, but, by the 
1830's, the Vauban school of military design was understood well 
enough by the American engineers that such construction could 
be kept under their own control.12 
A year and a half after Congress had acted in 1824, the Niles' 
Register, in a plea to increase the Corps of Engineers, eloquently 
stated the nation's case. "It is true, there are some distinguished 
private engineers in our country, but they are either insufficiently 
known, or too limited in their numbers for their talents and services 
to be made available in the greater part of the contemplated pro-
jects ... . "13 
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ry in South Carolina, Benjamin 
>k passage from Charleston to 
St. Augustine to await the New York contingent. Huger and Bris-
bane were met in St. Augustine by another member of the group, 
Lieutenant Augustus Canfield, who was stationed there with the 
4th Artillery. 
Perrault was instructed further to procure additional instru-
ments for his officers in New York, rent one or more vessels for his 
project, "observing in all your arrangements the strictest economy 
consistent with a proper and faithful execution of your duties," and 
to prepare an estimate of the funds necessary for this undertak-
ing.l5 
Evidently, either this assignment was not to Perrault's liking or 
the preparations were more time consuming than General Ma-
comb in Washington felt was necessary.ln any case, the major was 
still in New York in mid-May when he wrote to the Chief Engineer 
the reasons for his delay. Macomb's answer was blunt and direct. "I 
regret exceedingly to find from it [Perrault's letter] the difficulties 
which have retarded your expedition to Florida." However, the 
Chief Engineer stressed in strong terms that Major Perrault and his 
brigade were to leave New York immediately, "by the first opportu-
nity ... to Charleston, Savannah, St. Mary or St. Augustine or any 
other point which may enable you to reach the scene of your in-
tended operations in Florida.'' The general went on to say that if the 
sickly season of summer found him inland, he could return to the 
healthy places on the coast. While waiting for the fever season to 
pass, Perrault was to survey the coasts and harbors. He could not 
return north until his task had been completed.16 General 
Macomb's letter brought results. Major Perrault left New York at the 
end of May 1826. 
By July, the brigade had arrived at St. Augustine. Major Per-
rault divided his group into two parties; the gulf coast detachment 
consisted of Lieutenants Swift, Canfield, Smith and Walter Gwyn (a 
replacement for Lieutenant Eakin who had fallen ill); the Atlantic 
coast group was made up of Major Perrault, Lieutenants Searles, 
Huger, Brisbane, and a civilian, Mr. T. Gibbs. (Gadsden had highly 
recommended Gibbs to Perrault, stating that he had served as a 
surveyor on one of Gadsden's earlier projects and could be useful 
in the local area.) 
At the beginning of the next year, Major Perrault reported to 
the Chief of Engineers that the west coast demi-brigade had in-
formed him that the entrance to the Suwannee River was not satis-
factory. Even at high tide the water was no more than 6 or 7 feet 
deep. J ust as soon as he could communicate with that group, he 
would instruct them to look at Tampa Bay. 
29 

that Lieutenants Canfield 
nth on the west coast be-
were assigned to survey. 
~d men were blown out of 
e continually seeking the 
from their midst. 
,f the Indian murders in a 
!. "The Indians have com-
:ruel murder in this Coun-
led ... the discontented 
ninole Indians have deter-
nether letter he said, 'The 
st Shocking Character on 
e white man, four children 
house burnt to ashes .... 
~ Desperate Movement of 
11 The Governor immedi-
can L. Clinch and Colonel 
1manded garrisons within 
:1d troops to strike before it 
tary of War for Federal aid. 
took into the matter. Two 
tding general that he could 
either band of Indians. He 
ntly committed in Georgia 
and Florida, were the Acts of a few desperate Outlaws, three of 
whom it is believed, have already atoned for their crimes, and ef-
forts are making to have the others taken and brought to justice."18 
In light of the latter information, it would appear that the Gov-
ernor was crying wolf in an effort to have the Seminoles removed 
from Florida. To fan such fears as the Governor suggested was 
dangerous on the frontier. Such were the conditions under which 
Major Perrault and his brigade worked. 
In the spring of 1827, General Simon Bernard visited Florida 
to personally examine the terrain over which Lieutenant Colonel 
Perrault (he had been promoted while in the territory) and his bri-
gade had worked. General Bernard's itinerary was exhausting. 
Starting on 15 April, he examined the coast from the St. Johns 
River to the St. Marys. He then traveled up the St. Marys River on the 
route to Apalachicola Bay. He returned to the east coast via the 
Suwannee River. The general was back in St. Augustine by 13 May, 
preparing to cross the peninsula on the route from the St. Johns 
River to Tampa Bay. He arrived in Tampa on the 23rd of the 
month. Here, he took passage on the revenue cutter Alabama to 
examine the coast from Tampa to New Orleans.19 
When General Bernard returned to Washington, he called 
upon President John Q. Adams to report his findings. Bernard 
believed that a ship canal across Florida was impracti~able. The 
most that could be done would be to construct a canal 6 feet deep 
for steamboats and the final result did not justify the expense and 
effort. He did recommend a canal between Mobile and Pensacola. 
Later, Bernard also recommended the practicality of a canal from 
St. Marys to the St. Johns as part of the contemplated inland water-
way along the Atlantic coast.2o 
In 1828, the first project for constructing an intracoastal wa-
terway was adopted by Congress in the River and Harbor Act of 23 
May. Appropriations were made for enlarging the water system 
between Mobile Bay and the Mississippi Sound on the gulf coast, 
and from the Cumberland Sound to the St. Johns on the Atlantic 
coast. The Florida undertaking lasted from 1828 to 1838, and was 
revived from 187 4 to 1880. A later design to improve the mouth of 
the St. Johns River so changed the local transportation conditions, 
fuat fue Cumberland Sound- St. Johns River scheme was termi-
nated in December 1880. Work on the waterway has been pro-
grammed several times in the twentieth century. The first Florida 
project was given to James Gadsden. 
Gadsden parceled the work out to local contractors. A year 
later, he wrote to the Chief Engineer, Colonel Charles Gratiot, to tell 
him fuat fue canal cut near the Amelia narrows was completed; 
however, his contract with Zephariah Kingsley had been delayed. 
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Not all the work of the Corps was directed to improving trans-
portation systems that would encourage settlement. Even in the 
early nineteenth century there was concern with historical preser-
vation. The Castillo de San Marcos, renamed Fort Marion by the 
Americans, was constructed by the Spanish between 1672 and 
1695. It is the oldest masonry fort in the United States today. The 
Castillo was in good repair, serving as a garrison for Spanish 
troops at the time of cession. Extending from the fort to the bar-
racks of St. Francis was a sea wall of stone designed to preserve 
both the town and the fort from the ravages of the sea. Shortly after 
the Americans moved into St. Augustine, some unthinking gov-
ernmental offical removed a portion of the wall, using the stones to 
construct a wharf leading to the barracks. This destruction of part 
of the sea wall had grave consequences; the foundation began 
eroding away from under the Castillo. 
In the fall of 1834, St. Augustine was subjected to severe 
northeast gales accompanied by high water. The pounding of the 
sea led to a rapid deterioration beneath the castle. The storm 
brought fears for the safety of this magnificent edifice to many of 
the citizens. The town fathers approached the resident engineer, 
First Lieutenant Francis L. Dancy, with a plea for aid. Dancy wrote 
to General Charles Gratiot, stating that "should the government 
cause a few thousand dollars to be judiciously expended on it, it 
would remain for ages a monument, and not an unworthy one, of 
the Spanish Nation, by whom it was erected, and a memento of 
events more memorable in the history of our country."26 Funds 
were forthcoming and the Castillo was saved. 
Over on the west coast along the Apalachicola, St. Marks, and 
Ocklockonee Rivers, the Corps of Engineers also had navigational 
designs. Today, these rivers are in the Mobile District; however, 
during the early years when district boundaries were forming, they 
were under Jacksonville's control. In addition, their navigational 
improvements demonstrate the frontier working conditions under 
which the Corps had to contend throughout the territorial days. As 
on the east coast, the tasks were performed by both engineer offi-
cers and civilians. 
The first appropriation was made to clear the Apalachicola 
River. David B. Macomb, a civilian, was given the contract. Ma-
comb decided to use two flats, about 50 or 60 feet long, joined 
parallel, with Spanish Windlasses placed on them. This equipment 
was constructed at the junction of the Flint and Chattahoochee 
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detailed estimates of expenses on more than one occasion. 
The Chief Engineer, who began casting about for some com-
petent person to replace David Macomb, thought of James Gads-
den. Colonel Gratiot wrote Gadsden in April 1829 asking him to 
take over the St. Marks project. Gadsden declined. In August, Gra-
tiot wrote again, this time sweetening the offer by telling Gadsden 
he would have to be an overseer only; he would not be expected to 
work in the field. He also suggested that "perhaps the dredging 
machine which has been used in deepening the Channel at Mobile 
might be procured on very low terms if there is no further use for 
it."31 Gadsden still refused to accept the assignment. 
Finally, in February 1830, Macomb was notified that his serv-
ices were terminated because of his failure to settle his accounts. 
GabrielJ. Floyd was given the Apalachicola contract; Jesse H. Wil-
lis, the collector at St. Marks, was assigned the St. Marks job.32 
Gabriel Floyd lasted one year. Joseph White, Florida Territo-
rial Delegate to Congress, recommended the replacement of 
Floyd because he was not a trained engineer. White also submitted 
to the Chief Engineer several letters critical of Floyd written by 
other Floridians. 
Floyd, informed of these proceedings, wrote to the Chief En-
gineer asking to be kept on his appointment. When this had no 
effect, he wrote to the President claiming that White had done this 
to him solely on account of his ''adverse vote in the election of [the] 
Delegate. "33 Regardless of this counter charge, Second Lieutenant 
George W. Long, 4th Artillery, who was on engineering duty at Fort 
Jackson, New Orleans, was sent to replace Gabriel Floyd as agent 
at Apalachicola on 29 March 1831. 
In November 1831, First Lieutenant Long (who had been pro-
m?~ed that September) and Mr. Willis were placed under Captain 
Wilham H. Chase, Corps of Engineers. Chase was in charge of 
constructing Fort Pickens at Pensacola with the designation of 
Commanding Engineer of the Gulf of Mexico.34 
First Lieutenant Long's new duties were to be long and busy. 
He remained in Florida until he resigned his commission in De-
cember 1835. Long's tenure with the Corps in Florida in many 
respects epitomizes the experiences of engineers of that day. His 
tasks were varied, he had to improvise, and he was drawn into the 
private sector because of his engineering skills. 
. The first task Long undertook was to continue the excavating 
which had been commenced by Gabriel Floyd. He kept his crew 
on the job from July through late August until heavy rains caused 
the river to rise and effectively stopped all such work. Long then 
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readied their load, the wheel and axle was employed, which raised 
the diving rig high enough in the ship's well for a platform to be slid 
under the bell to remove the stone in the grapple. Then the whole 
performance would be repeated.37 
Long reported that his bell was a powerful engine with which 
to tear up rock from the river bed. Rocks up to 2 tons had been 
lifted with greater ease than if they had been taken from a dry 
quarry because of the buoyancy of the bell, combined with the 
power derived from wheel, axle, and pulleys. He strongly urged the 
Chief of Engineers to give serious consideration to employing his 
bell on other river tasks.3B 
Long went on to say that he had been informed that the Chi-
pola River was to be improved. He was well acquainted with that 
river. There was a section of 3 or 4 miles through a cypress swamp 
containing large trees in the water. He recommended that the trees 
by felled at low water, cut close to the surface, then his dMng bell 
could be sunk over the stumps and "a ready means will be had to 
accomplish the work of cutting the stumps out of the way-."39 
The major difficulty Long encountered while working on the 
Apalachicola was with his laborers. In September 1833, a crew of 
Negroes rebelled against their overseer, attacked and nearly killed 
the man. The entire group then deserted the job and fled to the 
sanctuary of the wilderness, undoubtedly to join the blacks living in 
Lt. Long's Diving Bell. 
Courtesy National 
Archives. 
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promote a railroad from Tallahassee to St. Marks. In justifying his 
acceptance of this work, he wrote the Chief Engineer that this pro-
ject was of first importance to the territory, and that the expense of 
getting an engineer from the north would be prohibitive for the 
promoters.42 
The Tallahassee-St. Marks Railroad brought forth these com-
ments from Comte de Castelnau when he visited middle Florida in 
1837-38: "Certainly [it is] the very worst that has yet been built in 
the entire world." Yet, he went on to say that it was a very useful 
road for "it would be almost impossible to take a heavy load of 
cotton across the sand that covers the country to the south, into 
which horses sink at every step." He reported that the train con-
sisted of two mules pulling carts along the tracks and it took about 
7 hours to cover the 23-mile route. Several times the company had 
tried to put a locomotive on the tracks, but the roadbed construc-
tion was so poor that the company gave up on the plan. 
Was it really the world's worst railroad? The Comte' s conclud-
ing remarks demonstrate otherwise. The Frenchman expressed 
Tallahassee Railroad 
Co. depot in 
Tallahassee, 1838. 
Construction was 
started on Florida :S first 
railroad (incorporated 
Feb. 10, 1834) in 1834 
and completed in 1836, 
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Leon (22 miles). 
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Photographic Archives, 
F.S.U. 
39 

new Americans: "Instead 
on of this railroad, one is 
Jold thought that inspried 
:tbited by hostile savages, 
s, which so few years ago 
:d out projects in the terri-
l in bringing settlers and 
Jlar tasks were more civil 
were military needs to be 
:I not shirk from undertak-
CHAPTER3 
The Military Frontier 
IN THE FIRST HALF of the nineteenth century, the Corps of Engi-
neers prepared defenses and fought in three Indian wars in Florida. 
The relatively minor engagements of the First Seminole War have 
been recorded in an earlier chapter. The two remaining frontier 
conflicts (the Second Seminole War, 1835-42 and the Third Semi-
nole War, 1856-57) called upon the services of the Corps of Topo-
graphical Engineers. Between the Second Seminole War and the 
Civil War, the Corps of Engineers was busy erecting fortifications 
around the perimeter of the state to bolster the defenses of the 
nation's sea frontier. 
In both men and material, the Second Seminole War was the 
longest, most costly Indian war fought by the United States. It was 
brought about as, a direct result of Congress' "Indian Removal 
Act," passed in 1830. Under the act, most American Indians east of 
the Mississippi River were to be moved west of the river to curb 
frontier conflicts between the white and red men. 
Prior to the Indian Removal Act, the United States Army had 
set up frontier outposts in Florida. In 1823, just 2 years after Florida 
became an American territory, James Gadsden was sent to 
Tampa Bay to select the site for a post. Fort Brooke was named for 
Colonel George M. Brooke, the commander of the troops who had 
responsibility for the actual construction. Soon there were several 
such military camps scattered throughout the territory, including 
Fort King. 
These posts were designed to protect the military from the 
Indians, who employed unsophisticated weapons. The frontier 
forts were generally temporary, rude log structures for quartering 
troops. They might be more properly considered cantonments 
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after the commencement of the War of 1812. Then Congress cre-
ated topographical officers in 1813; they were mustered out in 
1815 when the war ended. The next year the Topographical Corps 
became part of the general staff. In 1818, the Topographical Corps 
was placed under the Corps of Engineers where it remained until 
1838.ln 1838, it became an independent Corps and was assigned 
the functions of surveying roads, canals, lakes, rivers, and harbors. 
It was finally merged with the Corps of Engineers in 1863. Thus, 
during part of the Second Seminole War, the Topographical 
Corps was in existence supplying officers to map the unknown 
terrain of Florida.l 
Very early in the war, General Abraham Eustis sent scouting 
detachments ahead of his main column. One such party consisted 
of Colonel James Gadsden, Captain Augustus Canfield (both from 
the Corps of Engineers), Captain John T. Sprague, and Lieutenant 
J oseph E. Johnston, with 1 7 men, who were sent "in a miserable 
little steamer" to explore the St. Johns River as far as Lake Mon-
roe.2 When the Topographical Corps became a separate unit in 
1838, both Canfield and Johnston became topographical engi-
neers. These officers undoubtedly prepared field maps for General 
Eustis. 
Lieutenant Joseph E. Johnston's case was unusual. A year 
after that scouting mission, Johnston resigned his Army commis-
sion on 31 May 1837. Later, while waiting for a reappointment, he 
volunteered to serve in Florida as a civilian.ln the fall of that year, he 
was attached to a unit commanded by Lieutenant Levin M. Powell 
of the United States Navy. 
Powell had earlier suggested to the Secretary of War that a 
specially formed amphibious force, composed of both soldiers 
and sailors, might be able to penetrate the watery refuge of the 
Seminoles who were hiding in the Everglades. Secretary of War 
Joel L. Poinsett accepted the Navy Lieutenant's suggestion and 
preparations were made for the unit to enter the Everglades in 
December 1837. Powell's command consisted ofthree naval offi-
cers, 100 sailors, Lieutenant Henry W. Fowler with Company I, 1st 
Artillery, and Joseph E. Johnston, who was the group's civilian 
topographical engineer. 
Early in January, the group had a sharp engagement with 
Indians at the headwaters of Jupiter River. Lieutenant Fowler was 
wounded during the fight while the Americans were attempting to 
retreat to their boats. Johnston took command of the soldiers, 
rallying the waverers and directing the rearguard so successfully 
that the unit was saved from almost certain destruction. Lieutenant 
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or child. Out of these funds Blake had to pay all expenses, includ-
ing gifts, bribes, and travel costs to move the Indians. Blake suc-
ceeded in shipping 36 Seminoles west. With the failure of his mis-
sion in 1852, Blake angrily commented that if the Government 
would shut off the supply of powder to the Indians, and harass the 
red men by running surveys through their lands, they might be 
inclined to move. 7 
The surveyor general of Florida, John Westcott, proposed 
this same policy in his report of 1853, declaring "a gradual and 
easy approach by survey, and settlements from the present sur-
veyed lands, would ... soon accomplish peacefully and economi-
cally the object so most desired."8 It is difficult to accurately pin-
point whether the invasion by surveyors was the brainchild of Blake 
or Westcott. 
Captain John C. Casey, the Indian agent who succeeded 
Blake, presented the plan which was executed. It was similar to the 
suggestions of Blake and Westcott, but the timing was more com-
plex. First, Casey proposed to send surveyors out to study the land 
between the Kissimmee, Lake Okeechobee, and Fort Myers. Then 
he wanted roads opened in that region. Casey insisted that during 
this period there must be many units moving about and scouting 
on the roads, in boats, and in the swamp. 
Meanwhile, all trade with the Seminoles must stop, especially 
that of gun powder. After 18 months of this form of blockade, 
Casey reasoned that the Indians would be low on powder. That was 
the time, he suggested, to send surveyors into the heart of their 
land - the Big Cypress Swamp. This would probably lead to a 
violent reaction on the part of the red man, but so what? With little 
or no powder, the conflict should be short and one-sided.9 
Secretary of War Jefferson Davis accepted Casey's plan. (It's 
possible that Davis had his own reasons for accepting the plan. He 
was known to favor expanding the control of the United States into 
the West Indies to secure more slave-holding states for the country 
and, if so, south Florida, well settled with slave owners, would have 
been a good jumping-off place.) For whatever reasons, the plan 
was approved and, by the end of the year, reconnaissance groups 
were sent out into Indian territory. 
Lieutenant George L. Hartsuff, 2nd Artillery, was appointed a 
topographical engineer on 22 January 1855 and was assigned to 
lead a survey party in the vicinity of Big Cypress Swamp in the 
Everglades. Colonel Harvey Brown requested that Hartsuff gather 
detailed information which would be used by later groups sent out 
to cut roads and build forts in the region. The lieutenant was in-
structed to note the value of the land and its capability of support-
ing a civilized population. 
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W. Gunnison of the Topographical Engineers, and Lieutenant 
George Hartsuff, while working for the Topographical Corps in 
1855.15 
Although the engineering functions were divided between the 
two corps so that the topographical engineers did most of the sur-
veying, there was still much work for the Corps of Engineers, now 
concerned almost exclusively with military fortifications. The inter-
national situation seemed to Americans to demand strong de-
fenses. The 1830's and 1840's were turbulent years in the life of 
the country. The Indian War in Florida did not hold center stage in 
the national news. 
In 1836, the Texans were struggling for their independence 
from Mexico. After the Lone Star Republic was established, there 
were Texans interested in joining the United States, but, when 
President Jackson refused this overture, some of them began to 
court England. Whether this was done sincerely or just to prod the 
United States, it nevertheless posed the threat of having England 
encircle the country. 
Then the Pastry War (Guerra de los Pasteles) broke out in 
1838 between Mexico and France. The French Minister asked for 
his papers on 20 Apri11838. Before the month was out the French 
fleet arrived in the Gulf of Mexico to blockade the Mexicans. A small 
number of French troops landed and remained in the country for 2 
weeks.16 lt was a_minor international incident, but it demonstrated 
to the Americans the ease with which foreign navies could sail into 
the Gulf of Mexico where the southern states and the Mississippi 
River lay unprotected. 
James ~· Polk was elected to the Presidency in the fall of 
1844. His term of office, 1845-49, is considered one of the more 
active periods in the expression of American manifest destiny. 
During Polk's tenure, the nation confronted Great Britain over the 
Oregon question, and engaged Mexico in a war which added 
present-day New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, and California to 
the United States. The nation was expanding westward, and the 
Corps of Engineers had to create the fortifications necessary to 
protect the southern flank. On the Florida peninsula, this resulted 
in Fort Clinch on Amelia Island in the northeast, and Forts Jeffer-
son and Taylor in the south. On the western panhandle Fort Pick-
ens in Pensacola Bay was already standing guard. During the first 
months of 1849, Polk's last year in office, a board of engineers, 
with Captain Robert E. Lee as recorder, examined the general sys-
tem of defense along the Florida coast.t7 
In the fall of 1844 Captain John G. Barnard, Corps of Engi-
neers, was sent to the Florida Keys to survey sites for the proposed 
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Bricks were another item often in short supply. Dutton's 
prime contractors were in Mobile and Pensacola and he used New 
York and New Orleans as secondary suppliers. When Captain 
Scarritt arrived to assume command, Dutton was in the midst of 
one of his periodic shortages. He had no bricks for the masons to 
turn the arches in the first tier. 
Most of his artisans and mechanics were recent immigrants 
from Ireland and Germany. Captain Dutton employed a New York 
agency to keep recruiting these newly arrived craftsmen, none of 
whom were acclimated to the climate at Key West. Of course, New 
York was not the only entrepot for laborers. In 1856, Major John 
Sanders signed an agreement with Baker and Stetson of Philadel-
phia to transport 1 00 passengers for the Corps to Key West. The 
steamship Henry B. Beach was to have berthing spaces, erected 
between decks forward of the engine room, for 70 laborers after 
the regular ship's stateroom lodgings were exhausted. The ship-
ping agents stipulated that extra tables would be built, and a "privy 
placed on the side of the ship for the accommodations of the for-
ward passengers."1s 
William Land of Key West agreed to board Captain Dutton's 
workmen at the following rates: mechanics at $14 per month, la-
borers at $12 per month, and slaves or black laborers at $7 per 
month. Dutton had to furnish fixtures for all quarters and provide 
fuel.19 
Most of the backbreaking tasks were accomplished by local 
slaves, rented to the Government by their owners, and by a few free 
blacks. In 1845 John Saville, a free black living in Key West, ap-
pointed Benjamin Sawyer, a Key West merchant, his guardian for 
1 year so that he might be employed on the works at Fort Taylor.20 
Two years later, L. D. Rogers of Key West gave written permission 
for his slave Hector to work for the Corps of Engineers as a carpen-
ter.21 These are just two examples of some of the business forms 
used when employing laborers. 
Stephen R. Mallory, who became Secretary of the Navy in the 
Confederate States of America, was quite involved in supplying 
slaves for the Fort Taylor project. In 1848 he complained to Cap-
tain Dutton that one of the white men working for the Corps had 
physically assaulted his slave Mat, while Mat was on the job. The 
assailant was not in a position of authority over Mat, and Mallory 
accepted Mat's account of the affair because, "I have owned him 
about fifteen years and have never had occasion to lay my hand 
upon him."22 Three years later, Mallory transferred 14 slaves to 
Fernando J. Moreno who was to act as their agent in dealings with 
the Corps. Mallory had given the blacks to his wife Angela, and 
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Lieutenant Hunt sought near and far for good laborers, but his 
search for slave labor away from Key West brought a complaint 
from Florida Senator Stephen R. Mallory. The senator objected to 
the Lieutenant hiring slaves from the mainland and voiced his ob-
jection to the Secretary of War. Actually at fault were the slave 
owners of Key West, including the senator, who were preying upon 
the local labor shortage to raise their rates above what Lieutenant 
Hunt was willing to pay. But, the senator's influence soon was felt 
and Hunt was told to give preference to the local labor market. 
Two years under Hunt brought exceptional results in the erec-
tion of Fort Taylor. The second tier of the seaward curtains was 
completed, the soldier's quarters roofed, the parapet in place 
around the fort, and many lesser works finished. While it was far 
from complete, enough had been done to garrison Fort Taylor if 
an emergency arose, and war clouds were gathering over the 
United States.25 
Although both the sites ofF ort Taylor and Fort Jefferson were 
selected by Captain Bernard in 1844, a later time schedule for 
construction was set for Fort Jefferson on Tortugas. Chief Engi-
neer Totten selected Lieutenant Montgomery C. Meigs to draw up 
the plans for Fort Jefferson, which was to be a major military edi-
fice among the nation's defensive fortifications. It was to be a six-
sided, three-tiered, fort, mounting 250 guns and housing a war-
time complement of 1 ,500 men. 
Fort Jefferson, the 
largest masonry fort 
ever built in the United 
States, as sketched by a 
member of the garrison 
in 1860. This drawing 
appeared in Harper's 
Weekly on February 23, 
1861. 
Courtesy National 
Archives. 
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On 5 September 1853 Lieutenant Wright reported the contin-
ued subsidence of his table. General Totten sent a lengthy reply 
describing how to convert the pier foundation t~ a grill~ge b~seP 
When Wright's job was completed, Captain Dame! Phmeas 
Woodbury relieved him to erect the walls of the fort. This nev: sta~e 
of construction called for the erection of 50-foot walls, which In-
cluded hundreds of gunrooms with numerous brick arches. Cap-
tain Woodbury was an authority on the arch. He had published an 
engineering treatise, Sustaining Walls, in 1845, which had a sec-
ond edition in 1854. When he arrived on Garden Key, his second 
manuscript, Elements of Stability in the Well-ProportionedArch, 
was at the publishers.2s 
Captain Woodbury was succeeded in 1860 by Captain Mont-
gomery Meigs, who had originally laid out the plans for Fort Jeffer-
son. In the fall of 1860, Meigs, while stationed in Washington, D.C., 
had disagreements with several contractors over their contracts. 
Secretary of War John B. Floyd, more vulnerable to pressures of 
this nature than the captain, banished Meigs to T ortugas. When 
Floyd resigned shortly thereafter, Meigs was ~ecalled fr~m exile to 
return to his work on the aqueduct at Washmgton. Meigs served 
during most of the Civil War as the Quartermaster-General of the 
Army where he amassed an enviable record.29 
The war may have disrupted the building program of Fort 
Jefferson but it did not retard the subsidence. By 20 July 1863, 
headquarters ordered extensive experimental boring and piledriv-
ing to be undertaken on nearby Bird Key to locate once and for all, 
the elusive bedrock. 
The task was begun 24 February 1864 by First Lieutenant 
A. H. Holgate. His completion report of 3 May 1864 must have 
been an eye-opener. 'There is no solid rock within t?irty feet o~ t~e 
surface of the island, and in all probability there IS none w1thm 
reach of the longest pile we could procure." Holgate found that the 
top layer of sand, down about 18 feet, was firmer than the lower 
stratum. He noted that the water channels which criss-crossed the 
T ortugas shoal, or bank, varied in depth from 40 to 80 feet and he 
concluded that "it may not be unreasonable to suppose, therefore, 
that we must penetrate at least to this depth before reaching any-
thing like solid rock." The lieutenant continued: 'The patches of 
rock visible at the waters edge on East Key, Loggerhead and else-
where, and which formerly gave support to an underlying rock are 
pretty well proved to be a mere concretion - sand, shells and cor~! 
hardened by the action of the waves." F ortJefferson was a castle m 
the sand.30 
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CHAPTER4 
War and Defense 
THE REMAINING DECADES of the nineteenth century were brack-
eted by the Civil War from 1861 to 1865, and the Spanish-
American War of 1898. These two conflicts brought dramatic 
changes to the engineer's concept of military defense. The former 
war saw the demise of brick and mortar harbor fortifications em-
ploying smooth-bore guns, while the latter introduced high-
powered rifled guns and electrical mine fields to defend the 
nation's ports. Both the old and new military installations were to 
be found in Florida. 
When the Civil War broke out, there were four Federal forts in 
the south still in Union hands; Sumter in South Carolina, and Pick-
ens, Jefferson, and Taylor, all in Florida. Fort Sumter, where the 
opening shot of the war took place, fell after substantial bombard-
ment. Pickens resisted several assaults and remained under 
Northern control throughout the war. Neither Jefferson nor Taylor 
were threatened. All three Florida forts remained in the hands of 
the Federal Government. 
Similar to the Second Seminole War, the Civil War in Florida 
did not provide the Corps of Engineers with an opportunity to un-
dertake engineering projects of any note as a part of the war effort. 
Yet, once again, engineer officers served during the war in various 
military capacities. The actual fighting in Florida was minor. Only 
the engagement at Olustee can be properly called a battle. Still, 
actions in Florida were part of the overall conduct of the war. A brief 
overview will suffice to place the proper perspective upon Florida's 
role in the conflict. 
Even before the Florida legislature signed the Ordinance of 
Secession on 10 January 1861, Governor Madison S. Perry had 
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)f Baldwin, some 20 miles 
to the west. In September, fatigue parties deepened the ditches 
around Jacksonville to 12-foot depths and erected palisades in 
them. Their labor also included clearing away the timber near the 
works to provide clear fields for observation. 
The engineers repaired the docks at Magnolia, south of Jack-
sonville, during the month of July, in anticipation of an advance 
post being established there. Troops occupied Magnolia in August 
while the engineers were busy building a temporary fort. Septem-
ber was spent placing entrenchments around the Magnolia post. 
Then, on 4 November, Magnolia was evacuated and the fort de-
stroyed. 
In March 1865, the engineers erected a large blockhouse on 
the St. Augustine Road, 13 miles from Jacksonville, for the safety 
and security of couriers traveling between the two towns. Major 
Charles R. Suter's terse report on the Florida engineers recorded 
Military map of 
Jacksonville, 1865. 
Courtesy National 
Archives. 
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iertaking. Eventually, the 
group recruited by Daniels became the United States Second Flor-
ida Cavalry (Union), made up of Florida men loyal to the North. 
The Navy blockaders also had established contact with disaf-
fected bands of Floridians hiding out in the swamps on the west 
coast of Florida around the F enholloway River. The Sailors were 
providing these groups with arms and necessary supplies. On sev-
eral occasions the blockaders joined forces with the Floridians to 
strike at railroad bridges, disrupting Confederate communica-
tions.2 
General Woodbury decided to recruit these men for his Sec-
ond Florida Cavalry. In March 1864, he sent four of his refugee 
soldiers to the USS Tahoma which was on blockade duty off the 
coast and in communication with the disaffected bands. A week 
later Woodbury visited the Tahoma. The Naval officers took the 
general and his party ashore to talk with the Floridians. Woodbury 
spent 2 days at the refugees' camp in Confederate Florida, laying 
the groundwork for these men to enlist in the Union forces. Wood-
bury was successful, and the following month, many of these men 
shipped over for his refugee unit.3 
The Second Florida Cavalry operated along the west coast of 
the state, engaging in many minor skirmishes, all of which added 
to the burden of defense for the Confederacy. Unfortunately for 
General Woodbury, shortly after his refugee unit was formed, he 
contracted yellow fever and died at Key West on 15 August 1864.4 
His command was taken over by another engineer, Brigadier Gen-
eral John Newton. 
The last major skirmish executed in Florida was the work of 
General Newton and Rear Admiral C. R. Stribling (who had be-
come commander of the East Gulf Blockading Squadron).lt was a 
joint operation, involving 16 ships and about a thousand troops. 
The soliders were to land near St. Marks' lighthouse and move 
inland to Newport. The Navy was to steam up the St. Marks River to 
disembark 600 sailors at Old Port Leon to protect the Army's left 
flank. The ultimate objective was the capital at Tallahassee, but, 
between the planning and the execution, many things went wrong. 
Fog delayed troop landings after the advanced parties had been 
sent ashore. The Navy vessels grounded before reaching their ob-
jective, and the Florida forces waiting for the Union troops at Natu-
ral Bridge were able to stop General Newton's advance. Thus, in 
the last days of the war, Floridians celebrated the victory of the 
Battle of Natural Bridge, but, before a month had passed, General 
Robert E. Lee surrendered and the Civil War ended.5 
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By 1867, the number of prisoners at Fort Jefferson was less 
than fifty. Four companies of the 5th Artillery were all that was left. 
The hurricane of 187 4 was the final blow; the troops were with-
drawn. The fort's commandant wrote, 'There is not the slightest 
probability in my opinion of this fortification being completed 
within the next fifty years."a Yet, the engineer force continued to 
clean up after the havoc created by the hurricane. 
The end of Fort Jefferson, as a mighty brick and mortar fort 
important in the military world of static defense, came at the hands 
of the man who had created it. Old George Phillips, the master ma-
son who had come ashore on a sandy key 37 years before with 
Lieutenant Horatio Wright to commence work, returned to Fort Jef-
ferson in 1883 to pack up the last of the still usable engineering 
equipment. 
But, the problem of determining the proper defense against 
the improved weaponry remained. In the same year that George 
Phillips closed Fort Jefferson, President Chester A. Arthur initiated a 
modest but widespread military reform throughout the nation's 
armed services. In his annual message, President Arthur outlined 
what became the first stirrings of this reform.9 
The nation's military leaders were seeking answers to the 
changing technology. General Emory Upton had completed his 
seminal manuscript 'The Military Policy of the United States" in 
1880. Although it was not formally published until 1904, it was 
widely circulated among the military planners. Captain Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, USN, published his most influential book, The Influ-
ence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, in 1890. Bracketed 
by these two stellar military and naval critiques, based upon the 
study of history, was the report of the Endicott Board, which the 
Cleveland administration had set up as a continuation of the military 
reforms of the Arthur presidency. 
In 1886, the Endicott Board called for sweeping changes to 
defend the nation's shores: hundreds of batteries of both heavy and 
light ordnance to be installed; searchlights set up to illuminate har-
bors; an elaborate plan for mining restricted waterways ordered; and 
the building of torpedo boats to defeat the enemy's attempt to clear 
out mine fields. Of course, the Board realized that it was neither 
feasible nor practicable to completely defend the whole coast, but it 
did list 11 crucial ports and bays, none of them in Florida.1o 
On 29 March 1887, the Corps was instructed to prepare plans 
for the defense of the 11 ports and bays. By 30 June 1894, the task 
had been completed and new locations were added to the list, in-
cluding Key West. These military projects settled upon artillery and 
mines for protection, under the maxim that "Heavy batteries and 
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and a fort keeper. Fort Jefferson was under the Marine Hospital 
SeiVice as a quarantine station. The woodwork was decayed in both 
installations. In conclusion, Colonel Benyaurd said, "Large sums 
could be expended on both advantageously."I4 
Some money was forthcoming from Congress for defense, 
and with these funds Fort Taylor was cut down to one tier to lower its 
profile and to strengthen its structure so that it might accommodate 
the new 12-inch disappearing guns. The south curtain was filled in 
with concrete. Into the concrete were dumped the old columbiads, 
howitzers, and parrott rifles of the 1860's. The offensive weapons of 
another age were now strength supports for the new-age defense. 
Just as the physical objects of war were changing roles, so too 
the tenor of American military thought was in a state of transition at 
the time of the Spanish-American War. This conflict projected the 
United States onto the world stage as a major power. The war itself 
was a brief, minor affair more noted in American circles for the 
inadequacies it pointed up in the military organization. The Quarter-
master Corps, which had charge of all Army procurement, as well as 
the construction of camps and posts, was subject to the most criti-
cism. The Corps of Engineers had military responsibility for building 
forts and gun emplacements at home, and laying out entrench-
ments, military roads, and bridges in the field. Of all the branches of 
the Army, the Corps of Engineers was least criticized for its role in 
the Spanish-American War. 
Captain Charles H. McKinstry assumed command of the new 
Key West District 1 February 1898, just 2 weeks before the sinking 
of the United States battleship Maine in Havana Harbor. When the 
USS Nashville brought a captured Spanish merchantman into Key 
West, McKinstry wired the Chief Engineer for permission to plant his 
defensive mine fields, to protect the nation's southernmost harbor 
from possible Spanish attack. 
McKinstry soon discovered that his mines were defective, but 
he continued using them because "There was reason to apprehend 
that an attack on the place if made at all would be made at once .... It 
was therefore determined to proceed with the planting, relying on 
'moral [sic] effect to prevent an attack, and on judgement firing if an 
attack should be made."Is 
All along the seaboard, the citizenry was alarmed at the pros-
pect of war, fearing a naval attack. Insistent demands were sent to 
Washington for protection. Nowhere were the demands more insis-
tent than in Florida. Before the war ended, the mouth of the St. 
Johns River, St. Augustine, Miami, and Tampa Bay, as well as Key 
West, had temporary batteries constructed or under construction, 
and mines were planted in the St. Johns, Miami, and Key West wa-
ters. 
65 

:LEGRAPH CO. 
~er. 
Check 
._ ____ _ 
hie orders on 2 April 1898 
ries to defend Miami and, 2 
e. Colonel Benyaurd com-
l the weapons planned for 
:ll encouragement."J6 
:mth of the St. Johns River. 
privately owned land was 
:nent. Construction began 
ordnance arrived, the site 
>reech loading rifles and 7-
January 1899, two 8-inch 
by then the war was over. 
1d received their concrete 
:ts rapidly. Its sites were on 
Finally, the engineers had 
:tilroad to borrow one of its 
tyne Bay. The sand was 
inly not a strong or perma-
ber 1898, and the battery 
l,JB 
em because it was the ma-
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town, served by a single track railroad, added immeasurably to the 
confusion. Money became plentiful for defense, but the engineers 
were competing with the other branches of the Army for the limited 
railroad space, warehouse construction, laborers, and all of the 
other requirements needed to wage a war or defend a state. On 19 
April 1898, Colonel Benyaurd was ordered to give all of his tasks to 
subordinates, move to Tampa, and take personal charge of the situ-
ation there. 
Tampa was a boom town. The local labor market had been 
drawn off for other works. Benyaurd had to recruit men from Jack-
sonville, Mobile, and New Orleans. In spite of ample funds, outside 
labor, and much pressure from the Chief Engineer, Benyaurd re-
ported that no work on the construction of the batteries had been 
made by the end of 1898 because needed material had not arrived, 
due to the congestion of the railroad facilities at Tampa. The con-
centration of troops and Army supplies destined for the embarka-
tion of the expedition to Cuba, swamped the limited storage and 
transportation systems in the area. The colonel complained that "it 
was in some cases impossible to get material for two weeks after its 
arrival in Tampa."J9 Local military defensive needs were submerged 
beneath the avalanche of preparations for the overseas endeavor. · 
The work of the Corps of Engineers in Florida during the Span-
ish-American War was psychological, but the action of bringing 
guns to hurriedly constructed sites had a calming effect upon the 
civilians. For example, in Jacksonville, when the Florida Times Un-
ion and Citizen reported the arrival of the gun carriages and guns at 
the railway station, the news drew a number of people to the depot 
to view "the mighty machine(s)"20 
The Spanish-American War brought many inadequacies of 
the American Army to public notice. Secretary of War, Russell Alger 
left office under intense national criticism. In 1899, President McKin-
ley prevailed upon Elihu Root to become Secretary of War. Root was 
a New York corporation lawyer, not a military man, but he soon 
became well versed in the military institution he had been assigned 
to direct. He discovered it was creaky and moss-grown in organiza-
tion, thinking, and training. There was a need for reform, and Elihu 
Root took the lead. Under his guidance, a whole series of enact-
ments changed the Army: the creation of "the Army War College; a 
Chief of Staff and the general staff system; the replacement of the 
Militia Act of 1792 with the Dick Act of 1903, recognizing the Na-
tional Guard as the 'organized militia' and bringing it into a more 
effective relationship with the Regular Army; improved promotion 
and training systems; and an Army-Navy Joint Board, ancestor of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff."2J 
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CHAPTERS 
To The Sea 
FINDING THE SHIFTING CHANNEL through the bar at the mouth of the 
St. Johns River was at times as difficult as passing through the eye of 
a needle. The many St. Johns River improvement projects to allow 
navigation from Jacksonville to the ocean, were among the more 
complex and time-consuming undertakings of the Corps of Engi-
neers in Florida. It was because of these two attributes that, when the 
district office concept developed within the Corps, it was located in 
Jacksonville. 
The first man to seriously study the problem of the moving 
channel of the St. Johns was Dr. Abel Seymour Baldwin. Typical of 
that day, his profession resulted in his traveling up and down the 
valley of the St. Johns River by boat as well as by horseback. Dr. 
Baldwin became acquainted with the people living along the river. 
He also became familiar with the treacherousness of the St. Johns 
bar, which restricted access to the valley to small coastal vessels, 
thus limiting the growth of the town of Jacksonville and the region. 
Dr. Baldwin became fascinated by this problem of the shifting chan-
nel. Why didn't the river bed remain in one place? 
From 1850 to 1852, Dr. Baldwin studied the mouth of the St. 
Johns River. He held long conversations with people who knew the 
river from years of working on and living by the St. Johns. From all 
of this study, he concluded that the Fort George Inlet was the culprit 
Normally, the sediment, carried down a river by the current, fans out 
and settles when the river flows into the ocean where its current is 
diffused in the larger body of water. This is part of the creation of 
shoal waters about the mouth of a river. However, the main current 
from the river, continuing its force longer, has the effect of cutting 
through the shoal grounds, creating the channel of the river bed. 
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All of these phenomena added to the risks a merchantman 
encountered using the St. Johns River. Smaller ships, which were 
safe enough in draft, often were too light to be seaworthy in the 
Atlantic, especially during the fall hurricane season; large ocean ves-
sels might stand off the bar for days or weeks waiting to enter the 
river. Once over the bar, the route to Jacksonville was relatively easy. 
With added cargo, the ship might have to wait once again for 
enough water to exit the St. Johns. Jacksonville, as a seaport, was a 
poor competitor for Fernandina and Savannah, even though it drew 
upon the tremendous resources of the St. Johns valley. 
The early solution to the shifting channel, and the one pro-
moted by the people on Amelia Island, was to use the deep water 
harbor of F emandina. Small coastal steamers could steam from 
Jacksonville to Fernandina, by either the protected intracoastal wa-
terway or the outer oceanway, where the goods could be transferred 
to the large vessels for destination any place bordering the world's 
seas. This was not acceptable, however, to the citizens of Jackson-
ville, who dreamed of opening the St. Johns River so that their own 
city might engage in world trade. 
Dr. Abel Baldwin presented his answer to the shifting channel 
of the St. Johns River to his fellow citizens in 1852: Close up the Fort 
George Inlet. Dr. Baldwin reasoned that the waters of Fort George 
River would then be added to those of the St. Johns. Two effects 
would result; the elimination of the cross-current over the shoal 
ground, and the strengthening of the main flow of the St. Johns 
River, which would aid in the creation and deepening of the cut 
across the shoal grounds. The logic of his observations resulted in 
the town voting to send Baldwin to Washington, D.C., to present his 
proposal before Congress to seek Federal aid. 
At first, everything went as planned. Florida representatives in 
the House presented the doctor's views to Congress, and they re-
ceived permission to have Dr. Baldwin explain his project to the 
engineers of the Topographical Bureau. The bureau accepted and 
approved the doctor's plan with a recommendation to Congress to 
appropriate money so that it might carry out the plan. Congress 
provided the funds in two separate bills of $10,000 each. 
Unfortunately for Dr. Baldwin, Congress failed to pass a bill for 
fortifications that session; therefore, the funds appropriated in the 
Ughthouse Bill and River and Harbor Bill were divided between the 
Corps of Engineers and the Topographical Corps. This resulted in 
works on the Atlantic being assigned to the Corps of Engineers, 
while the Topographical Corps received projects on the Great Lakes 
and western rivers. Dr. Baldwin had to start over again with the 
Corps of Engineers. 
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The formal hearing did not end Dr. Baldwin's fight with the 
Corps. In 1857, he obtained another examination of the mouth and 
bar of the St. Johns, this time under the direction of Ueutenant 
Stephen D. Trenchard, USN, who was serving with the Coast Survey 
service. Dr. Baldwin was delighted with the results. A comparison of 
the 1853 and 1857 charts showed great changes in the underwater 
topography which convinced the doctor that his assumptions had 
been justified.6 But, once again, Dr. Baldwin's goal was thwarted, 
this time by the outbreak of a major conflict- the Civil War. 
After the war, Dr. Baldwin became a member of the Jackson-
ville Board ofT rade, which was formed in 186 7. The following year 
he headed the board's Bar Improvements Committee and, in that 
capacity, he was back in Washington seeking funds from Con-
gress.? His plea resulted in General Gillmore ordering several more 
surveys during 1868 and 1869. The results were no different than 
earlier reports submitted by the Corps in rejecting Baldwin's views. 
Colonel William Ludlow, in charge of the latest investigations of 
the St. Johns, wrote the doctor that Gillmore had discussed with 
him the many plans proposed for improving the St. Johns Bar. 
Gillmore had considered straightening the river channel above the 
bar to increase the scouring action; constructing piers for the same 
reason; Dr. Baldwin's plan of closing Fort George Inlet; and, finally, 
raking or dredging of the bar itself. This last plan was most agreea-
ble to Gillmore. a 
After more thought, General Gillmore submitted his plan to the 
Chief of Engineers, suggesting the channel be deepened, "by re-
peated dredgings or rakings during the strongest stage of the ebb 
current, promising, as it does, at least a fair measure of success at 
compartively small cost." Along with his letter, Gillmore forwarded a 
communication from Charles H. Campbell of New York, who had 
been engaged in towing on the St. Johns bar, offering to dredge and 
keep the depth at 15 feet for $10,000 per year. Brigadier General A. 
A. Humphreys endorsed Gillmore's letter, approving the operation 
after stressing that it was a "purely experimental" program which 
could not be a permanent solution.9 
Dr. Baldwin would have worn a smug smile of satisfaction if he 
had read Gillmore's follow-up report on the dredging operations. 
The contract, which had been issued on 19 October 1870 "for 
dredging, raking or otherwise," was cancelled on 22 May 1871 be-
cause of lack of success.10 In fact, the failure was so complete that 
Gillmore made no payment on the contract. 
Gen~ral Gillmore was at the end of his resources. He had no 
confidence in the practicality of jetties, he did not accept Dr. 
Baldwin's proposal, and his own scheme of raking or dredging had 
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As General Gillmore described the Henry Burden 's opera-
tions, the steamer would travel outside the bar with its suction pipes 
raised. Then, it would turn, lower the pipes, and steam in slowly to 
the bar. As soon as it reached the outer edge of the bar, the pumps 
would be turned on, the speed reduced to barely maintain steerage-
way, and the Burden would cross the bar sucking up sand and 
water. Once over the bar, the pumps would be stopped, the pipes 
raised, and the dredge turned to begin its outwardbound run. The 
process of lowering the suction pipes, reducing speed, and dredg-
ing the bar would be repeated on the outgoing track. These two runs 
would be sufficient to fill the Burden's storage bins. During the outer 
turnaround, the side gates to the bins were opened, the pipes raised 
off bottom, the pump run of full speed drawing in clear water, and 
the storage areas flushed out. It took the Henry Burden 6 minutes 
to turn at the completion of each run.B Very little time was lost dur-
ing the dredging operations. 
During 1871-72, Gillmore's Henry Burden removed almost 
48,000 cubic yards, cutting a channel 15 feet deep at high tide. But, 
the storms which lashed the mouth of the St. Johns during the 
winter of 1873-7 4 deposited more sand than the Henry Burden 
could handle. Each time the channel was dredged, another storm 
would fill it up. Gillmore became discouraged. He wrote: "The natu-
ral and proper port for the shipment of all freight arriving in east 
Florida, is Fernandina, and the inside passage should be en-
larged .... I doubt the wisdom of expending any more money upon 
the bar at the mouth of the St. Johns River." 14 When the appropria-
tions ran out, the Henry Burden was retired from service on the St. 
J ohns and the water over the bar was soon a mere 6 feet. 
The problem with the St. Johns River bar was a hindrance to 
the economic growth of the whole region. Not only did the shallow 
bar keep out or delay deep draft vessels from using the port of Jack-
sonville, but the sinuous channel caused groundings and ship-
wrecks which drew scavengers, undesirable elements of society, to 
the river's mouth. From 1850 to 1868, excluding the war years, 
there were fwe sailing ships and two steamers lost while attempting 
to cross the bar.15 In addition to those seven major disasters, there 
were innumerable minor mishaps due to piloting errors. 
Two ships, the brigs Neva and John, both had their cargos 
rifled by crewmen of ships inside the bar and by the local residents 
living near the bar, when they grounded after missing the channel. 
The result of these and similar events was an increase in insurance 
General Quincy Adams 
Gillmore's Henry 
Burden. 
Courtesy Corps of 
Engineers. 
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on the mouth of the Mississippi, came to Jacksonville, studied the 
bar, and presented his proposal to the townsmen. He said two con-
verging jetties should be built which would create a stable 20-foot 
deep channel out to sea. The price was high, an estimated $1 .7 
million. Still, Captain Eads felt it was a small cost to open Jackson-
ville up to the world, and influential Jacksonvillians agreed. Con-
gress was besieged with pleas from the city.19 
General Gillmore, in New York City, felt the pressure. He sent 
Assistant Engineer George Daubeney to the St. Johns for yet an-
other survey. Daubeney came up with a plan similar to the one Eads 
had suggested. Gillmore, accepting his engineer's proposal, drew 
up plans for permanently fiXing and deepening the treacherous, elu-
sive channel. Gillmore favored a low or submerged jetty rather than 
the high one proposed by Eads. Of the two jetties, the northern one 
was to be the longest, 9,400 feet, while the southern would be 6,800 
feet in length. Gillmore felt that if all of the river's waters were trapped 
and channeled through the jetties, the force of the current would be 
too great, and would result in excessive scouring of the bed. He 
designed the jetties so that from the shore out they would be sub-
merged, with the last 2,000 feet being built up to one-half tide level. 
This design, with the early sections being submerged, would allow 
the waters rushing out during ebb flow to spill over the jetties, reduc-
ing both the velocity and volume of water contained to scour the cut. 
Gillmore assumed this method would result in a channel of 15 feet 
at mean low water. Congress adopted his plan on 30 June 1879 
with an appropriation of $125,000 being funded in 1880.20 
When work started on the jetties, Lieutenant Walter L. Fisk was 
assigned as officer in charge of the St. Johns River project. On 1 0 
November 1880, he opened an office at Fort George. This office 
was the beginning of a resident engineer in the Jacksonville area, 
and, while not yet the Jacksonville District, the needs of Florida were 
better served from this time on. 
Army engineer office at 
Mayport during St. 
John s River j etty 
construction in 1900 . 
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Still, there were continual problems cropping up to vex Lieu-
tenant Fisk and his successors. Mr. Ross related: "A very annoying 
circumstance arose about 1885, when an individual stopped our 
work by an injunction, claiming that he had a patent on the log 
mattress that we were using. Fortunately, sometime previously I had 
thought out a design of mattress, composed of fascines of brush 
and other small growth, that might answer the purpose just as well 
as the logs, and save a great deal in the cost. The opportunity to test 
it out was now at hand, and shortly afterward we laid the first fascine 
mattress foundations. It proved a perfect success, and from that 
time the Government used the design in all foundations thereafter, 
and the plan is now in universal use wherever jetties are built on sand 
or mud base."23 
One unexpected result of the south jetty was to route some 
water around the south or outer side with enough velocity to scour 
the sand from under the foundations. Lieutenant Fisk had to con-
struct several spur jetties perpendicular to the south pier to correct 
this fault. Then, very serious erosion took place on the south jetty 
because, at times during the ebb flow, the river water was so much 
higher than the Atlantic waters that the river flowed over the jetty with 
enough velocity to carry away part of the bottom sand next to the 
foundation. Fisk solved this by raising the jetty height. 
Captain James C. Post. Lieutenant Fisk's successor, was con-
fronted with a new problem. The extra weight added to the jetty 
caused appreciable settling of the foundations. In some places the 
structure dropped 15 feet. In one night a section sank 6 feet.24 And, 
so it seemed to go for the resident engineers. 
The early rock hauled in for the jetties consisted of huge blocks 
of granite shipped from New York in seagoing barges. Sometimes 
these carriers would arrive during storms, which called for the ut-
most in seamanship and engineering skills to properly dump the 
stone in its proper place. Florida limestone was not as heavy as the 
New York product, but, when some of it was used it was found to be 
superior. The marine life had an affinity for the local stone, growing 
rapidly over the structure, cementing the blocks together naturally. 
Eventually, only local limestone was used in the jetty.25 
Mr. Ross recalled another innovation during the jetty work: "At 
this stage of construction, Captain W. M. Black, engineer in charge 
of the work at that time, devised a plan of two ridges of stone with a 
space between, built up to the level of low water. The space between 
the ridges was then filled in with oyster shell and a layer of stone 
placed on top. The shell made a solid hearting when covered over 
with stone; being mixed with Florida limestone, they both found 
their n?Itural element in the ocean where shellfish had something to 
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cling to, thus cementing the whole into a solid breakwater below the 
low water level. The oyster shell hearting was used only where the 
water was deep and still. This kind of construction has proven satis-
factory."26 
Concrete blocks of 6 to 1 0 tons were also used in place of rock. 
In 1887, when the coast was lashed by a particularly severe gale, 
Ueutenant William M. Black found that some of the 1 0-ton blocks 
had been moved a mile or so out to sea. Of course, this was an 
unusual storm, but it certainly demonstrated the energy in nature, 
and if man intended to compete, he would have to work on a similar 
scale. In the contract written in 1891 , District Engineer Black in-
sisted that the stone topping must consist of a minimum of 1-ton 
stone with 50 percent of the stones used being over 4 tons in weight. 
When the work was completed, marine life had cemented the jetties 
together so that there was, in effect, two huge single obstructions 
jutting out to sea from the mouth of the St. Johns River.27 
To add to the construction problems, Congress was erratic in 
appropriating money for the project. The original plan called for 
$1.7 million, and in 1884 the Jacksonville interests had petitioned 
for $.6 million. Both sums were on a grand scale compared to ac-
tual allotments. 
1880 Congress granted ........ $125,000 
1881 Congress granted ........ $100,000 
1882 Congress granted ........ $150,000 
1884 Congress granted ........ $150,000 
1886 Congress granted ........ $150,000 
The result of this piecemeal funding was to have the engineers 
operate from hand-to-mouth. Often, while waiting for more money, 
the scouring actions would do so much damage that a major por-
tion of the next appropriation would be spent repairing damage. By 
the time the corrections were effective, the project's funds would be 
low again. 
Colonel Gillmore wrote in 1883 that "The work of improving 
the mouth of the St. Johns River has been for sometime past, and is 
still, in a critical condition. Ample means should be furnished to 
proceed with the work, and to protect it thoroughly."28 Two years 
later Captain Rossell stated: "During the progress of the work, from 
its commencement on 14 December 1880, up to the present time it 
has been idle, through lack of money, for more than a year. The 
damage caused by these delays has materially increased the cost of 
the work,"29 Again, in 1887, Captain Black complained of the dan-
gers of inadequate funding.3o 
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Dames Point were especially hard hit. St. Johns Bluff was set back 
several hundred feet within a period of 1 0 years. This latest problem 
called for building retaining walls and throwing up riprap (a sustain-
ing wall of stones put together without any formal order, as in deep 
water or on embankments to prevent erosion) at various places 
along the river bank. Chaining the St. Johns bar spread construction 
upriver.35 
The whole concept of opening Jacksonville to the sea became 
a growing notion which called for greater efforts to improve the port. 
By 1909, the Board of Trade wanted a 30-foot channel. Ships were 
growing in size; the 24-foot depth was not enough. According to 
business sources of the time, foreign ships could load comfortably 
to 27 feet. Therefore, many lines stopped off at nearby deep water 
ports to discharge part of their cargo to lighten the ship for a visit to 
Jacksonville. It seemed as if the region was always a bit behind in its 
efforts to be a first -class port. 
In 1910, work began on a 30-foot depth. Several dredges were 
employed. The dredging was not without its mishaps. The St. Johns 
was destroyed in an accident on the jetties on 5 August 1912. The 
stationary hydraulic dredge Jacksonville proved inadequate for the 
task, so it was traded for another dredge, the Major J. C. Mallory in 
1914. A privately owned dredge, the Atlantic, owned by the Standard 
American Dredging Company of Oakland, California, sank in 32 
feet of water on 31 August 1916. It was later raised, but not em-
ployed on the St. Johns River. The Key West, a hopper dredge, 
brought up to work the final portion of the 24-foot channel, re-
mained and turned to on the new project. When the task was com-
pleted in 1918, the Key West was still on the job. All the dredging 
work was accompanied by restraining walls or rip rap. 
Even routine maintenance had its occasional hazards. On 1 7 
September 1928, the pipeline dredge Welatka was working along 
the north jetty, dredging and dumping the material around the jetty, 
Fishing off the south 
jetty at the St. Johns 
River in about 1925; 
Note remains of old 
wreck at right o{jetty. 
Courtesy DeGroot. 
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U.S. Waterways Experiment Station of Vicksburg, Mississippi. Most 
of the problems were ironed out before actual construction. Work 
began on 10 July 1950 when the dredges Barlow and Philadel-
phia bit into the muck. More than 15 million cubic yards were re-
moved. By 3 August 1951 the cutoff dredging had been completed. 
The dike along the southside was in place by 24 October 1951, the 
34-foot channel from Mayport to Fulton was finished by December 
1951, and the final blasting to clean up was over by January 1952. 
Jacksonville had a shorter, deeper exit to the sea. 
The Fulton Cutoff created a large island in the St. Johns River, 
first known as Goat Island, then, later, named Blount Island. It be-
came a major industrial site for the city, offering excellent waterfront 
facilities for oceangoing vessels. By this time, the Jacksonville Port 
Authority was the city's agency responsible for harbor improve-
ment. The Port Authority traces its lineage through the Jacksonville 
Chamber of Commerce back to the early Board ofT rade, of which 
Dr. Baldwin was one of the prime movers. 
When Ribault Bay became the Mayport Naval Station, the 
Jacksonville District assisted the Navy in dredging out the carrier 
basin. Also, the bar channel had to be deepened to 42 feet to ac-
commodate the giant aircraft carriers. 
The Fulton Cutoff and 
Blount Island. 
Courtesy Corps of 
Engineers. 
85 

The mammoth aircraft carriers were but precursors of the 
monstrous commercial vessels being built for world trade. The 
River and Harbor Act of 27 October 1965 called for a 38-foot depth 
from the Atlantic to mile twenty, which is just beyond the Jackson-
ville Port Authority's Tallyrand Avenue docks. Everything proceeded 
according to plan until the contractors ran into limestone rock off St. 
Johns Bluff. When blasting began, there was an uproar from the 
residents on shore and from local fishermen. These two groups 
went to court to stop the use of explosives. Residents feared dam-
age to their private wells; fishermen feared destruction of marine life 
and their economic well-being. 
The district instructed its contractors to use smaller amounts 
of explosives in order to quiet the demands of the citizens, but this 
was not the answer. On 13 July 1972, Judge Charles E. Scott, U.S. 
District Court, issued a preliminary injunction order to the Jackson-
ville District to cease all blasting because the district had failed to 
comply with the Environmental Impact Statement, as required by 
the National Environmental Policy Act. 
In answer to Judge Scott, the district issued a report on 15 
August 1972 stating that the explosions brought only temporary 
distruption to aquatic life; within a reasonably short time the area 
Giant pieces of granite 
unloaded onto north 
jetty during 
maintenance under 
contract on May 11, 
1961 . 
Courtesy Florida 
Publishing Company. 
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Jacksonville's desire to reach the sea to engage in the ocean 
trade of the world has had great influence upon the Corps of Engi-
neers in Florida. These projects seem to be never-ending tasks as 
oceangoing commerce continues to use larger and larger carriers. 
Because the taming of the St. Johns River channel and bar was 
such a complex, long-term affair, the Corps established a resident 
engineer office to supervise the river projects. This office became 
the Jacksonville District. Had any other region of Florida had a simi-
lar program at an earlier time, that region might have been the site of 
the peninsula's district office. Jacksonville's call "to the sea" was the 
reason for the creation of the Jacksonville District. 
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THE CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN FLORIDA PROJECT is the largest 
civil undertaking of the Jacksonville District. The region encom-
passes most of the 18 southern counties covering some 16,000 
square miles. Lake Okeechobee is the heart of this project, but the 
area extends northward up the Kissimmee River and includes the 
upper St. Johns River Basin, westward following the Caloosahat-
chee River, an important artery to the Gulf of Mexico, and south-
ward along the Everglades, that river of saw grass, oozing in a 
broad arc from the shores of Lake Okeechobee to Florida Bay and 
the Gulf of Mexico. (The English surveyor, Charles Vignoles, 
named the saw grass area south of Lake Okeechobee the "Ever-
glades" in his Observations upon the Floridas published in 1823.) 
Initially, the promoters of south Florida felt it was just a simple 
matter of dredging a few canals from Lake Okeechobee to the At-
lantic or Gulf of Mexico to drain off excessive waters, leaving an 
immensely rich, fertile muckland for man to turn into a tropical cor-
nucopia. The tremendously delicate, centuries-old ecological 
balance which had been developed in nature was not understood, 
considered, or known by those early pioneers who envisioned tap-
ping this agricultural El Dorado. 
In south Aorida, after the area was drained, the soil subsided, 
causing new problems, and, as the fresh water supply was depleted, 
saltwater intrusion began. By June 197 4, the National Government 
had spent $206 million, while state and local interests added an-
other $38 million. Yet, it was estimated that to complete the project it 
would take an additional $497 million in Federal funds and $117 
million in local matching monies. I With hindsight, it is now clear that 
there was no simple solution. Still, it would be an anachronism to 
fault the early pioneers for errors only recently learned. 
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Mer Texas gained its independence from Mexico in 1836, it 
encouraged settlers from the southern states to its wide open plains. 
The Far West also was calling. In the spring of 1843, a caravan of 
over a thousand pioneers jammed the Oregon Trail. It was apparent 
to Florida's publicists that something must be done to divert some 
of these land seekers to south Florida, and one way to do that was to 
publicize the wealth and fertility of a drained Everglades. 
No sooner had the territory become the State of Florida in 
1845, than the legislature asked Congress to support a program of 
reclamation. A resolution on 1 0 December 1845 called upon the 
Federal Government to send competent engineers to investigate 
and to survey the Everglades to counteract the prevailing opinion 
that the watery, southern peninsula was valueless. 
Senator James D. Westcott, Jr., carried Florida's message to 
Washington where he enlisted the aid of Secretary of the Treasury, 
RobertJ. Walker. On 18June 1847, Walker appointed Buckingham 
Smith to gather "authentic information in relation to what are gener-
ally called the 'Everglades' on the peninsula of Florida."4 
The Buckingham Smith report included a vast amount of in-
formation gathered by the very men who had trekked through the 
glades during the Florida War. Smith went beyond the role of com-
piler; he actually entered the Everglades to see for himself the condi-
tions in south Florida. His conclusions were published as Senate 
Document No. 242 of the 30th Congress in 1848. On the whole, it 
was a favorable report, as indicated by his quote of Colonel Harney 
who predicted that the population would jump to "a hundred thou-
sand souls or more" within 5 years of any drainage.5 
Senator Westcott immediately introduced a bill to grant to 
Florida all lands south of the established survey, on condition that 
drainage projects, financed by the sale of public lands at $1.25 per 
acre, be commenced by 1851. It seemed assured of passage until 
Florida's other senator, David L. Yulee, opposed the measure. Yu-
lee, far more realistic, knew that the state was too poor to finance 
such a measure. He pressed for passage of another act whereby the 
state of Arkansas was to be granted swamp and overflowed lands 
unfit for cultivation. He believed that Florida could be included in a 
similar transfer of its swamp and overflowed lands. Yulee was cor-
rect; two years later, when the Swamp Land Act was passed, Florida 
acquired the Everglades, and the state benefited from the omission 
in this act of any specific date for the beginning of drainage. 
There were several early attempts at drainage of a local nature 
to open inlets to the sea, but these were not designed to reclaim 
submerged lands. During the Second Seminole War, old Fort Jupi-
ter was built on the southern shore of Jupiter River, 3 miles inland 
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It can readily be observed that the new state had much poten-
tial wealth, all of it tied up in land. In 1855 the Internal Improvement 
Fund was established to handle these public lands. Its task was to 
manage the state's domain and to apply the proceeds from the 
sales to internal improvements. 
In 1866, William H. Gleason entered into the first drainage pro-
ject agreement with the trustees on lands near the Everglades. Al-
most a decade later, Gleason submitted a claim for 3,840 acres. His 
action was based upon a small ditch, dug from Lake Worth to the 
Atlantic Ocean, which he alleged lowered the lake, thereby draining 
six sections of land. His work is now the Lake Worth Inlet and his 
labors changed the lake from a fresh-water body to a salt-water 
extension of the Atlantic Ocean. At the time of his claim, the trustees, 
who were in receivership, refused to accept his allegations. After a 
long court battle, the trustees were able to cancel his request for 
lands in 1879.a 
Four individuals approached the trustees in February 1869 
with an ambitious plan to reclaim land along the Caloosahatchee 
River, Lake Okeechobee, and Kissimmee River. Half of the lands 
drained would be turned over to the promoters, who were to com-
mence the following year and to complete their project within 7 
years. Nothing ever came of this agreement, but it established the 
pattern for later grants. 
The Corps of Engineers became involved in south Florida 
when Congress passed an act to survey the Caloosahatchee River. 
At that time, the west coast of Aorida was under the control of Cap-
tain Andrew N. Damrell, with headquarters at Mobile, Alabama. 
Damrell sent Assistant Engineer, J. L. Meigs, with a survey party to 
Fort Myers in March 1879 to carry out the congressional instruc-
tions. 
Fort Myers had a population of about 150 persons and a busi-
ness district consisting of four stores supplying goods and medi-
cines necessary for the sparse population of the Caloosahatchee 
valley. Contact with the outside world was maintained by several 
schooners plying between Fort Myers, Cedar Key, and Key West. 
The citizens of Fort Myers were interested in the survey being con-
ducted, and they expressed the hope that better drainage could be 
effected to render the valley safe and secure from its frequent floods. 
The previous year had been particularly difficult. The rains had been 
so heavy that the valley was submerged from 6 February to 1 De-
cember 1878. Many of the settlers living on the rich, hummock 
lands bordering the river, had been driven off by high waters. These 
hardy pioneers were eager to volunteer their services to aid the engi-
neers. 
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Meigs decided that the waters of Lake Hicpochee were at the 
same level as Okeechobee because there was no perceptible cur-
rent; therefore, he started his line of levels from the south shore of 
Hicpochee. 
Meigs' line of levels followed the drovers' trail from Hicpochee 
to Fort Thompson, then to the old military road, which ran close to 
the dividing ridge south of the Caloosahatchee valley, on to Fort 
Myers. 'The results of the leveling are," according to Meigs, "inter-
esting as showing the elevation of Lake Okeechobee above tide 
water of the Gulf of Mexico, and as, perhaps, the beginning of engi-
neering operations that will one day protect the Kissimmee and 
Caloosahatchee Valleys from disastrous floods, and reclaim the 
very valuable Okeechobee Margin."ll 
At the conclusion of his report, Meigs noted that during periods 
of drought, the marsh became dry and it was possible to ride a horse 
in the river channel from Fort Thompson to Sugar Berry Hum-
mock. This would be the time to construct a river canal at least 40 
feet wide and 6 feet deep, and a similar canal to connect Hicpochee 
to Okeechobee. He estimated the cost to be $}48,978 to provide 
passage for vessels 40 feet long with 8-foot beams, from the Gulf of 
Mexico to Lake Okeechobee. 
The assistant engineer realized that neither the sparse popula-
tion nor the small trade of the region, warranted such an expendi-
ture but he stated that "the principal advantage, however, to be 
expected from this improvement would arise from the partial drain-
age of the wide margin of saw-grass marsh bordering the shore of 
the Upper Caloosahatchee and the Lower Kissimmee, and sur-
rounding Lakes Hicpochee and Okeechobee. The soil of these 
marshes is a rich black loam, 5 or 6 feet in depth and deemed by 
experts admirably adapted to the growth of sugar cane."12 
The Meigs report may have been the tocsin of the drainage 
mania which soon swept over the Okeechobee region. The 1880's 
were the haydays of the Robber Barons, when the moves and ma-
chinations of the financial wizards were adulated by the masses. 
Florida participated in this era of the nation's history as three ty-
coons battled and maneuvered for position within the state. Two of 
these men were railroad magnates; Henry Flagler building down the 
east coast and Henry Plant constructing along the west coast. The 
third, in the southern swamp lands, was Hamilton Disston, the drain-
age king. 
Hamilton Disston became president of Disston & Sons upon 
his father's death in 1878. He was a millionaire who became inter-
ested in land development in south Florida. In February 1881 , Dis-
ston entered into an agreement with the trustees of Florida's Internal 
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settlers sent many testaments concerning the benefits wrought by 
Disston engineers to the trustees in Tallahassee.16 
Former engineer for the Central and Southern Florida Flood 
Control District, Larmar Johnson, writing in 197 4, pointed out that 
"the limited rainfall records of the period indicate that 1881 to 1884 
was a dry cycle." He did not understand how the pioneers living in 
that region, so close to nature, could have been hoodwinked by 
Disston' s agents. Johnson felt that the Disston engineers soon real-
ized that their work was not the primary cause of the drop in water, 
as evidenced by their renewed attempts to enlarge the original ca-
nals which had been dug so hurriedly in the first years of the project. 
Nevertheless, the trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund agreed 
with Disston that over 2 million acres had been reclaimed. Accord-
ingly, they deeded land to the Disston Company.17 
A private survey, more serious than the Times-Democrat's, 
was the Ingraham Expedition of 1892, designed to cross the Big 
Cypress Swamp and the Everglades from the Gulf coast to Miami. 
Ostensibly, it was to investigate the possibility of a railroad from 
Tampa to Miami. The expedition left Fort Myers on 16 March and 
finally, after undreamed of hardships, emerged in Miami 7 April 
1892.18 
During this same period of the early 1880's, the Corps of Engi-
neers had been operating along the Caloosahatchee River, deepen-
ing the canal for navigation purposes. District Engineer, Captain 
William M. Black's annual report of 1887, reflected the changing 
attitude of the people of the Caloosahatchee valley. Citizens were 
now voicing fears that Disston's Atlantic and Gulf Coast Canal and 
Okeechobee Land Company's drainage ditches were carrying too 
much water from Lake Okeechobee down their river, flooding their 
cultivated lands. The valley people were alarmed over the navigation 
work of the Corps in deepening the channel. They believed that it 
might add to the drainage flow. They requested that the United 
States discontinue improvements to the Caloosahatchee until it was 
certain that this would not increase the danger of flooding.19 
However, before this attitude of the pioneers had a chance to 
tum against drainage, the Disston project ceased. Disston's empire 
was dealt two crippling blows in the 1890's; first the financial depres-
sion of 1893 occurred, and second, his untimely death in 1896. 
Disston heirs were not interested in his south Florida plans and the 
drainage program withered. 
When Napoleon Bonaparte Broward ran for governor in 1904, 
one of his most potent campaign oratory themes was directed to-
ward draining the Everglades. He argued that all that was needed 
99 

d let a body of water obey 
;ea." At emotional times 
.oud voice: "Water will run 
attained the governership 
:my off the swamp waters 
Jstees to build two dipper 
tes, to commence work. 
~r in 1906. The Governor 
tch the Everglades move 
:utting a canal as it went. 
) follow, and an engineer-
e dredge."21 In Broward's 
there was no thought to 
1ich to base the drainage 
st qualified drainage engi-
Jst as he had stated it time 
ill run down hill!" 
I the Everglades Drainage 
:luded Lake Okeechobee. 
thin the district 5 cents per 
challenged the legality of 
se by the proposed canal 
r than would lands far re-
In 1910, under Governor Albert W. Gilcrest's administration, 
the State of Florida and the large landowners reached a compro-
mise which ended their long-standing court battles. The owners 
agreed to pay up their back taxes; the State's Drainage Commission 
promised to spend the money for dredging 200 miles of canals. 
The 10 years from 1917 to 1927 were the most active in reclama-
tion. During this period, more than half the excavation of the Ever-
glades took place. Of course, this does not include later Federal 
projects concerned with flood control programs. In all, 433 miles of 
canal, 54 miles of levee, and 14 canal locks were completed by 
1927. Population figures were up, land values quadrupled, acreage 
under cultivation tripled, railroads and highways pushed out to the 
shores of Lake Okeechobee, and it appeared as if the visions of the 
dreamers were a reality.z3 
Yet, even visions may have flaws when examined closely. Both 
the farmer and the boat operator had an interest in the waters of 
Lake Okeechobee. The farmer saw high water in the lake as threat; 
the boat operator was more concerned when the lake was at a low 
stage. In those early days of reclamation by private and state inter-
ests, the men in power leaned toward the farmer's position. As the 
lands surrounding Okeechobee subsided, the level of the lake was 
regulated downward to balance the agricultural interests. When the 
lake outlets began to seriously lower Okeechobee's level, the Corps 
of Engineers entered the debate to protect the interests of the navi-
gating sector on public domain.z4 
Generally, Lake Okeechobee overflowed its banks when its wa-
ters rose 20 feet above mean sea level. In 1912, when the trustees of 
the Internal Improvement Fund applied for a permit from the War 
Department to connect its four main Everglades canals to Lake 
Okeechobee, the Corps of Engineers stipulated that the lake waters 
should not be allowed to drop below 14.56 feet above mean sea 
level. It was 1917 before the lake level dropped to that depth, and 
then it was the result of a prolonged drought, rather than drainage 
conditions which caused the drop.25 
The opposite situation occurred on 18 September 1926 when 
a hurricane came ashore at Miami, crossing the bay and roaring 
inland over Lake Okeechobee. Miami was left in a shambles with 
over 1 00 of its citizens dead. The wind, rain, and lake waters of 
Okeechobee merged into a massive force which pounded against 
the earthen dike of the lake's southwestern shore. Three miles of 
levees crumbled, sending floodwaters raging from Clewiston to 
Moore Haven. Peak waters, 1 0 to 12 feet high, swept over Clewiston. 
In the storm's wake, almost 400 persons had died in Okeecho-
beeland.26 
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Franklin D. Roosevelt's Public Works Administration, which spent 
$4.1 million on the project in fiscal year 1935. To this amount, the 
Corps and state funds brought the total to over $5.8 million. 
Through 1937, the district's major source of construction funds 
came from unemployment relief money from Washington, but, in 
fiscal year 1938, funds for the project were cut back. The engineers 
were back to their more meager allocations. By this time, however, 
the task was 80 percent complete.30 
The district constructed hurricane gates, as well as channels 
and levees. Hurricane gates are openings in the levees to allow pas-
sage of water and vessels through the encircling retainer walls. 
When a hurricane approaches, the gates are closed to contain the 
high waters generated by wind-tide, and to protect the surrounding 
countryside from inundation. As the project grew in physical size, 
maintenance, rather than construction, costs, became the greater 
expense. By 1940, maintenance costs ran $1.7 million, compared 
to $.6 allocated for new work. 
The early 1940's were years of drought. When saltwater 
seeped into several municipal systems in 1945, conditions became 
critical. Fortunately, heavy rains fell during the spring and summer 
months of 1946 and 194 7, which eased the situation before irrepa-
rable damage resulted. Hurricanes passed over Lake Okeechobee 
in September and October of 194 7, bringing much needed water to 
the lake. This sudden change in condition made it necessary for the 
district to shift to its flood control system, and for the next 6 months, 
the task was to control the rate of discharge from Okeechobee. The 
lake reached a peak of 18.73 feet above mean sea level in October. 
Had the district not been able to regulate the outflow from the lake, 
the equivalent of 26.89 feet would have been reached by December. 
Such levels could have caused a flood disaster comparable to those 
of the 1920's.31 
The saltwater intrustion at the beginning of the decade was a 
warning of a new area of concern. It was clear that that something 
must be done so that south Florida would not be at the mercy of 
such natural phenomenon again. The flood control plan must do 
more than drain excess waters from Lake Okeechobee.lt must con-
tain fresh water in volume sufficient to keep out the intruding seawa-
ter from the underground water table. 
The Jacksonville District developed a plan for a network of 
canals, locks, dikes, and levees, designed to draw off flood waters 
rapidly, to eliminate overdrainage, and to conserve water for later 
use during dry periods. This new program was all inclusive as it 
sought to protect farms already developed, add lands which were 
suitable for agriculture, set aside terrain which should remain in the 
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Once the vast extent of the south Florida water problem was 
grasped, continguous areas were brought into the original scheme. 
In 1954 Congress added the upper St. Johns and the Kissimmee 
River Basins to the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control Dis-
trict. Four years later, 64 square miles, located in Hendry County 
west of the agricultural and conservation areas, were included. In 
1960, the Nicodemus Slough in Glades County brought another 39 
square miles into the project. An area in south Dade County was 
added in 1962 and southwest Dade County in 1965, and the flood 
control umbrella covered Martin County in 1968.32 
Long before the project was completed, it received a severe 
test, when, in March 1960, heavy rains fell over the Kissimmee and 
lstokpoga river basins, setting records for water levels and dis-
charges. Later in the year, the state was drenched by three tropical 
storms. In July, Hurricane Brenda moved in from the Gulf of Mexico 
to dump a large amount of rain, followed by Donna in August, and 
Florence in September. Rainfall during these latter 2 months was 
more than four times the normal amount. More water flowed into 
Lake Okeechobee than could be discharged, and it remained that 
way until mid November. Yet, the early flood control work proved its 
worth and minimized destruction around Lake Okeechobee. Al-
though the work was only 27 percent completed, it was enough to 
limit high water damage to minor events along the north shore. 
The wet years of 1960 and 1961 were followed by some of the 
driest years on record. Evaporation alone exceeded the rainfall by 
27 inches on the lake. The water conservation aspects of the pro-
gram were put into action. More than 400,000 acres of farmland 
were irrigated by water drawn from Okeechobee. Large sections of 
the Everglades literally began to dry up, threatening the very exist-
ence of alligators, birds, and certain fishes. 
Broward County ranch 
under water during 
floods of 1948, the year 
that the flood control 
project was adopted. 
Courtesy Corps of 
Engineers. 
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tot forage for food. 
ervice joined the Florida 
n aproaching the district 
responded by pumping 
gions to the east coast, 
while water from the agricultural areas was sent north to Lake 
Okeechobee. A swath was cut through the saw grass of the northern 
Everglades National Park to increase the natural drainage flow to-
ward the gulf. Finally, traffic was stopped on the levee roadways so 
that the deer might use this higher ground; because of these mea-
sures, the herd of Everglades deer survived. 
During this period of feast or famine for south Florida's water 
supply, the Jacksonville District was conducting a long-range study 
of the complex problem. When the plan was submitted to Congress 
in 1967, the solution consisted of refining many works which had 
been done in the past, such as improving canals by deepening navi-
gational channels, and building more pumping stations, secondary 
canals, and levees. In addition, the district suggested that the height 
of the levees around Lake Okeechobee be increased so that they 
could contain waters of 21 feet above mean sea level. 
At the present time, the project has "91 7 miles of levees, 950 
miles of canals, 30 pumping stations, 192 floodway control and 
diversion structures, 57 railroad bridge relocations, and 2 highway 
bridge relocations," and the job is 39 percent complete.33 
The Jacksonville District's 1975 annual report reads like an oft-
told tale: "Fiscal year 1975 started as a severe drought was ending in 
south Aorida. Heavy rains began in the last week of June 1975 and 
continued through August, causing a complete turn about in the 
hydrologic conditions in the lower half of the state. The south Flor-
ida area went from a condition of drought to that of an over abun-
Hoover Dike holds back 
flood waters in 
September 1966. 
Courtesy Corps of 
Engineers. 
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Yesterday's men of vision, who could only see that "water will 
run down hill," brought ecological disasters to south Florida; the 
Jacksonville District Engineers, studying the multitudinous facets of 
nature's balance, are gradually redressing the equation so that 
many may live and raise agricultural produce in the region called 
Pa-hay-okee (Grassy Water) by the Indians. 
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The Intracoastal 
Waterways 
FLORIDA'S INTRACOASTAL WATERWAYS did not come into existence 
from one single project. The dredged canals and natural waterways 
which gird the state from Jacksonville, south to Miami, with a cross-
state route utilizing the St. Lucie Canal, Lake Okeechobee, and the 
Caloosahatchee River to Fort Myers, then up the gulf coast to An-
d ote River, are the result of many separately scheduled projects. 
By the very nature of the peninsula's terrain, the early settlers 
made extensive use of the existing waterways. When James Gads-
den surveyed the east coast for the purpose of laying out a military 
road south to Cape Florida, he discounted the feasibility of a road 
through that desolate countryside, but he did strongly urge that a 
canal be bult at the Haulover to join Mosquito Lagoon with Indian 
River. He made this recommendation in December 1824, at the end 
of his first expedition. His report the following year, after his success-
ful trek, included a map which delineated the Haulover.1 However, 
the territory was settled too poorly for the Government to undertake 
any improvement project that far south. 
Two years later, the citizens of St. Augustine, Matanzas, and 
T omoka petitioned Congress to alter Gadsden's plan. He had deter-
mined that New Smyrna should be the southernmost terminus of 
the military road down the coast. Settlers of these three communi-
ties felt that the population south ofT omoka was not great enough 
to sustain the road. The Floridians requested that the road run from 
the Georgia line to T omoka, but that the funds for continuing the 
road south be used to construct a canal, linking the Matanzas with 
the Halifax River. Such a cut, about 8 miles long, would provide a 
more satisfactory communication link along the coast from St. 
Augustine to New Smyma.2 However, Washington took no action 
upon this petition. 
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Navy Ueutenant Levin M. Powell's group of sailors and soldiers, 
with the civilian Joseph E. Johnston acting as the topographical 
engineer for this amphibious detachment, departed St. Augustine in 
schooners for Mosquito Inlet. Here they offloaded to break out their 
small craft for the sail up the lagoon to the Haulover. Powell spent 
the month of December 1837 drilling his conglomerate forces into 
a cohesive unit while he moved his boats and supplies across to 
Indian River. For many units, the interruption at the portage was a 
needless consumption of time.ln Powell's case, the delay was bene-
ficial; it provided the opportunity for the two services to learn to work 
together. 
Among the troops forced to delay at the Haulover were three 
companies of the 1st Artillery. With these soldiers was Army sur-
geon Jacob Rhett Motte who wrote of Powell's men drilling: "When 
drawn up in line they presented a curious blending of black and 
white, like the keys of a piano forte; many of the sailors being col-
oured men. There was also an odd alternation of tarpaulin hats and 
peajackets, with forage caps and soldiers trip roundabouts; soldiers 
and sailors, white men and black, being all thrown into the ranks 
indiscriminately, a beautiful specimen of mosaic, thus modifying 
sailor's ardour with soldier's discipline."7 
A year after hostilities ceased, Quartermaster General Thomas 
S. Jesup stated in his annual report of October 1843 that: "The 
difficulties which I experienced when directing the operations 
against the Seminoles in the campaign of 1837-8 in supplying the 
division of the Army operating south of the Haulover, on the Atlantic 
side of the Peninsula of Florida, enable me to speak with positive 
certainty as to the necessity of improving the inland commmunica-
tions from Saint Augustine to Key Biscayne."8 But, despite Jesup's 
pleading, no action was forthcoming on the Haulover Canal, proba-
bly because the Indian War had ended and the civil traffic was not 
significant. 
Shortly after the cession of combat, Colonel William J. Worth, 
commanding in Florida, sent First Ueutenant Jacob Edmund 
Blake, topographical engineer, to the Haulover to make a survey. 
Blake considered this protgage to be a waste of manpower when a 
canal could join so easily these two waters, eliminating the work of 
offloading, loading, and offloading of supplies over such a short 
obstacle.9 
Blake found that the distance between the two waters was only 
725 yards with the highest point of land being 8~ feet above the level 
of the water. He recommended that the cut be made. To remove the 
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>arty from Titusville to the 
le he was at the Haulover, a 
northeaster struck which caused the waters in Mosquito Lagoon to 
rise 20 inches higher than the Indian River. The result was a current 
of 2.8 miles per hour flowing west through the cut, making it almost 
impossible for LeBaron's sloop to stem the current. This flow con-
dition to the west was not normal. The reverse generally was true, 
because the Indian River had a greater surface, a smaller outlet to 
the sea, and a longer reach from the ocean to its headwaters; the 
river was often higher than the lagoon. When Le Baron used the 
canal in 1878, the river had been 2 to 3 feet above the lagoon, and 
had remained that way for several months. The current under those 
conditions had tested severely many of the vessels trying to move 
against it.14 
Federal construction of the intracoastal waterway was delayed 
after LeBaron's survey when private enterprise moved in. The Flor-
ida Coast Une Canal & Transportation Company, organized 7 May 
1881, was granted a State charter in August 1881 to construct a 
continuous waterway from the St. Johns River to Miami. Four years 
later, the state granted the company the right to continue from 
Miami to Key West, but no work was ever done on this latter portion 
and the amendment became inoperative. 
The original project was based upon a 5-foot deep, 50-foot 
wide channel. The state was to grant 3,840 acres of land for each 
mile of canal built. Beginning in 1883, construction continued al-
most unceasingly until 1912, when the last section of the canal was 
finished and the final grant of property was deeded by the state. 
Total land awarded to the company was 1,030,128 acres for 268 
miles of canal. Yet, seldom during this period, were conditions of the 
State charter met by the Florida Coast Une Canal & Transportation 
Company. Once a section of canal had been examined and ac-
cepted by the state, maintenance became minimal. Jacksonville 
District Engineer, Colonel Gilbert A Youngberg noted in 1926 that 
tile canal's "dimensions have never been successfully maintained, 
and, except by taking advantage of tides and high waters, navigation 
witll vessels of more tllan 4-foot draft is practically impossible."1s 
But long before Colonel Youngberg's remarks, tile Corps of 
Engineers had been called upon to help correct a trying situation for 
tile Florida citizens living along tile Indian River. This reach of water-
way running 128 miles from Titusville to Jupiter Inlet was tlleir only 
highway of commerce and transportation, and it was apparent tllat 
tile canal company was not providing a satisfactory outlet. The 
citizen's pleas to Congress were heard and District Engineer, Cap-
tain William H. Black was instructed to examine the Indian River. 
Captain Black found conditions poor due to tile shallowness of 
certain sections of tile waterway. He noted that tile area served by 
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::>rps to make a preliminary 
investigation of sites for an inland route which would become part of 
the larger project of a protected waterway from Boston to the Rio 
Grande. The district looked at four choices: down the east coast 
where the canal company had dredged; follow the St. Johns River, 
Dunns Creek, and Crescent Lake before constructing a canal to the 
coast just north of Titusville; up the St. Johns through Lake Harney, 
then create a cut to a point north of Titusville; or continue beyond 
Lake Harney through Lake Shad and Salt Lake before building a 
shorter canal to Indian River north of Titusville. While the last route 
was recommended by the district, Washington decided to delay 
actual construction. It was 1920 before Congress again ordered the 
Corps to look into the intracoastal waterways. The River and Harbor 
Act of 21 January 1927 finally adopted the project, utilizing the exist-
ing private canal, and it was 11 December 1929 before the Corps of 
Engineers actually took possession of the waterway. The project 
called for a canal 8 feet deep and 75 feet wide. 
Ueutenant Colonel Laurence V. Frazier was the district engi-
neer when the Corps assumed control over the east coast waterway . 
His operation to clean up the channel was complex, massive, and 
efficient. As equipment became available to the colonel, he put it to 
work on the project. The United States snagboat D-1 moved into 
Pablo Creek from the St. Johns River and headed south, clearing 
obstructions from the creek. By the end of the year, it had removed 
46,810 snags, logs, and other impediments to navigation. A month 
later, the U.S. pipe-line dredge Congoree followed in the wake of the 
D-1 removing fill from the channel. 
The Army Engineer 
dredge, Congoree, 1936. 
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Work on the east coast section of the Intracoastal Waterway 
was in progress during the depression years of the 1930's. The pro-
ject received funds for emergency relief from the Public Works Ad-
ministration during the years 1932-35. More than 500 jobs were 
provided through the addition of this relief money. 
In 1938, an act was passed to increase the channel from 
F emandina Harbor to St. Johns River to 12 feet deep and from 90 to 
150 feet wide. This work was completed in 1941 , just before the 
United States entered World War II. Shortly after the country's entry 
into the war, German submarines were prowling the Atlantic coast, 
sinking merchant ships in appalling numbers. It became apparent 
that the Intracoastal Waterway provided a safe channel for water-
borne traffic along the east coast. Additional wooden barges were 
built They were used to carry bulk freight at substantial savings in 
precious metal, fuel, and rubber which the nation needed for its war 
effort23 
After the war, the east coast waterways were deepened and 
widened to improve the transportation network. Today, the main 
channel from Jacksonville to Miami is 125 feet wide. It is 12 feet 
deep to Fort Pierce and 10 feet deep from Fort Pierce to Miami. 
There is a short reach of channel, 75 feet wide and 7 feet deep, 
running south of Miami for 63 miles, which was built between 1935 
and 1939. The 1945 act to enlarge the waterways included this 
Palm Valley bridge over 
Intracoastal Waterway 
at Palm Valley is the 
only bridge still 
operated by the Corps of 
Engineers. 
Courtesy Corps of 
Engineers. 
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erglades Drainage District boundaries to the Gulf of Mexico and the 
East Coast Intracoastal Waterway, by straightening and dredging 
channels 80 feet wide and 6 feet deep. But, he qualified this by 
stressing that the state must construct and maintain similar chan-
nels from the western to the eastern boundary of the Everglades 
Drainage District and must include the necessary dams and locks 
for this undertaking. This plan would creat a cross-Florida water-
way.25 
Before much could be done on Brooke's recommendation, 
the hurricane of 1928 struck the lake with even more fury than the 
1926 blow. The new district engineer, Lieutenant Colonel Frazier, 
presented additional measures to provide for the safety of the inhab-
itants of this region. The levees were to be raised higher and made 
more sturdy. A new belt-line canal should be dug around the south 
shore of the lake. The dredged material would be available for the 
southshore levee. This was a departure from the previous canals in 
Lake Okeechobee which had gone through the center of the lake 
from east to west. The belt-line canal would be longer, but it would 
also provide the necessary levee to protect cultivated lands south of 
the lake.26 
Two years later, 53 miles of levee line and right-of-way had 
been surveyed along the southshore. Foundation tests had been 
made for the construction of hurricane gates at Moore Haven, 
Clewiston, Miami Canal, and Hillsboro Canal. Ninety miles of flood-
way and navigation channel in the Caloosahatchee River had been 
surveyed and the district's pipe-line dredges Sarasota and 
Congoree were raising muck along the proposed channeJ.27 
By 1937, with the benefit of WPA funds, the project was 92 
percent completed. A boat-a-cade left Fort Myers on 22 March, 
headed east, to officially open the Okeechobee Waterway. The 
group reached Stuart on the St. Lucie River the next day. Florida's 
east and west coasts were joined at last. 
The completed project consisted of four locks (St. Lucie, 
Moore Haven, Ortona, and W. P. Franklin) along its 155-mile length. 
The main 8-foot channel varies from 80 to 1 00 feet in width. The 
secondary south channel from Clewiston to Belle Glade is 
shallower; 6 feet in depth. The Okeechobee Waterway serves both 
commercial barges and recreational boats. It has averaged 4 72,000 
tons and 14,000 passengers per year from 1963 through 1973.28 
As the Okeechobee Waterway developed, extending the east 
coast protected water route across the Florida peninsula to the gulf 
coast, west coast interests quickened to the idea of creating an ex-
tension along their coast. Congress responded to the pleadings of 
this group by authorizing the Jacksonville District to examine the 
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For the future, there are two users of the waterways: recrea-
tional boaters and barge carriers. As the threat of reduction of fossil 
fuel grows, the value of barge transportation as an energy saving 
measure becomes more real and striking. 
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CHAPTERS 
Building Harbors 
COMMERCE, vital to the well-being of any society, was especially nec-
essary to Florida because the natural products of the soil had to be 
brought to distant markets rapidly. In the latter quarter of the 
nineteenth century, the railroad was beginning to penetrate the pe-
ninsula, but railroads running to nowhere were poor risks for invest-
ment. Ideally, the rails should terminate at a deepwater port which 
would complement and extend overseas the interior transportation 
network. Even before the railroads actually arrived, Floridians were 
looking to the future, requesting Federal aid to develop useful ports 
along Florida's coast. 
Assistant Engineer, Gustave Jaenicke arrived in Tampa on 13 
July 1871 to survey the region for the development of harbor facili-
ties on the west coast. Captain Andrew N. Damrell instructed 
Jaenicke to make a detailed report of his week's work every Satur-
day night, to be forwarded to him at Mobile, Alabama, whenever the 
mail system would allow. Jaenicke was given $1,938.40 for expend-
itures, which was to include the cost of the draughtsman's plotting 
after he had returned to Mobile. Damrell told him: "Your pay will be 
at first $150 per month; if satisfaction is given it will be increased to 
$200."1 Jaenicke left Mobile aboard the Lighthouse tug General 
Poe for Apalachicola. There, he hired his surveying party, chartered 
a sloop, and set sail for Tampa Bay. 
Tampa was a city of about 1,000 people, whose only contact 
with the outside world was through small, coastal vessels plying the 
ports of the Gulf of Mexico. Yet, in spite of its isolated location, 
Tampa supported 18 stores, a newspaper-printing shop, black-
smith, tinsmith, harness-maker, and two carpenters. According to 
Jaenicke, there was not much money in circulation and most busi-
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ness was on a credit basis. Yet, he expressed the conviction that, 
regardless of its isolation or lack of money, the town had considera-
ble trade which would improve if the proposed harbor work were 
undertaken and the railroad came into the community.z 
The main purpose of Jaenicke's visit was to examined the bay. 
Tampa Bay, between 6 and 9 miles wide, runs northeasterly into 
Florida peninsula 24 miles before it branches out Y-shape into two 
inner bays. Hillsborough Bay is the easternmost and Old Tampa 
Bay is the westernmost prong of the upper reaches of Tampa Bay. 
The Hillsborough River empties into its namesake at the head of the 
bay. 
In the midst of Jaenicke's survey, a mid-August northwest gale 
set in while his party was working on the bay. By noon, it had be-
come a hurricane force storm, blowing down trees, fences, and 
breaking boats from their anchorage. The surveying crew rode out 
the storm safely, but all of the beacons, tripods, signals, and many of 
the range poles had vanished. Jaenicke began again. He had no 
more than repositioned his equipment before another storm lashed 
the area, creating more damage. His expenditures were mounting 
rapidly from nature's destruction; still, he completed his work and 
submitted his recommendation on time. 
Tampa Bay was not Jaenicke's problem. There was adequate 
water in the bay to meet shipping needs. Jaenicke was concerned 
with Hillsborough Bay because he was trying to improve the city's 
communications with the rest of the world. When he finished his 
work, he presented three estimates: a straight channel200 feet wide 
from the 12-foot contour in Tampa Bay up Hillsborough Bay to the 
river and the city, at a cost of half a million dollars; dredge the exist-
ing sinuous shipping channel from its 5-foot depth to 12 feet, for 
$50 thousand more than his first estimate; or, by cutting the width to 
100 feet, deepen the present channel for a quarter of a million dol-
lars. Jaenicke thought the project was worthwhile. 
Captain Damrell's superior in Mobile, Colonel J . H. Simpson, 
studied Jaenicke's survey and recommendations carefully before 
reaching a quite different conclusion. Simpson believed there was 
not enough business to warrant spending the large amount of 
money necessary to make Tampa accessible to the sea. It would 
cost far less (about $180,000) to build a short line railroad the 9 
miles from Tampa to Passage Point than to dredge the channel. If 
the city truly desired to reach the sea, he recommended that it build 
a railroad and use Passage Point as Tampa's port.3 With this nega-
tive recommendation, no action was taken on the Tampa project. 
By the end of the decade, local interests once more prevailed 
upon Congress. Assistant Engineer J . L. Meigs had to spend the 
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Captain Black's recommendations and Henry Plant's actions 
had repercussions on the harbor work. Another survey in 1888 de-
termined that the Hillsborough project should be modified to re-
main at the then dredged depth of 8 feet, while attention should be 
paid to improving Port Tampa on Old Tampa Bay. The River and 
Harbor Act of 11 August 1888, accepting the earlier recommenda-
tions, called for dredging a 20-foot channel to Port Tampa to bring 
deep water to Plant's South Florida Railway terminal.8 By 1893, as a 
result of these various modifications, the channel to Port Tampa had 
been completed to the 20-foot level; work had ceased in Hillsbo-
rough Bay, leaving a channel 1 00 feet wide and 7 feet deep; and the 
Hillsborough River stood at a 9-foot depth. Thus, the terminal facili-
ties along the river's edge of the city of Tampa exceeded the bay 
entrance channel's ability to provide traffic.9 
No real action was taken to relieve Hillsborough Bay's problem 
before the Spanish-American War occurred in April 1898. Tampa 
was selected as the major port for embarkation because of its prox-
imity to Cuba. The terrible limitations of a port 9 miles from the city, 
served by a single-track railroad line, need not be repeated. Condi-
tions were abominable, but, at least they highlighted the necessity of 
improving the port facilities of Tampa's Hillsborough Bay, as well as 
Port Tampa. Both areas were subject to new legislation under the 
River and Harbor Act of 3 March 1899, which called for widening the 
channel and deepening it to 27 feet at Port Tampa, while improving 
Hillsborough Bay to 12 feet.l o 
The development of the two inner bays became more than just 
an engineering problem of the most economical method of serving 
the city of Tampa. The improvement of each one became part of the 
economic struggle between the railroads and other business inter-
ests. Captain Herbert Deakyne reported the situation to the Chief of 
Engineers in 1902 when he informed him that the single railroad 
line controlled the docks of Port Tampa, and that the only way to 
move goods from the wharves to Tampa was over South Florida's 
tracks. Deakyne went on to say: "It is stated that the rate for moving 
certain kinds of merchandise from a ship at Port Tampa to Tampa is 
about equal to the rate on the same merchandise from New York to 
Tampa direct by water."11 A year later Colonel Charles J . Allen, senior 
member of a board of engineers studying the Tampa situation re-
ported: "It was clearly shown at the public hearings ... that, owing to 
excessive wharf and freight charges, it is practically impossible for 
the shippers of Tampa to do business through Port Tampa."12 
Therefore, these merchants depended entirely on the Hillsborough 
channel for their economic well-being. 
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Captain Spalding estimated that at least 12 thousand more 
feet of docking facilities were needed. It was a question of where the 
wharves could be built. An extension of the Hendry & Knight chan-
nel eastward would provide somewhere on the order of 2,000 feet. 
The low-lying bedrock in the Hillsborough River eliminated any river 
work. The only additional area available was the estuary just east of 
the Hendry & Knight channel which ran north towards Ybor City, a 
subdivision of Tampa. That was the region selected by Spalding as 
the next expansion of Tampa's harbor. 
The Jacksonville District engineer was deeply concerned that 
his proposal should benefit the public. Therefore, he offered some 
rather unusual suggestions. He felt that the Ybor Estuary should be 
Hillsboro Bay, from 
turning basin to Ybor 
City. 
Courtesy Corps of 
engineers. 
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The city submitted satisfactory evidence of its purchase of wa-
terfront property, for a depth of 700 feet from the water's edge along 
Ybor Estuary, to the Secretary of War 18 April 1911. When the devel-
opment plan for the estuary was approved 8 August 1913, the pro-
ject was activated, creating the present day facilities.17 
Ship rW15 aground in 
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District Engineer Major Thomas H. Handbury's preliminary ex-
amination of Biscayne Bay in February 1895, reported that the bay 
was 26 miles long with an average width of 6 miles. Half of the bay 
had a low water depth of 6 feet or less. The remaining portion ran to 
less than 1 0 feet, with occasional holes with soundings of 13 feet. 
The mean tide rose and fell a foot. The west shore was coral rock, 
rising at times to 1 0 feet above water level and running back to the 
Everglades about 6 miles inland from the coast. Among the several 
short streams flowing from the glades into the bay, the most signifi-
cant was the Miami River. Four miles upstream from the mouth of 
the Miami River there was a quarter-mile rapids, with a fall of 4 feet, 
marking the boundary of the Everglades. 
The east side of the bay was bounded by coral reefs along its 
entire length. Most of the reefs were above high water, with the soil 
upon them supporting a thick growth of mangrove, saw palmetto, 
and similar vegetation. The rest of the reefs were covered with sand, 
which was exposed only at low tide. Throughout this chain of coral 
were openings or cuts, connecting the bay with the ocean beyond. 
Three miles to seaward, another reef ran parallel to the first which 
was awash during high tide. Between these two strips of coral lay 
Hawk Channel, permitting an inside passage with 12 feet of water 
from Cape Florida to Key West. Unfortunately for sailors, there are 
numerous rock formations scattered throughout Hawk Channel. 
Following this overview of the region, Major Handbury de-
scribed in detail the three principal cuts permitting access to the 
ocean. The northernmost was Norris Cut, separating Miami Beach 
from Virginia Key. This channel, almost opposite the mouth of the 
Miami River, was the most direct route for exit from the Miami 
settlement. 
Bear Cut was a mile and a half south of Norris Cut, dividing 
Virginia Key from Key Biscayne. Bear Cut was twice as wide as 
Norris, yet it also had 4 feet on the bar. However, Handbury was told 
that Bear Cut had 4 feet of sand over the coral at its bar, making it 
possible to dredge an 8-foot channel without using explosives. 
The southernmost opening was Cape Florida, traversing the 
lower end of Key Biscayne. Actually, there were three narrow chan-
nels exiting the bay across the low sand flats which covered the coral 
reef. Two of these outlets carried 1 0 and 12 feet of water. The diffi-
culty was that vessels using Hawk Channel had to make a twisting, 
tortuous course over the shoal flats before reaching the exit chan-
nels. This route could be dredged to a depth of 11 feet, but the 
exposed position on the shoal buffeted by drifting sands and prevail-
ing storms, could not be maintained except under constant care. It 
was concluded that Bear Cut offered the best approach to Biscayne 
Bay and Miami. 
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extensive use of explosives. For simple dredging down to coral rock, 
however, Colonel Benyaurd recommended that the Cape Florida 
Cut be used, because it was the only route which could be dredged 
to near 12 feet. If a harbor deeper than 12 feet were to be developed, 
Benyaurd felt that Norris Cut would be the most practical exit.22 
When Assistant Engineer James H. Bacon began the third sur-
vey, 15 August 1899, he pushed his crew in a race against time. 
Yellow fever had broken out in Miami and he knew that it was only a 
matter of days before the city would be quarantined. Bacon was 
right; the quarantine suspended all work on 30 September and it 
remained that way until 1 7 January 1900. He finished his survey a 
month later.23 
By 1900, Miami had 2,500 inhabitants, supported by a rather 
large hinterland population which had followed the railroad building 
south, establishing settlements all along the fertile land and now 
opened to northern markets. Flagler's arrival in Miami had done 
everything that Major Handbury had predicted. Winter vegetables 
which used to go to Key West for transshipment were now sent 
directly to New York by rail. Flagler built a large hotel at Miami and 
another at Nassau, and he joined the two by a tourist-carrying 
steamship line. It was soon apparent that the original wharf on the 
Miami River was too restrictive, so he built another on Biscayne Bay 
and extended his tracks to it. Because of this growth, a board of 
engineers was set up to examine the feasibility of creating an 18-foot 
harbor at Miami.24 
Of the three natural cuts in Biscayne Bay, the Board felt that 
Norris Cut was the most practical. Yet, as they studied all of the 
factors noted by James Bacon, it became apparent that a better 
route would be to cut through Miami Beach, about a mile north of 
Norris Cut. Here, the 18-foot contour line bent in closest to shore, 
offering the shortest distance to deep water. Because this cut would 
interfere less with the littoral current, the length of the jetties needed 
to keep the channel free from the shifting sand would be shorter. 
The Board made its decision to strike out directly for the sea, cutting 
into the southern portion of Miami Beach.25 
The result of all these surveys was the River and Harbor Act of 
13 June 1902, which stipulated that the Corps of Engineers would 
create an entrance to Biscayne Bay and build a refuge basin near 
the entrance on the bay side of the cut. All of this was contingent 
upon the Florida East Coast Railway Company constructing, at its 
expense, a turning basin 1 ,600 feet long and 500 feet wide adjacent 
to the wharves, and digging a channel 85 to 1 00 feet wide across the 
bay to connect the two basins. 
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Ships waiting off 
Government Cut to enter 
Miami harbor, 1925. 
Courtesy State 
Photographic Archives, 
F.S.U. 
'Prins Valdemar' 
overturned in Miami 
harbor January 10, 
1926. 
Courtesy State 
Photographic Archives, 
F.S.U. 
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a restricted area with the heavy concentration of ships held in port by 
the disaster. Finally, salvage crews took over, before freeing the Prins 
Valdemar from her unwelcomed resting place. 
Many of the vessels arriving after the incident dropped anchor 
at sea to offload their cargo onto lighters to be carried ashore; a very 
costly, time-consuming procedure. Those ships not yet committed 
to Miami's port were sent elsewhere; the ships in port sat gathering 
barnacles and marine growth, and losing business. The Valdemar 
effectively ended Miami's building boomP 
The Valdemar was the first of three disasters to visit Biscayne 
Bay. The hurricane in September of that year swept in from the 
Atlantic, bringing destruction and death to south Aorida. A section 
of the north jetty, as well as huge portions of the revetment along 
Government Cut, crumbled before the onslaught of the sea. But, the 
Jacksonville District returned to the task, and by the end of the fiscal 
year, the project was 61 percent completed. The hurricane of 1928 
was not as destructive to the port projects. The full brunt of its fury 
was reserved for the Lake Okeechobee area, inland. Still, it was 1933 
before all the earlier projects in Biscayne were completed. 
As the nation slowly recovered from the Depression, a new 
interest developed at Miami's port- cruise ships carrying tourists to 
the Caribbean and Bahama islands. Hardly had this trade begun 
before World War II stopped such luxury traffic. During the war years, 
while Tampa and Jacksonville boomed with defense shipping, Mi-
ami languished. It had no war-related industry to sustain it. With the 
coming peace, the traffic in Biscayne Bay picked up again. 
Post war shipping brought with it larger vessels and more prob-
lems. Miami's bar pilots complained of the constant hazards they 
faced in bringing these ships into port. The first bone of contention 
was the 500-foot bar channel. Although the bend approaching the 
channel was 850 feet wide, the course change was about 45 de-
grees, which necessitated bringing large ships around to their new 
headings in shallow waters. The pilots had to line up with the jetty 
entrance, without the benefit of range lights to help align the ship 
properly. Usually, ships approached this turn under crosswind and 
crosscurrent conditions, and the limited water under the keel made 
the vessels respond sluggishly. There had been a number of 
groundings or near grounds to emphasize the dangers. 
The second hazard occurred just as the ships entered the jetty 
channel. Once again, the normal southward flowing current and 
crosswinds pushed against the vessel as it approached the pro-
tected channel. When the bow entered the 300-foot channel, the 
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of pushing the vessel onto the south side of the channel where, once 
again, a pilot often had to rely on increased speed to gain control to 
keep his ship tracking correctly.28 The situation needed attention 
before shipping interests left Miami for better ports. 
District Engineer, Colonel Paul D. Troxler listened to the pilots' 
views before he presented his recommendations. The Chief of En-
gineers accepted Troxler's report asking Congress to widen the ship 
channel and to enlarge the turning basin. The River and Harbor Act 
of 14 July 1960 was the result of Troxler's plan, and his project was 
completed in October 1964. 
MIAMI HARBOR 
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District Engineer, Colonel Elmer K. Kirkpatrick recommended 
modifying the San Juan Harbor project in November 1955, so that 
the ocean entrance channel would have a 45-foot depth, the Army 
Terminal Basin 36 feet, and a new channel to be cut from the Army 
Terminal Basin to the eastern end of Graving Dock Channel. At the 
juncture of these latter channels, Kirkpatrick requested an addi-
tional anchorage be constructed about 3,200 feet long, 1 ,550 feet 
wide, and 36 feet deep. His program was authorized on 3 July 
1958.31 
Four years later, the general and detail design work had been 
completed and dredging commenced. During 1963, four dredges 
were at work in San Juan harbor; Gahagan No. 18, Jamaica Bay, 
Allan Judith, and Crest. These four vessels removed 7,340,253 
cubic yards in 1963. The following year, the dredge Cartagena was 
added to the project, and 98 percent of the work was completed. 
The project was finished 10 May 1965.32 
rarther east at Christiansted Harbor, St. Croix, Virgin Islands, a 
project had been authorized, a year before the Jacksonville District 
became responsible for the island, to provide an approach channel 
25 feet deep and 300 feet wide from the Caribbean Sea to the turn-
ing basin just offshore. However, funds were not provided and the 
project languished. An economic restudy in 1957 reported that 
there was no justification for a 25-foot approach depth, and in 1961 
the plan was modified to 16 feet. It was 1962 before the dredge 
Trident was employed on Christiansted Harbor, and the task was 
completed 5 April 1963.33 
Seaports are gateways to world commerce. The Jacksonville 
District's harbor building activities opened these gateways for the 
people of its region, and brought economic well-being to remote, 
isolated communities. Of all of the tasks performed by the Jackson-
ville District, this endeavor touched the lives of all inhabitants more 
directly than any other. 
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CHAPTER9 
Ship Canal-
Barge Canal 
THE LONG AWAITED MOMENT arrived on 19 September 1935. Presi-
dent Franklin Delano Roosevelt pressed a telegraph key in his Hyde 
Park, New York, home, detonating an explosive charge in Florida, 
and officially opening construction on the Cross-Florida Ship Canal. 
The event was received with mixed emotions by Floridians. Gener-
ally, those living along the proposed route in the northern part of the 
state were jubilant; but, south Floridians were worried that the ven-
ture might turn their land into a desert by damaging their water 
supply.1 
Of all the engineering projects undertaken in Florida, none has 
had a longer, more turbulent, or emotional history than the Cross-
Florida Canal. Time after time, Congress, at the pleading of local 
interests, had the Corps of Engineers conduct surveys for a feasible 
water course across the peninsula. In all, 28 routes were examined. 
Even before the territory traded hands from Spain to the United 
States, James Gadsden wrote to John C. Calhoun recommending 
an investigation of a route from the St. Marys River in Georgia to the 
Suwannee River in Spanish Florida.2 
Immediately after the exchange of the territory, Americans be-
gan to think and write of a waterway connecting the Atlantic with the 
Gulf of Mexico. All three authors (mentioned in Chapter Two) writing 
about Florida in 1821 and 1822, presented proposals for water 
transportation across the peninsula. James Grant Forbes sug-
gested a canal from the St. Lucie River to Lake Mayaca. William 
Darby's book contained a letter from a supporter for a canal project 
to his friend in Charleston, South Carolina, proposing that the St. 
Johns River be united with either Tampa Bay or Apalachicola Bay. 
William H. Simmons wrote of the desirability of connecting the St. 
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proportional amount in conjunction with a private joint stock com-
pany.8 Of course, the company would have access to the informa-
tion gathered by the engineers. 
Two days after appointing Gadsden, et al, to investigate the 
possibilities of a canal, the Florida Legislative Council wrote to Con-
gress once again on the subject. The memorial asked for a canal 
wide and deep enough to accommodate Mississippi River steam-
boats so that these vessels could extend their travels to Savannah or 
Charleston.9 
Floridians were not the only Americans interested in the water 
connection. Congressman Daniel Webster submitted a resolution 
asking for an examination of the peninsula to determine the feasibil-
ity of a project so beneficial to the nation as a whole.10 
This barrage of requests bore fruit. On 3 March 1826, Con-
gress passed an act providing for a survey for a canal across Florida. 
The Board of Internal improvements drew up the plans which Major 
Paul H. Perrault executed when he commanded the survey brigade 
discussed in Chapter Two. 
Joseph White and James Gadsden were political enemies, 
even if they were on the same side with respect to the Florida canal. 
White complained to the Secretary of War in the spring of 1827 that 
he had been informed that one of Perrault's officers had been elec-
tioneering in a St. Augustine tavern for James Gadsden. Among 
other things, the officer was supposed to have said that the canal 
would never be completed unless Gadsden was elected as Florida's 
delegate to Congress. "Such gross improprieties, which bring into 
disrepute the government, and its officers, will! am sure ... meet your 
decided disaprobation," White told the Secretary.11 Whether this let-
ter helped or not, the final outcome was White's election by two to 
one over Gadsden. 
Early in 1827, General Simon Bernard and Captain William Tell 
Poussin visited Florida for a whirlwind tour of the two routes exam-
ined by Perrault. They considered the St. Johns and the St. Marys 
Rivers. Both routes were to link up with St. Marks on the Gulf of 
Mexico. It was the treacherousness of the St. Johns Bar which pre-
cluded the construction of a ship canal. Between the current, winds, 
and shallow bar, sea-going vessels were not certain of gaining en-
trance, and an inaccessible harbor in wartime could prove disaster-
ous. But, if all goods in transit had to be transshipped by boat or 
barge anyway, then, they felt that the St. Johns River provided the 
best waterway for a barge canal because it would only be 25 miles 
long, as opposed to 45 for the St. Marys route.12 However, based 
upon his personal investigation, plus the data from the survey bri-
157 

;ident John Quincy Adams 
., while a 6-foot deep cut for 
did not think the project 
piecemeal. On 20 October 
:> submit his surveys of the 
;ound. Seven months later, 
)f the St. Johns River was 
:. Marys River to the Suwan-
as completed by 9 Novem-
lry was turned over to the 
it included all of his officers' 
assed this on to General 
provements could issue its 
1rd presented the complete 
I as Senate Document 102, 
: 14 7, 20th Congress; the 
mal documents upon this 
ct were impatient with this 
is findings, Delegate White 
lain of the slowness of the 
t it had been two and half 
mrvey, and that, until Con-
;sibility of proceeding. If the 
Congress soon, that body 
ass before any action could 
on 14 July 1828 that the 
xwardness." The following 
Engineer that the maps be 
ormed that there were no 
1bt that there was a large 
jge to sustain a canal. Be-
before proceeding further, 
~ the previous work. 
r Poussin was assigned to 
Frederick Searle, who had 
~port immediately to Major 
Washington, Joseph White 
d Advocate to inform his 
ng made to determine the 
he summit level. The third 
nfantry, surveying The Falls 
of the Ohio, was ordered to go to Florida as soon as possible after 
completing his Ohio work. 
Major Poussin concentrated first upon running the survey lines. 
In July 1831, he left Florida on furlough to visit his home in France, 
and UeutenantJohn Pickell replaced him in charge of operations.1s 
Pickell spent much of his efforts trying to determine if a canal would 
lose water through filtration, or gain water by the process of infiltra-
tion and perculation. He sank a series of wooden shafts 7 feet 
square, 20 or more feet into the ground. These shafts were drained, 
then observed as they filled with water. From his experiments, which 
were reported to the Chief Engineer, he concluded that a canal cut 
might gain water through the infiltration properties of the terrain, but 
the money ran out before enough shafts were sunk to be certain.16 
With nothing decided by this latest survey, Congress put aside 
the ship canal project. Two years later, the Florida Legislative Coun-
cil reconciled itself to the fact that the Government probably would 
not provide a ship canal across Florida. The council petitioned Con-
gress to consider constructing a railroad from Jacksonville via Talla-
hassee to St. Marks.J7 
Even James Gadsden recognized the futility of the ship canal. 
As he put it: "Had the Report of the Engineers been favorable as to 
its practicability, an intercourse across the Peninsula of Florida 
might long since have been secured."18 In 1838, he sent a memorial 
to Congress, seeking to incorporate the Florida Peninsula Railroad 
and Steamboat Co., to create a link across the territory. 
It was 1852 before Congress again took up the question of 
Florida's ship canal. This time, the terminal points were to be the 
headwaters of the St. Johns River and Tampa Bay. UeutenantMartin 
Luther Smith, topographical engineer, was the officer in charge. 
Martin Smith followed the line from the St. Johns River to Tampa 
Bay, while Ueutenant W. F. Smith made a reconnaissance of Char-
lotte Harbor and Peace Creek. W. F. Smith soon abandoned his 
survey when he realized that these waters were too shoal. 
Martin Smith used data obtained from Ueutenant Pickell's ear-
lier work in 1831 to expedite his own task. Based upon Pickell's 
report, Smith believed that there was no reason to worry about the 
water loss from infiltration. His concern was with the approaches to 
the ship canal on both the east and west coasts of Florida. Smith 
ended his investigation inconclusively, stating that there were four 
likely places to cut through the peninsula. Because he had funds 
and instructions to survey only two of the lines, he felt there was no 
possibility of reaching a conclusion until the other two routes had 
been fully explored. For the survey made by his group, Ueutenant 
Smith noted that the routes were too circuitous, and the depths of 
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with a view to the construction of a ship-canal from the St Marys 
River to the Gulf of Mexico. "20 Gillmore had his engineers in the 
field by November of that year. The primary purpose was to estab-
lish, if at all possible, the capacity of Okefenokee Swamp to supply 
the water necessary to feed the long summit reach of the proposed 
canal. To answer this question his engineers spent 5 months in 
the field. Transit and level lines were run from Fernandina and Jack-
sonville to Lake City. These lines were the base lines for all other 
observations. 
Next, U. S. Civil Assistant Engineer, S. L. Tremont had his men 
push inland to the swamp itself. They ran lines all around the border 
of the Okefenokee. This was followed by offset lines into, and some 
across, the watery lands. Side trips were made to surrounding lands 
to examine the many lakes and ponds which could become part of 
a feeder system to support a canal. Then, the engineers moved 
down the Suwannee River to the gulf, locating and recording several 
good lines for the proposed project. From April to December 1879, 
the field work was recorded, examined, and mapped.21 
Tremont's final report delineated his canal route. The eastern 
terminus would be Camp Pinckney, 29 miles above the town of St. 
Marys on the St. Marys River. The cut would pass through the Oke-
fenokee Swamp on a heading of 248°, then cross the Suwannee 
River near Blount's Ferry to Ellaville, a reach of 77 miles. Here, the 
canal would turn to a heading of 260° 15' for the remaining 64 
miles to St. Marks. The total distance from St. Marys to St. Marks was 
170 miles, 60 of which would be along the summit level. The engi-
neer calculated it would take 11 locks (350 feet long, 80 feet wide, 
and 24 feet deep), five on the eastern end and six on the western 
end, to lift and lower the ships utilizing this waterway. 
In his conclusion, Tremont said, "I believe I have shown conclu-
sively that the Okefenokee swamp, with its contiguous water sheds, 
is capable of supplying all the water that may be required to operate 
a ship canal to its full capacity during the entire year."22 
Lieutenant Colonel Gillmore, as was his custom on all major 
projects, went back to the records of previous surveys to add to his 
engineer's field reports. He noted that the loss of water by filtration 
had never been satisfactorily calculated. Gillmore pointed out that 
the 1826 survey had not come to grips with that particular problem; 
that the Board of Internal Improvement had suggested another ex-
amination, which had resulted in Lieutenant Pickell's expedition. 
The Board, and later, Lieutenant Martin Smith, accepted Pickell's 
conclusions that filtration would not be a problem. As Gillmore 
viewed the results, the weakness of Pickell's work was twofold; first, 
the head under which his infiltration experiments took place had not 
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With regard to the purpose of his survey, Le Baron felt that 
there was much work left to be done before any positive recom-
mendations could be made. "From this rather uncertain data, I am 
inclined to believe that a small canal without locks can be easily 
and economically constructed at a probable cost of less than two 
million dollars, on the general route indicated."26 John W. Sackett, 
who accompanied LeBaron, prepared the expedition's maps. 
John Gartland recorded some of his hardships: "I experienced 
great difficulty as well as delay in discovering the section lines, the 
blazed trees denoting merely the direction the line had taken, while 
the posts set by the Land Office to mark corners had all disap-
peared ... It was only by a reference to the deeds of settlers residing 
near the survey that I was enabled to locate position of lin~ with 
reference to the State survey."27 
Gartland reached a different conclusion than Le Baron with 
regard to the necessity of employing locks. He noted the different 
levels of various lakes in his region, and felt a series of cuts would 
soon drain the higher waters off. "The difference in level between 
where it [Bowlegs Creek] emerges from Lake Buffum to where it 
enters Peace Creek, being 65.125 feet. It is therefore evident that any 
improvement of those streams for the purpose of steam navigation, 
is impracticable without the use of locks."28 
A year later, Colonel Gillmore issued his findings. Again, he 
discussed reports of earlier expeditions. The J . L. Meigs report of 
1879 was especially singled out for its information. Gillmore con-
cluded that the route could not be employed without the construc-
tion of locks. Such a canal would have a cost "plainly unwarranted 
by the amount of traffic and the extent of population that would for 
many years to come be accommodated by it"29 This was the fifth 
major survey made by the Corps of Engineers in almost 60 years. 
There seemed to be no prospect for a waterway across the state. 
Some Florida proponents of a canal attempted to turn to pri-
vate enterprise. The Atlantic and Gulf Transit Canal Company was 
chartered in 1878, with capitalization of $30 million to build and 
operate a canal across the state.3o Nothing concrete came of this 
venture. Several private surveys were undertaken, but the task 
was too large and costly to be considered without tremendous 
governmental aid. Realistically, this was a project for the National 
Government 
In 1909, when Congress authorized the sixth survey, the project 
was a barge canal. This endeavor did no better than the previous 
examinations; the recommendation was unfavorable. The canal 
backers met the same results in 1924 when the report was reviewed 
and its negative findings confirmed.31 
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,rmer Army Chief-of-Staff, 
General Charles P. Summerall as president. He applied to the Re-
construction Finance Corporation for funds, but was not successful 
in obtaining any money. The RFC rejection was followed, in rapid 
order, by similar refusals on the part of the Public Works Administra-
tion and the Department of Commerce when these agencies were 
approached for funds.34 Next, General Summerall persuaded Presi-
dent Roosevelt to appoint another board to study the matter. The 
Interdepartmental Board of Review, created by the President in April 
1934, finally recommended a 30-foot sea-level ship canal to the 
President.35 
It was evident that Franklin Roosevelt had made up his mind as 
to the value of the canal's construction to relieve some of the unem-
ployment problems of the nation. On 30 August 1935, at a news 
conference, the President mentioned that he would probably spend 
$4 or $5 million as a relief measure on the canal. Four days later, a 
natural disaster gave Roosevelt his springboard to the construction 
of Florida's ship canal. A hurricane swept over south Florida and 
dashed the cruise ship Dixie onto French Reef in the Florida Keys. 
Franklin Roosevelt, a master of political timing, announced the very 
next day that he was allocating $5 million in relief money for a canal 
which "would forever make it unnecessary for seagoers to risk their 
lives in circumnavigation Florida's long, hurricane-blistered 
thumb."36 At long last, the trans-Florida waterway was funded; al-
though the source of the money did not come from the normal 
congressional appropriation. This initial allocation of $5 million was 
nowhere near the amount needed to complete this project, but it 
was a start. 
Scores of mule teams 
and hired labor clear the 
route of the ship canal; 
October 11, 1935. 
Courtesy Corps of 
Engineers. 
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·elt told reporters that he 
would not use any more relief money for the Florida project.39 In-
stead, the President planned to ask Congress for the money. This 
was obviously a sound move on Roosevelt's part. It allowed him to 
divorce himself from the project while putting the burden of pro-
ceeding upon Congress. The appropriation went down in defeat in 
the Senate by a vote of 39 to 34. 
The Ocala, Florida, Engineer District was discontinued 1 Sep-
tember 1936, and the Jacksonville District had to secure work on 
the canal after 1 year of operation.4o The project was 3 percent com-
pleted. The remains of this first building attempt included several 
sections of excavated canals, four massive bridge piers south of 
Ocala, jutting skyward with no roadway built above them and no 
water below, and Camp Roosevelt. Camp Roosevelt was turned 
over to the WPA, then transferred to the University of Florida to serve 
as an extension campus. In 1937, the Camp Roosevelt campus had 
over 4,000 students enrolled in the piney woods of central Florida. 
Even as the district engineers were closing project activities, 
the numerous proponents for the canal were working for its reinsti-
tution. The Chief of Engineers appointed a new board of officers to 
review all previous reports. This Board presented a favorable report 
to the public on 16 April1936.lt suggested a 33-foot deep, 250-foot 
wide canal be built to benefit the nation as a whole. 
A year later, Chief of Engineers, Major General Edward M. 
Markham reported to the Secretary of War his justification of the 
project "The following matters have weight in the balance; the great 
Administration building 
for Army Engineers goes 
up at Camp Roosevelt in 
September 1935 prior to 
start of construction of 
Florida ship canal. 
Courtesy Corps of 
Engineers. 
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After the relief funds were exhausted, the Corps of Engineers 
sought $12 million from Congress to continue its work. On the floor 
of the Senate, Arthur Vandenberg led the fight to withhold such 
funds. When he was successful, the canal was doomed; the project 
was set aside for the time being. 
World War II changed the situation, and interest in a cross-
Aorida waterway was revived. Now it was a military project, espe-
cially after German U-boats stalked the east coast shipping lanes in 
wolf packs. Early in 1942, Congress asked the Corps of Engineers 
to review the project in the light of the latest military actions. The 
engineers suggested a 12-foot deep, 150-foot wide, waterway along 
the 13-B route. 'The value of the barge canal in time of war ... is 
sufficient to warrant its construction," concluded the Corps' report. 43 
The comments were well placed; during the war about 165 ships 
were sunk in and around Aorida. 
On 16 July 1942, when the Senate debated a bill for both a 
pipe line and a barge canal across Florida, Senators Claude Pepper 
and Arthur Vandenberg squared off to renew their argument Arthur 
Vandenberg objected to the barge canal being funded under the 
guise "to promote the national defense and to promptly facilitate 
and protect the transport of materials and supplies," when it had 
been stated that it could not "be completed until the fall of 1945 at 
the earliest"44 This time, Florida's Senator Pepper was victorious. 
Seven days later, the President signed a new law, authorizing a barge 
canal. Unfortunately for the proponents, the bill carried no appropri-
ations. In some respects, the result was a tie, but the stalemate 
worked to the disadvantage of the promoters of the waterway. 
There was never disagreement as to the military advantages of 
the canal. The Chief of Engineers told a House subcommittee in 
1946 that "If this canal had been finished during the war time it 
would have paid for itself several times over."45 
The opponents stuck to their position, without qualms of giv-
ing aid to the enemy, because the engineers had stated that the 
construction time would be at least 3% years - leading to the possi-
bility that the war would be over before the canal was completed. 
Further, building this waterway would add to the manpower and 
material shortage already in existence in wartime America.46 To their 
way of thinking, opposition to the canal was not disrupting the war 
effort. 
As soon as the war ended, the Chief of Engineers proposed 
early construction of the waterway, with a request for $20 million. It 
was not approved by the House committee, nor did it reach the floor 
of Congress for a vote. By 1949, the annual report listed the project 
under the Intracoastal Waterway section, rather than as a separate 
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Once the task was approved and funded, it did not take the 
J acksonville District engineers long to start moving earth. A section 
of canal, running from Palatka to the St Johns Lock, was begun 24 
February and completed by 4 August 1964. Another section, from 
the St Johns Lock to Rodman Pool, was under construction during 
1964. On the western end, there was more work as a dredge began 
excavating a canal from the Gulf of Mexico toward Inglis Lock. The 
dredge labored from November 1964 almost to the end of January 
1965, before giving way to dragline operations. In addition to the 
digging, there was bridge construction as the overpass for U. S. 
Highway 19 began. The first lock work started in December 1964 at 
the site of the eastern St Johns Lock; 4 months later, work began on 
the Inglis Lock. so It seemed as if the district wanted to make up for all 
the lost time . 
By 1969, the project had created three new lakes; the Rodman 
Reservoir became Lake Ocklawaha; Eureka Reservoir was changed 
to Eureka Lake; and Inglis Reservoir became Lake Rousseau. In the 
early months of 1969, the engineers held the levels of Lake Ockla-
waha to 14-16 feet while the final clearing of trees and limbs took 
place. Then, during June and July, the discharge outlets were regu-
lated to allow the lake to fill to its operational level of 20 feet mean 
sea level. 
The Jacksonville District maintained responsibility for regulat-
ing Lake Ocklawaha. During the period from July 1969 to June 
1970, when rainfall was above average, the engineers estimated that 
the increase in water amounted to 2,181,000 acre-feet Of this total 
net increase, 19,000 acre-feet were needed to bring the lake level to 
20 feet; 22,000 acre-feet were employed for lockages for Buckman 
Lock (formerly the St Johns Lock); and 2,140,000 acre-feet were 
directed through Rodman Spillway.st 
Among the construction tasks performed by the Jacksonville 
District were such unlikely items as boat ramps and campsites. The 
days when engineering projects were just for economic gain were 
over. Today, the engineers play a major role in providing recreational 
service and facilities wherever possible. The United States has 
reached the stage of development whereby its society is highly in-
dustrialized and urbanized, and it demands activities for satisfying 
the emotional and aesthetic needs of its people. The nation's wilder-
ness areas belong to the people as a whole; therefore, in answer to 
the public's need for recreational areas, the Corps included this fac-
tor in the planning of its projects. Hand in hand with the desire for 
leisure time activities, is the growing awareness that our environ-
ment must be preserved and set aside for future generations. Ueu-
tenant General FrederickJ. Clarke, Chief of Engineers, observed the 
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public change in attitude in 1971 when he said: "Our efforts in the 
Civil Works Program are changing somewhat in emphasis to reflect 
the public's growing desire that the development of our natural re-
sources for economic benefits no longer be the sole criteria for our 
work. Rather, people seem willing to forego, or to pay more for their 
immediate needs so that the quality of their environment may be 
preserved and enhanced for the future. In that light, environmental 
values are now being given full consideration along with economic, 
technical, and social and other factors when we study alternate 
means of meeting human demands. We are attempting to keep 
resource options open for future generations as far as it is possible 
to do so."52 
There were other groups, with the same goals, who felt that the 
Cross-Florida Barge Canal was not compatible with the desire to 
preserve the natural state. The Florida Defenders of the Environ-
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ment called on President Richard M. Nixon to halt construction on 
the project. They, and others, put great pressure upon the President 
Nixon finally ordered construction stopped on 19 January 1971, on 
the basis that the canal "could endanger the unique wildlife of the 
area and destroy this region of unusual and unique beauty."53 Work 
was suspended immediately. In March 1971, three of the four major 
contracts were ordered completed, either for safety or environmen-
tal reasons. When all work had been properly secured, the project 
stood at 28 percent completed. 
For over 100 years, the Corps of Engineers surveyed for a 
cross-Aorida waterway without being able to justify crating such a 
project. The first successful funding of the plan was by Presidential 
decree as a step to relieve unemployment in the 1930's. The first 
time the engineers found the canal economically justified was 1958, 
and, by the time construction began, opposition centered upon the 
environmental dangers of such an undertaking. Immediately after 
construction on the canal was halted, new environmental impact 
studies were begun by the Jacksonville District at Congress' direc-
tion. Meanwhile, the Cross-Aorida Barge Canal remains suspended 
in limbo once again. 
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CHAPTER10 
Twentieth Century 
Military Activities 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR in 1898 ended military activities of the 
nineteenth century; the new century had a different task for the 
Corps of Engineers in Florida. In the earlier period, Florida had been 
the locale for actual fighting; in the twentieth century, conflicts 
moved to overseas theaters. World War I did not directly affect the 
J acksonville District. The United States' participation in the struggle 
was confined to a 19-month period. The Secretary of War estab-
lished the Cantonment Division within the Quartermaster Corps as 
the agency responsible for training camp construction. None of 
these camps were located in Florida. 
When war clouds rolled over Europe in 1939, the United States 
began to take stock of its military posture. The country needed to 
rebuild its army. In the initial phase of creating a large, modern army, 
the tasks included the erection of training facilities, the gathering of 
war materials, and the stockpiling of supplies to support any desired 
troop movements. All of these jobs, functions of the Quartermaster 
Corps, placed an overwhelming burden upon that organization. In 
the streamlining reorganization which took place during 1940-41, 
various functions were taken from the Quartermaster Corps and 
given to the Corps of Engineers, such as the Air Corps construction 
in November 1940, and all military construction and cantonment 
maintenance work for the Army on 1 December 1941. Ueutenant 
General Brehon B. Somervell, one of the leaders in the plan to con-
solidate construction work under the Corps of Engineers, issued his 
assessment of the merger in September 1941, warning that "Under 
no circumstances should the less important, slow moving, civil 
works be permitted to dominate the reorganization for vital, fast 
moving and extensive requirements" for the defense effort.l 
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Orlando was not the only Air Corps establishment in Florida. 
The state, enjoying excellent flying weather, drew many air installa-
tions to the peninsula, both Army and Navy. MacDill Air Base at 
Tampa was another base taken over from the Quartermaster Corps 
and constructed by the district. During 1941-42, four short connect-
ing runways were built, including perimeter taxiways and two large 
parking aprons. In 1943, a larger instrument runway was built along 
with its parallel taxiway system.3 
It is sometimes difficult, in retrospect, to grasp the sense of 
urgency which underlay most activities during the hectic period just 
prior to and during World War II. Time has a way of masking emo-
tions more completely than actions. Everyone concerned with de-
veloping the nation's preparedness felt that their task was crucial, 
that their demands were reasonable, and that their solution was the 
only answer to a critical problem. It was the obligation of the district 
engineer to build well, rapidly, and as economically as possible. 
Thus, when the commander atMacDill Air Base requested "Coo lite" 
glass be installed in his hangars to lower heat and glare, District 
Engineer Colonel William C. Weeks solved the problem with $50 
worth of blue paint, sprayed over plain window glass, for a substan-
tial savings over the $3,000 cost of Coolite originally requested.4 
Just a little over 7 miles north of MacDill Field was Drew Field. 
This airport had formerly been Tampa's municipal airport, with one 
hangar and a sod field. Originally, the Air Corps planned to use this 
base as an auxiliary field to house 150 enlisted men in a tent camp. 
By the time the Jacksonville District assumed responsibility for 
Drew Field, the planners had transformed it into an installation 
housing 421 officers, 9,615 enlisted men, and a hospital. So many 
Inside hangar no. 3, 
Macdill Field. 
Courtesy National 
Archives. 
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estimate, there would be no need to disrupt the completed con-
struction in order to accommodate the increased numbers.6Jn the 
hectic days of early mobilization, it was necessary for the district to 
think ahead of the latest directive received. 
The largest and most controversial military task in Florida 
during World War II was Camp Blanding, near Starke, 30 miles 
southwest of Jacksonville. Its history has all the ingredients which 
epitomize the rapid war time construction: the site had been se-
lected at an earlier time for a different purpose; the principal con-
tractor, Starrett Brothers & Eken, a successful northern company 
that built the Empire State Building in New York City, was on unfa-
miliar ground building in the swamp and pineland of Florida; north-
em labor unions moved south with Starrett Brothers & Eken to 
jostle with independent southern labor, creating additional tensions; 
and the installation dwarfed the rural town of Starke. Throughout all 
of this was the pressure of time - to build facilities to store and use 
the materials - to build quarters before the troops arrive. It was a 
pressure-laden situation from the start. 
The site was initially selected in 1939 by the Florida National 
Guard to replace Camp Foster, the former guard camp near Jack-
sonville which had been transferred to the Navy. Brigadier General 
VIVian B. Collins, Aorida National Guard, selected a 27,000 acre site 
in Clay County on Kingsley Lake.lt was an excellent site for a country 
plantation type retreat for hunting and fishing. When the plans were 
drawn up, the layout was modest. The state estimated about 
$700,000 would be necessary to create a summer camp for Aorida 
guardsmen. The Fourth Corps Area Commander, Ueutenant Gen-
eral Stanley D. Embick, was as impressed as General Collins with 
Camp Blanding, and soon the camp was placed on the Protective 
Mobilization Plan list. 
When the national defense program accelerated in the spring 
of 1940, rumors began circulating that Blanding would be more 
than just a guardsmen's summer camp. In mid-year, the War De-
partment plans were released indicating that Blanding would house 
the 31st Division from Aorida, Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi 
for a year's training cycle. The Quartermaster Corps had to move 
fast to create a major training base out of virgin terrain. Then it was 
announced that the 43rd Division from Maine, Vermont, Connecti-
cut, and Rhode Island was scheduled to move in 50,000 troops by 
the next spring. An installation of this size caused construction esti-
mates to soar to $27.5 million, and the labor population to create 
this camp rose to 21 ,000. 
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::lesirable need to save 
~ unique idea of leasing 
luxury hotels. Patterson broached his idea to War Department offi-
cials upon his return to Washington. Major General Walter R. Weaver 
accepted the idea, and, after he became head of the Army Air Corps 
Technical Training Command, he decided to utilize hotels in Miami 
Beach for his operation. In answer to initial criticism, General 
Weaver replied; 'The best hotel room is none too good for the 
American solider."I3 
At the peak of the tourist season, the Corps of Engineers re-
ceived the directive putting it in the hotel leasing business. Morris A 
Spooner, later chief of the real estate division for the Jacksonville 
District, was assigned to this detail at its inception. The timetable for 
this, as for other related defense operations, was brief. By the end of 
January 1942, the Army Air Corps asked representatives of the Mi-
ami Beach hotels to report on its facilities. Early in February, the 
Dade County Defense Council and Hotel Men's Association met 
with the Corps of Engineers to draw up plans. By 20 February 1942, 
the first of 400 enlisted men arrived in Miami, followed in the next 
few days by 500 officer candidates. 
In the fall of 1942, more than 200 additional hotels in Miami 
had been taken up by this program. The Army then expanded the 
program to other resort areas to do the same thing. Atlantic City, 
New J ersey, leased 4 7 hotels; Daytona Beach, 48; and St Peters-
burg, 58, before the year was out. The procedure was fairly standard. 
Upon completion of negotiations, the hotel owners would evict the 
guests, take down the draperies, and remove the rugs and objects of 
art as the servicemen moved in. The WMC's utilized Daytona 
Beach, the Breakers at Palm Beach became a general hospital, and 
an Army Air Corps radar school was located in a leased club at Boca 
Raton. At the peak, around October 1942, 348 hotels in Miami 
Beach held 78,000 servicemen.I4 
By the summer of 1943, the great need for training facilities 
began to slacken. Trained troops were being shipped overseas, and 
the permanent cantonments were completed and able to handle 
more of the training population. The pressing necessity was over. 
Most of the Government leasing contracts included a 30-day can-
cellation clause. On 19 June 1943, the War Department released 
information that 1 09 of the 340 hotel leases at Miami Beach would 
be terminated at once. More hotels were closed in November, fol-
lowed by another group in January 1944. It had been a unique plan 
which had succeeded admirably. 
The success of this program can be measured in many ways. 
In dollars, the cost savings were impressive. The rental bill was about 
$12.5 million, with an average cost of $170 per man. Camp Polk 
had been constructed at a cost of $1 ,263 per man, averaged out at 
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Among the major peacetime military construction projects 
were the many contracts to build Capehart housing for military fam-
ilies in Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal Zone. Paul B. Schultz 
inspected the $5.4 million contract for living units being erected on 
the west coast of the Canal Zone. In January 1960, he reported that 
the 134 units of Area One were 93 percent finished, Area Two's 100 
domiciles 67 percent completed, and Area Three's 96 units 9 per-
cent completed. 
Capehart housing was basically the same in Puerto Rico and 
the Canal Zone, but the different climatic characteristics necessi-
tated some building changes. For example, the outside stairways on 
the four-family buildings in Puertq Rico were not satisfactory in the 
Canal Zone because of the excessive rainfall in that region. The long 
rainy season, with over 120 inches annual rainfall, meant adding 
electric clothes dryers to the unit design. The parking area for Fort 
Davis had to be placed continguous to the housing to accommo-
date family living under these wet conditions. The soil laboratory 
reported swelling tendencies of 3 to 4 percent, which caused the 
district to abandon terrazzo flooring at Fort Clayton in the Canal 
Zone. In spite of these differences, the division's building program 
kept pace with the initial construction schedule.J7 
In addition to military housing, the Jacksonville District per-
formed the usual construction and maintenance for the Army and 
Air Force. The erection of a crypto room at Fort Buchanan, Puerto 
Rico, in 1964, called for a work space surrounded by 8-inch ma-
sonry walls, with a reinforced concrete floor, and all reinforcing bars 
grounded to the crypto room ground (a ground bar embedded in 
the wall encircling the room about 6 inches above the floor). The 
standard commercial metal-clad door was set in a 16-gauge 
frame.1a 
District engineers in Puero Rico were involved in several pro-
jects at Ramey Air Force Base, improving apron lighting and build-
ing a new jet fuel storage farm, when the 2 July 1964 issue of the 
San Juan Star carried a headline, "Navy Public Works Office to 
Handle Caribbean Jobs." That same morning, the area engineer in 
San Juan sent a dispatch message to the district engineer quoting 
extensively from the newspaper report. Subsequently, in July 1964, 
the district turned over its Caribbean military construction to the 
Navy.J9 
The Jacksonville District participated directly in the Vietnam 
conflict through the employment of one of its dredges, the Hyde, in 
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Willie J. Williams, civilian cook on the Hyde and one of the 
three men injured in the mine explosion, transferred to the 
Davison, the Hyde's replacement, and he remained in the war 
zone. On 16 January 1969, Williams was fatally injured in another 
mine explosion while he was riding a launch back to the Davison. 
On 14 July 1969, District Engineer, Colonel John F. McElhenny 
presented Williams' widow his Purple Heart and Vietnam Civilian 
Service medal posthumously.22 
In June 1970 the Jacksonville District turned its military con-
struction projects over to the Mobile District. This change in tasks 
placed the district in the same status it had prior to 1940. However, if 
the need arose, the Jacksonville District has demonstrated that it is 
capable of moving into a pressure lade ned situation and producing 
the desired results in military construction. 
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CHAPTER 11 
Cape Canaveral 
CAPE CANAVERAL Is LOCATED on the east coast of Florida almost 
midway between Jacksonville and Miami along the Intracoastal Wa-
terway. The Florida coast trends generally south-southeast, but, 
about 50 miles north of the cape, the shore begins to veer to the 
east This change in direction projects a long, curved coastline out 
into the Atlantic Ocean. At the cape there is a sudden reversal as the 
beach turns westward. This is followed by a long arc, trending first 
southwest, then south and finally, south-southeast, rejoining the 
general alignment of the peninsula's shoreline some 30 miles south 
of the cape. A shoal extends southeasterly from the cape farther into 
the Atlantic for 7 to 8 miles, with water depths varying from 3 to 16 
feet The shoal and the recurving south shoreline of the cape en-
close the area of deeper water, known as the Canaveral Bight, 
wherein water depths of 20 to 40 feet are found. 
The northwest tip of the bight, which is approximately 3 miles 
west-southwest from the cape, is known as Canaveral Harbor. 
Knowing of the protection offered by the Canaveral Bight, mariners 
have sought shelter at Canaveral Harbor from storms at sea for 
many years. The anchorage provides a relatively safe haven from 
the most common storms approaching from the north and east; 
only the occasional tempest from the southeast threatens a ship 
anchored at Canaveral Harbor. I 
As early as 1889, local interests were advocating the construc-
tion of a deep water harbor along the shore of the Canaveral Bight 
But, the area, sparsely settled, did not command the backing neces-
sary for such a project WhenJ. Francis LeBaron traveled through 
the region in 1869, he reported that there were only a dozen settlers 
within a radius of 20 miles of the haulover, which was about 35 miles 
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prime movers in placing plans for a port at Canaveral before Con-
gress and the Corps of Engineers. Their plans for the new port were 
more complex than the earlier projects. It was no longer just a chan-
nel from deep water to a dockside terminal on the shores of 
Canaveral Bight Now, the plan envisioned a dredged cut through 
the barrier beach to Banana River. On the river there would be a 
turning basin with terminal facilities, and the seaward approaches to 
the cut would be protected by jetties. A tributary canal was requested 
to link up the seaport facilities with the intracoastal canal to the west 
This canal would cut through Merritt Island, which separated Indian 
River from Banana River.6 
District Engineer, Colonel Lewis H. Watkins held a public hear-
ing at Cocoa on 13 February 1939 to discuss this project. There 
were about 300 persons at the meeting representing many civic 
organizations and municipalities from the eastern and central sec-
tions of Florida. The Canaveral Harbor District, in existence at the 
time, submitted its economic survey prepared by the New York con-
sulting engineering firm of R. S. MacElwee. On behalf of the Atlantic 
Peninsula Corporation, C. C. Kirkpatrick, traffic analyst, presented 
data substantiating the harbor district's survey. Colonel W. C. Weeks 
was the district engineer when the district finally submitted its evalu-
ation of the project in 1941. Concluding that the project was not 
feasible at the time, Weeks recommended that no action be taken 
by the Federal Government 
Division Engineer, ColoneiJarvisJ. Bain reversed Weeks' deci-
sion. He thought that Weeks had overestimated construction costs 
and had underestimated the freight tonnage to be generated by 
such an enterprise. Bain recommended an entrance canal, guarded 
by two jetties, through the barrier land from the 27 -foot contour line 
in the Atlantic to a 27 -foot turning basin in the Banana River. The 
basin would be enclosed by a dike, with a lock constructed through 
it leading to an 8-foot deep barge canal running west to the Intra-
coastal Waterway.7 Of course, the local interests had to obtain the 
right-of-way, spoil disposal areas, etc., and had to demonstrate that 
public facilities would be created in furtherance of the project before 
the Corps of Engineers would begin construction. Complying with 
these stipulations required time on the part of the local organiza-
tions. 
The State created a governing body known as the Canaveral 
Port Authority to oversee the non-Federal aspects of the program. 
Five million dollars in revenue certificates and bonds were autho-
rized to carry out local responsibilities. On 22 February 194 7, the 
Canaveral Port Authority informed the district engineer, Colonel Wil-
lis E. Teale, that plans and specifications for the proposed port had 
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tending about 150 feet into the channel from the south shore of the 
cut The U.S. hopper dredge Hyde worked on the entrance channel 
the first 3 months of 1952, but the lack of progress halted its opera-
tions until conditions could be stabilized. From that time on, sea-
ward dredging efforts were employed only to maintain the channel. 
During fiscal year 1953, the entrance channel was dredged four 
times to keep the waterway open. 
Emergency construction was initiated on a south groin in June 
1953, in an effort to halt the shoaling of the channel. It consisted of 
an 813-foot shoreward section with a 445-foot revetment. This 
groin work was underway before the seaward extension of the south 
jetty had been made. Both tasks were under construction from June 
to November 1953. Between December 1953 and June 1954, the 
north jetty was built it was 1,150 feet long with a 300-foot revetment 
attached. Gradually, conditions improved as the north jetty took 
shape; by early September 1954, the work was complete. 
At the end of fiscal year 1958, port construction work had been 
completed, except for the lock connecting the turning basin with the 
Intracoastal Waterway. This task was deferred for further study. 
By this time, the military services utilizing the missile complex 
at Canaveral needed greater depth at the entrance channel and in 
the turning basin. Service funds were transferred to the district to 
dredge a 33-foot basin with a 36-foot outer channel. Later, in 1961, 
as the military required additional depths, the outer channel was 
deepened to 37 feet, the entrance to 36 feet, and the turning basin to 
35 feet At the same time, the barge canal lock was authorized and 
constructed with enlarged dimensions of 125 feet wide, 600 feet 
long, and 12 feet deep.9 
Man-made Port 
Canaveral, built under 
Corps of Engineer 
contracts and 
supervision in 1950-52, 
has since undergone 
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Nearby, Patrick Air Force Base was being renovated. The base 
had originally been the Naval Air Station, Banana River, during 
World War II. In the post-war years, it had deteriorated rapidly after 
being phased out of operational use. When the Air Force acquired 
the installation, the district had the task of renewing the base. In the 
first 6 months of its existence, the Patrick Area Office expended 
almost $1.7 million in construction contracts. 
In 1951, the district began building a skid-strip which was a 
7 ,000-foot long, 300-foot wide landing strip, designed for the recov-
ery of SNARK, a winged missile. This was a time of transition in the 
air age from the pre-ballistic weapons to the ballistic. The SNARK 
was one of the last of the winged missiles to be phased out as strate-
gic plans shifted to the ballistic carriers of nuclear weapons. The 
SNARK had a 6,000 mile range at cruising speeds of 600 miles per 
hour. Its landing gear consisted of skids; therefore, the ski-strip was 
surfaced with compacted limerock fill. During the test phase of the 
SNARK operations, some of the missiles were flown downrange, 
then returned to land, which saved considerable funds through re-
covering and reusing the missile.1 1 In 1955, the skid-strip was 
lengthened to 10,000 feet with a 1 ,000-foot overrun at each end. 
Later, the whole area was hard-topped with asphalt concrete to at-
tain its present status as an all-weather airfield. 
Missile science developed rapidly during the 1950's and 
1960's, and the district's knowledge of space structures advanced 
with the hardware. After the Bumpers came the LARK, first 
launched in October 1950. The engineers constructed the original 
scaffolding to service this missile on the pad. By present day stand-
ards, this early service tower resembled a painter's scaffold. The 
lARK's blockhouse was an army tank pressed into service. 
REDSTONE's service tower was the forerunner of the now 
famed gantries so familiar to viewers of launchings of the nation's 
manned space vehicles. It was designed to provide access to all 
levels of the missile while it stood in an upright launch position. The 
service tower was constructed on an A-frame mast which rose 140 
feet above the pad. On the mast were cantilevered work platforms 
which could encircle the missile, allowing access to all stations on 
the vehicle. Elevators brought technicians up and down the mast to 
the desired level, from the ground to the 15-ton hammerhead crane 
at the top, or to any intermediate level. The structural steel base 
which supported the mast was mounted on railway tracks. This 
massive, self-propelled unit was designed to move to the missile or 
back away from it The Noble Company of Oakland, California, built 
the REDSTONE service tower and transported it to the cape in 14 
railway cars. Seven of the company's men re-assembled the tower 
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at the launch site within 5 days after delivery. The service tower was 
available almost immediately thereafter for REDSTONE's maiden 
flighl12 
The shift to ballistic missiles demanded new construction de-
signs for the launching complex. These new vehicles generated tre-
mendous forces thrust down upon the pad. The engineers had to 
design structures to carry off the high heat and flame produced 
during ignition and launch. Then, too, this new technology required 
complex communication systems between the vehicle and the con-
trol area. The engine~rs had to design and construct the physical 
systems to carry the myriad parts of the overall launch to their 
proper places. 
Yet, the problems were not as divergent as one might expect 
The missiles being developed were similar to their predecessors; 
thus, the various component parts of the launch resembled those 
which had gone before. There was the missile assembly and check-
out building, the transportation system to the launch area, the 
launch pad, the service tower, and the blockhouse. Although each 
new missile made different demands upon these stations, the simi-
larities narrowed the variations to matters of degree. 
The Jacksonville engineers built 21 missile assembly build-
ings, which resembled hangars, before the Saturn, Apollo, and Titan 
Ill vehicles were introduced. It was in these buildings that the com-
ponent parts of the missiles were gathered to be assembled. Unlike 
aircraft hangars, the missile assembly buildings were honey-
combed with covered trenches, below the ground floor, which car-
ried the myriad power circuits, testing devices, compressed oxygen, 
and other gasses necessary to launch a missile. 
Overhead, the buildings all housed cranes for lifting and mov-
ing the huge sections of the missile as it was assembled. The cranes 
were unlike ordinary industrial cranes. Because the interior space of 
the missile assembly building had to be free from all encum-
brances, the crane bridges were of an underslung design, moving 
on rails suspended from roof trusses. Each bridge covered half the 
main bay, but interlocked with another bridge on the other half. This 
arrangement allowed the crane to cover the whole bay.D Learning 
from the earlier structures, the Jacksonville District built the last 16 
missile assembly buildings utilizing a basic design, which allowed 
the standard frame to be fabricated, even as the special design fea-
tures were being planned for the specific missile series pro-
grammed to undergo tests. 
From a construction point of view, the most individual and 
complex portion of the missile assembly building was the emplace-
ment of utilities supporting each missile series. The missile deter-
mined, with great exactitude, where and what services were 
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During the era of the intermediate range ballistic missiles, the 
igloo had base walls of 2-foot reinforced concrete. The dome of the 
structure was much more solid, beginning with a 5~-foot thickness 
at the base, and increasing to 8 feet at the crown. Three layers of 4-
inch armored glass provided viewing ports. The degree of protec-
tion provided varied with the potential explosive force of the missile. 
Atlas complexes numbers 11 through 14, had inside walls 1 0~-foot 
thickness, then 7 feet of sand held in place by a gunite-concrete 
shell.15 The Atlas blockhouse was a far cry from the early sand-
bagged army tank. 
To track the missiles after launch, the district engineers have 
built everything from periscope mounts to complex buildings hous-
ing radio and radio installations necessary to monitor all aspects of 
space flight To interconnect all of these various forms of communi-
cation data, the district engineers have laid about 400 miles of un-
derground ducting, just within the 9 square miles on the cape 
proper. To include Merritt Island, Titan Ill, and Apollo Saturn com-
plexes, would add greatly to the total mileage. 
In addition to the space structures at the cape, the Corps spent 
over $8 million on conventional military base construction at Patrick 
Air Force Base. The old World War ll buildings were renovated or 
replaced. One new and unconventional building was the technical 
laboratory built at Patrick. This massive structure, with 455,000 
square feet of floor space, is a dominating structure on the base. It is 
here that the data are collected, collated, and displayed to the scien-
tists and technicians working on America's newest frontier -
space.16 
Commensurate with the growth of the space program, was the 
growth of the Jacksonville District personnel attached to the Patrick 
Area Office. The first three engineers arrived at the cape in May 1950 
where they immediately went to work on the Bumper 8launch pad. 
It was September before they had a chance to move into their of-
fices at Patrick Air Force Base. From that meager beginning, the 
Patrick Area Office grew as it designed and constructed the launch 
and support systems of the Thor, Redstone, Vanguard, Pershing, 
Jupiter, Atlas, Polaris, Minuteman, Titan, and Saturn I missiles. All of 
these programs called for new designs to be met under exacting 
timetables. 
By January 1963, the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration (NASA) was ready for the Apollo, and the Air Force was 
ready for its Titan Ill programs. The Chief of Engineers decided that 
these projects demanded closer administrative and support organi-
zation than could be provided from a distant district office, even one 
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CHAPTER12 
Interoceanic Canal 
Study 
ON 22 SEPTEMBER 1964, Congress authorized President Lyndon B. 
Johnson to appoint a commission of fwe men to make a complete 
study of the feasibility of a sea-level canal across Central America. 
The Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission was em-
powered to conduct on-site surveys for selecting the most suitable 
route, to determine the type of construction to be employed (con-
ventional or nuclear excavation), and to estimate the cost of the 
proposed project. It was authorized to utilize the facilities of any 
agency of the executive branch of government, and to expend up to 
$24 million in the process.1 
Almost a year later, the Commission requested that the Chief of 
Engineers be its engineering agent. He, in turn, delegated to the 
Jacksonville District Engineer the responsibility of collecting data in 
the field, and of conducting the engineering studies. The district 
engineer entrusted this task to Mr. Edward W. Eden, Jr. However, 
nuclear aspects did not come under the district engineer's control. 
The Atomic Energy Commission supervised the nuclear operations 
and safety while the U.S. Army Engineer Nuclear Cratering Group 
had charge of the nuclear excavation design. 
District Engineer, Colonel R. P. Tabb established his Interoce-
anic Canal Studies Field Office in the Canal Zone on 22 July 1965. 
His field director, Colonel Alex Sutton, Corps of Engineers, super-
vised the on-site data collection and was the United States' repre-
sentative on the Joint Canal Study Commissions created in both 
Panama and Colombia. He served in this capacity until his office 
was abolished on 31 July 1969. 
There were so many supporting organizations involved in this 
project that the Commission created the Canal Studies Coordinat-
ing Committee, composed of the Atomic Energy Commission, the 
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Rico Nuclear Center, the Smithsonian Institution, the Stevens Insti-
tute of Technology, the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey, 
the United States Naval Ship Research and Development Center, 
the University of Florida, the University of Michigan, and the Water-
ways Experiment Station of the Corps of Engineers.2 
The United States has been interested in an interoceanic canal 
since the mid-nineteenth century. Since the Panama Canal was 
opened to traffic on 15 August 1914, many studies have been con-
ducted by the Government to plan for the time when the canal 
would reach its maximum ship transit capacity. The 194 7 report of 
the Governor of the Panama Canal listed 30 possible routes, from 
the Isthmus ofTehauntepec in Mexico to the northwestern region of 
Colombia, as potential locations for alternative crossings. The Atlan-
tic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission used the 194 7 
route numbers for its own investigation. 
Initially, the Commission contemplated investigating the fol-
lowing proposals: 
-Route 8 was a sea-level canal along the Nicaragua-Costa 
Rica border to be built primarily by nuclear procedures. 
-Route 14 was the present lock canal converted to a sea-level 
canal using conventional excavation. 
-Route 17 was a sea-level canal crossing the Darien Isthmus 
to be constructed by nuclear methods. 
-Route 25 was a sea-level cut traversing the Atrato-Truando 
region of northwestern Colombia to be built by a combination of 
conventional dredging across the Atrato Flood Plains and a nuclear 
excavation across the Choco Highlands to the Pacific. 
It was determined that only Routes 1 7 and 25 would be sub-
jected to an in-depth field study, and that existing records were ade-
quate for the other proposals. The Commission later requested a 
review and update of cost estimates for improving the present Pan-
ama Canal while maintaining the lock system of transit (Route 15 ), 
and for building a new lock canal (Route 5) in Nicaragua. Some 
months later, in 1966, it was determined that a new sea-level canal, 
near the Panama Canal yet distant enough so as not to interfere with 
present canal operations, was preferable to Route 14 (the conver-
sion of the Panama Canal to a sea-level waterway). This led to the 
addition of Route 1 0 as a sea-level canal to be constructed by con-
ventional methods south of Routes 14 and 15. 
Eventually, eight routes in four different geographic regions of 
the American Isthmus were chosen to be studied: two traversing 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica; three clustered about the present Pan-
ama Canal; one crossing the Darien Isthmus; and the final two near 
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~ing 150 feet (the divide's 
lowest point in Central America). There are a number of active vol-
canoes in this locale. Tropical moist forests, having both evergreen 
and deciduous trees, cover much of the area. Temperatures seldom 
rise above 95! F. or fall below 70! F. Rainfall averages 250 inches per 
year on the Atlantic coast, decreasing to 60 inches annually on the 
Pacific side. Population density is as varied as the rainfall, but in an 
inverse proportion with the eastern jungles, holding fwe persons per 
square mile. The Pacific slopes and the shores of Lake Nicaragua 
and Lake Managua average 25 persons per square mile. 
The district engineer survey teams plotting the canal alignment 
east of Lake Nicaragua worked through the underdeveloped, 
sparsely inhabited, thick jungle. Even on the more densely settled 
western portion of the proposed routes, the population centers of 
both Nicaragua and Costa Rica were over 1 00 miles from the 
planned canal. 
The east coast jumping-off place was the small town of San 
Juan del Norte at the mouth of the San Juan River, where cargo 
ships could not approach closer than 3 miles to shore. Supplies for 
the surveyors had to be brought off in lighters. Much of the surface 
travel inland was performed in native dugouts powered by outboard 
motors. Even this method was painfully slow because of the snags 
and blowdowns which closed the jungle streams. The survey lines 
were cleared by native labor whenever possible. Work camps, often 
supplied by Air Force helicopters, were set up along the way. 
In the next region, the Panamanian Isthmus is both low and 
narrow. Routes 14 and 15 (this is the present Panama Canal, modi-
fied by improving the present locks, Route 15, or converted to a sea 
level route, Route 14) cross the Continental Divide where its altitude 
is 300 feet above sea level. Route 10, to the south, would traverse a 
slightly higher elevation. This region is serviced by the two urban 
centers of Colon (population 85,000) on the Atlantic and Panama 
City (population 415,000) on the Pacific coast The two terminals 
are linked by a railroad and a two-lane highway, as well as the 
present canal. 
Route 1 0 provided the most primitive conditions for survey 
teams in this region. Most of the ground cover consists of tropical 
moist forests with multi-storied canopies. In the southern portion of 
the zone, small savannas are scattered about throughout the jungle. 
The area has a rainy season from mid-April to mid-December. An-
nual rainfall varies from 130 inches on the Atlantic side to 70 inches 
on the Pacific. 
Of course, the surveyors were not continually hacking their way 
through Panama jungles. The rolling hills on the Pacific slope have 
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1\11 of this data lent credence 
to a proposed canal, but much more on-site information was 
needed. Between 1966 and 1969, the Jacksonville District con-
ducted extensive field surveys as it studied all aspects of the locale. 
The country of Panama has four major types of forest, and all 
four are to be found along the Darien crossing. The Caribbean 
coastline has a narrow strip of sand beach along Caledonia Bay. 
Almost immediately, the tropical moist forest, with its tall deciduous 
trees shading the lower evergreens and palms, cover the terrain. Ten 
miles inland is the Continental Divide where the lowest suitable 
crossing for nuclear excavation is Sasardi Pass, at an elevation of 
1,000 feet Here, the vegetation is premontane wet forest Thereaf-
ter, Route 1 7 runs south-southwest toward the Gulf of San Miguel. 
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standing the region. 
The Interoceanic Canal Studies Field Office was interested in 
more than the basic physical properties of climate and land along 
the proposed route. The indigenuous cultures were studied for 
knowledge of the social and agricultural organizations of the Indians 
to be affected by a canal. Such information was a vital element in the 
engineering decision about to be made. Marine and terrestrial plant 
and animal life were studied to assess their relation to the Indian's 
food chain. To protect the lives of the many construction personnel 
necessary to create the project when a favorable decision is 
reached, insect and animal specimens were collected along the 
way. Animal blood samples were analyzed to determine the types of 
potential human illnesses residing in nature's living reservoirs of dis-
eases. All of this data was painstakingly gathered from 1966 
to 1969. 
The Atrato-Truando region of northwestern Colombia is prob-
ably even less known than the Darien Isthmus. Route 25 in the 
Atrato-Truando area is, in many ways, a mirror image of Route 17. 
The Atlantic terminal would be located in the Gulf of Uraba. The 
canal alignment would follow the Atrato valley through marsh-type 
soil. The flood plain is covered with impenetrable thickets of tall 
grasses, cane-like palms, and bush-type plants. As the route leaves 
the marshes, the rolling uplands of the Choco Highlands are en-
countered, consisting of multi-storied hardwoods. In this region the 
Continental Divide shifts to the Pacific side lying within 20 miles of 
the coasts. The divide is covered with dense, low evergreens, mixed 
with epiphytes and woody vines. Passes range in altitude from 900 
to 1 ,000 feet The proposed canal would terminate at the mouth of 
the Curiche River, which empties into Humbolt Bay. It is the Pacific 
coast which has the sandy beach in this zone. The rainfall ranges 
from 80 inches at the Gulf of Uraba to 200 inches on the Pacific side. 
The Jacksonville engineers had to make the same extensive 
investigation of the Atrato-Truando region as that made in the Da-
rien Isthmus. A base camp was established on Curiche Beach for 
the Pacific operations. It was supplied by Army LCM's and the beach 
was used as an airstrip by small aircraft. From here, a 78-mile base-
line ran from the Pacific coast across the Choco Highlands to the 
Atrato River. In all, 160 miles of cross sections were surveyed. Using 
aerial mapping, 540 square miles of the surface were plotted. 
Along the Atrato River the marshlands provided very little solid, 
dry ground for base camp operations. Therefore, the district had to 
employ barges to be used as a floating base camp. 
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CHAPTER13 
Water Hyacinths 
IN ALL HISTORICAL PROCESSES there is a problem of continuity and 
change. Seldom is there a complete break with the past, particularly 
so with institutional history. Often, times change so gradually as to 
be imperceptible to those living through the process. The district's 
struggles to contain the spread of the noxious weed called the water 
hyacinth, is an excellent example of the growth and development of 
the services rendered by the Corps during the last decades of the 
nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth. The project arose 
as a result of the direct appeal of private commercial interests re-
questing governmental aid against a natural phenomenon which 
was disrupting river communications along the St Johns River. By 
the third quarter of the twentieth century, the struggle had led the 
district into a new frontier - the science of biological engineering -
to serve not a limited group of shippers, but all of the people. 
The water hyacinth is a beautiful, free-floating, freshwater plant 
Its dark green leaves rise above the water's surface from its bulb-like 
base, while in the center of the plant towers a spike of lavender 
flowers, presenting an attractive appearance. The plant's beauty is 
undoubtedly the reason for the water hyacinth's rapid spread 
throughout the southeastern states. When the flower fades, after 24 
to 48 hours of bloom, the stalk bends in the middle, thrusting the 
flower spike with its seed pods under water. Upon the completion of 
the ripening process, the seeds are released to settle on the bottom 
or to become entangled in the roots of the plant, for beneath the 
water's surface lurks a bushy mass of fibrous roots, from 6 to 24 
inches in length, extending away from the leaf bulb. The seed retains 
its powers of germination for seven or more years under water. 
Throughout the year, two crops of plants will mature during the 
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On 3 June 1896, 2 months after Handbury wrote the above, 
Major James B. Quinn received an appropriation of $1 ,000 to rid 
the Tickfau River in Louisiana of the pest. At that time, water hya-
cinths were confined to the southern waters of Louisiana and the St. 
Johns River in Aorida. 
The following year, Lieutenant Colonel W. H. H. Benyaurd, 
stationed in St. Augustine, and Major Quinn, were appointed a two-
officer board to investigate the hyacinth menace. They were inter-
ested in the origins of this plant as a function of their duties, and they 
recorded all the information they could gather. Assistant Engineer 
John Warren Sackett (who later became one of two civilians to hold 
the position of Jacksonville District Engineer) told the Board that the 
water hyacinth was "a native of Venezuela and [it] was introduced 
into this country as an ornamental plant many years ago." The 
Board also recorded that "It has been stated and very generally 
believed that the plant was introduced from Europe some seven or 
eight years ago and planted in a small pond near Palatka. Here it 
flourished to such an extent that ... the plants were taken from the 
pond and thrown ... into the river." It then offered yet another story: 
"Other opinions have been given that years ago the hyacinth was 
known on the lower St. Johns. It is further stated that the extensive 
marsh between Lake Harney and the source of the river is, and has 
been for years, the hiding place and nursery of the plant."3 
The basis for the Palatka tale was derived from a newspaper 
article read by Colonel Benyaurd while he was in New York City in 
1896. The 20 September issue of the Sun carried a lengthy article 
and photograph concerning the hyacinth · infestation of the St. 
Johns River. Benyaurd clipped the item and sent it to Chief Engi-
neer, Brigadier General William P. Craighill.4 
The Sun reporter had interviewed Mr. J. E. Lucas, owner of 
several steamboats, operating on the St. Johns, who said: "I know 
the man who brought the first plant to Florida, ... and he thought 
that he did the State a favor. I have it from his own lips, and I've 
known him since long before that time, for I used to carry him up the 
river in a launch year after year to his orange grove. He was Mr. 
Fuller, father ofW. F. Fuller of Brooklyn, owner of Edgewater Grove, 
... seven miles above Palatka ... I understand that he brought them 
from Europe."5 
In discussing the situation in Louisiana, the Board noted: "No 
definite statement has been made as to the length of time that the 
streams in Louisiana have been affected. It may be stated, however, 
that one of the members of the Board, when in charge of certain 
river and harbor improvements in the State some twenty years ago, 
had the plant and its peculiarities described, and it is believed that it 
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Between wind and current, the plants began gathering at the bridge. 
This halted their journey north down the river to the sea and destruc-
tion. The growing plant became formidable. Not only did it impede 
water traffic, but, when the wind blew the tangled growth against the 
town docks at Palatka, the steamers had to spend hours fighting 
their way from the dock to midchannel against the relentless pres-
sure of the living green mass. 
The bridge was being rebuilt in the summer and fall of 1894 
with the same low clearance as the earlier bridge. The citizens of 
Palatka became alarmed; they called upon one of the town's leading 
citizens to remedy the situation. President E. S. Crill of the East Flor-
ida Savings and Trust Company, wrote to Florida Representative C. 
M. Cooper in Washington for aid. If the structure were raised above 
the water to provide sufficient clearance, the plants could float 
downriver to the Atlantic and extinction. If no changes were made 
on the bridge, then the inhabitants of the St. Johns River valley could 
look forward to annual occurrences of plant blockades. President 
Crill told his representative that "no one can realize how fast this 
plant multiplies and spreads; and when I say acres, I mean acres and 
hundreds of acres."1o Crill's communication made the rounds from 
Representative Cooper to the Secretary of War to the Corps of Engi-
neers, to Major Thomas Handbury in St. Augustine, and back to the 
Chief of Engineers, between 9 February and 10 April 1895. The 
major said that he would talk with the railroad officials about the 
bridge, in the hopes that they would voluntarily provide some relief. 
Bridge at Palatka, 
showing three small 
steamers attempting to 
make their way through 
a mass of Hyacinths. 
Courtesy U.S. Senate. 
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percent of the water. Tests made by Sackett on the crushed pulp did 
indeed prove his speculation to be accurate; crushing effectively 
killed the weed. But, it was a very slow and laborious process. Sack-
ett left John E. Harris in charge of this phase of work at St. Francis 
while he went upstream to experiment with gathering and towing 
the weed to areas for destruction. 
For this new project, Sackett had a net built of three-sixteenths 
of an inch cotton line, with one lead and one cork border. The com-
plete rig was 200 yards long. He discovered that the tow boat could 
encircle a mass of the hyacinth by proceeding slowly, and, if the 
wind and current were favorable, he could move the plants about 
However, too great a speed, adverse wind, or the wrong current 
would put a heavy strain on the net When this happened, the plants 
crowd up to the net, sink the cork line, and tumble free. It was not a 
very practical solution. 
Next, the district tried chemicals. Muriatic acid, sulphuric acid, 
and carbolic acid were used in varying strengths with negative 
results. While the tops of the plants suffered from the acids, the 
bulbs and roots were not damaged, and soon they had put forth 
growth as high as that which had recently been destroyed. The engi-
neers tried jets of steam, at 70 pounds of pressure, with similar 
results. When kerosene was sprayed on the weed there was no reac-
tion at all- the plants continued to grow. 
Sackett and the Board discarded the idea of employing some 
animal or parasitic growth against the water hyacinth in view of ear-
lier disasters caused by the introduction of rabbits into Australia and 
the Australian lady bug into Califomia.J3 
In February 1899, John Sackett visited Louisiana to check on 
the progress of Assistant Engineer P. H. Thomson, who was 
engaged in the same work in that state. Thomson had tried a satura-
tion solution of salt mixed with quick lime. It was fatal to water hya-
cinth, but the cost was prohibitive. 
Sackett returned to Florida to recommend to the Board that 
two sternwheellight-draft steamers be built, fitted to gather hya-
cinths from the bow to feed to crushing rollers. His plan was ac-
cepted and funded. The vessel's design was carried out, but, 
because the frost during the winter of 1899-1900 destroyed much 
of the hyacinth on the St. Johns River, it was decided to hold up 
construction to await the results from the steamer being built in 
Louisiana. The next year, Sackett again visited Louisiana where it 
was determined that the steamer, while effective in killing the weeds, 
could not keep pace with the vigorous growth of the hyacinths. 
Meanwhile, the Harvesta Chemical Compounding Company 
of New Orleans had developed a chemical spray which seemed to 
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Captain Shunk continued to spray until January 1904 when 
funds ran out and the Le Reve was laid up at Jacksonville. From 
November 1902, a total of 1,178,602 gallons had been used to 
destroy 14,144,018 square yards of the plant. This program had 
relieved hyacinth congestion and had promoted river traffic. The 
captain noted that after the shift to bicarbonate of sodium, there 
were considerably fewer complaints from the cattlemen and he was 
confident that in none of the complaints had it "been clearly shown 
that the injury could be traced to the compound."15ln reality, it may 
have been that the cattlemen shifted their grievances from the dis-
trict to Washington, for the River and Harbors Act of 3 March 1905 
singled out Florida as the only state where "no chemical process 
injurious to cattle which may feed upon the water hyacinth shall be 
used."16 Spraying in Florida came to an end, although other south-
em states were free to use chemicals. 
In 1896, when water hyacinths were first brought to the atten-
tion of the Corps of Engineers as a menace in Florida, John Sackett 
wrote: 'The subject is a novel one."I7 Almost a decade later Captain 
Shunk could well have replied "Amen!" to Sackett's remarks. In No-
vember 1905, Headquarters in Washington authorized him to hire 
cattle to probe further into the problems connected with spraying. 
Shunk set up his operation at Riveria, 2 miles below Palatka on the 
east bank of the St. Johns. 
The crudeness of his experiments, and his frustrations as an 
engineer turned experimenter, are best expressed in his final report. 
He tried numerous mixtures which he sprayed on the plants to keep 
the cattle from eating the hyacinths. Captain Shunk tried aloes, a 
very bitter substance, but the cattle ate the plants without pause. 
Next he used whale oil soap. The animals didn't notice the solution, 
nor did they stop eating. Finally, he applied a mixture of badly de-
composed eggs, dissolved in water. That horrid spread turned away 
the cattle. Even after a heavy drenching rain the animals refused to 
touch the plants. At the end of 8 days it was still effective, but a storm 
carried away the sprayed plants before Shunk could determine how 
long it would remain effective. 
Just as victory seemed near, Captain Shunk failed. When he 
added to his solution the compounds of arsenic and copper to kill 
the hyacinths, the killing compounds eliminated the putrefactive or-
ganisms of his mixture. Within a few days the cattle were eating as 
before. Shunk decided that the only answer was to return to the 
mechanical method. I a 
The district was not concentrating exclusively upon spraying to 
eliminate the water hyacinths. In March 1900, the district engineer 
became aware of a patented invention of Joseph Allan of Macon, 
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the center for the hull of the boat In all, the three axles, with saws 
spinning at 1 ,000 rpm, would cut a 1 0-foot swath through the hya-
cinth. Behind the sawboat would be a channel of shredded leaves 
and rhizomes, which would decompose and sink in about 2 weeks. 
Generally, the area cut would be passed over four different times to 
macerate the debris; if the rhizomes were not materially damaged 
there was the possibility of regeneration. During an 8-hour day, a 
sawboat could cut about 8 acres. The cost varied between $3.50 
and $35 an acre, depending on plant size and ease of access of the 
boat 
The sawboat's propulsion depended upon the same cotton gin 
saws revoMng in the water. In clear areas it could achieve speeds of 
4 or 5 mph, but this speed was reduced considerably among the 
hyacinths. The sawboat was limited to rather open reaches of water 
carrying at least 18-inches depth because there was no reverse to 
the propulsion system. 
To keep a creek from emptying its plants into the main stream, 
the district sometimes built booms to hold back the hyacinths. In 
some places, elaborate booms were designed to open when the 
tide was running out, to hurry the plants on to the sea; when the tide 
shifted, the booms closed to check hyacinth drift upriver. 
Water hyacinths spread southward into Lake Okeechobee. 
During the reclamation era, when drainage canals were connected 
to the lake, the ubiquitous weed followed the man-made waterways 
to the coast South Florida has ideal growing conditions for water 
hyacinth and the plant prospered. The infestation of the canals be-
gan with their link-up to Lake Okeechobee about 1918. By the mid-
twenties, it was necessary to employ a clamshell dredge with a 
Conveyor system pulls 
Hyacinths into shredder 
on Lake Okeechobee, 
March 1973 when Corps 
of Engineers conducted 
crash spraying program. 
Courtesy Corps of 
Engineers. 
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were helpful, though, because they dispersed the sprayed mats 
along the river. The rains also flushed out many of the river's tribu-
taries, bringing more hyacinths into range of the spraying crews. In 
spite of the weather setbacks, the project was completed in 50 days 
with over 3,000 acres sprayed.21 
Meanwhile, experimentation continued with other methods of 
weed removal. One under investigation was biological control, 
which began in 1959. Earlier success with the Argentine flea beetle 
to combat alligator weed, led to the introduction of the Argentine 
mottled water hyacinth weevil (neochetina eichhorniae). Adult in-
sects were brought into the country, quarantined briefly in California, 
then transferred to the quarantine laboratory at Fort Lauderdale. 
Water hyacinth leaves and stems were used for feeding the adult 
weevils who soon placed eggs in the plants. The eggs were carefully 
removed, washed in a 0.5 percent hypochlorite solution to eliminate 
any fungus spores which might have been accidently transmitted 
from the adult weevil, and the cleaned eggs replaced in new plants. 
These eggs were then moved into the field to be placed among the 
healthy hyacinths. 
The eggs were released on 23 August 1972 at Collier Estates 
in Fort Lauderdale. It requires 7 to 10 days for emergence of the 
larva. Three months in the larva stage is followed by 2 weeks in the 
pupal stage in an underwater cocoon. The final cycle is the emer-
gence of the adult weevil. The new adult begins feeding on the plant 
immediately, producing many feeding spots on the hyacinths. In 
southern Florida, the weevil, which normally lives about 1 year, 
should be able to produce overlapping generations. It will take sev-
eral years before the impact of the hyacinth weevil can be deter-
mined in the field. It is not the final answer, but it is expected to keep 
the weed down to more manageable levels. Undoubtedly, all three 
methods- mechanical, chemical, and biological- will continue to 
be employed.22 
Puerto Rico's aquatic weed problem is limited to water hya-
cinth but the island faces a different set of circumstances. There is 
very Httle fresh water navigation within the island; most commercial 
and private boaters use the ocean. The dangers presented by the 
weed include the clogging of the hydroelectric plants, the aque-
ducts, and sewerage pumping stations. The green menace also 
blocks irrigation systems when it fills the canals and ditches. In the 
past, Puerto Rico has relied heavily upon 2,4-D spraying in the reser-
voirs supplying water to hydroelectric plants. There has also been 
some experimentation with water snails which feed upon the hya-
cinths. Similar to the mainland, Puerto Rico will have to use all three 
methods to control the plant23 
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CHAPTER14 
For The 
Commonweal 
IN RECENT DECADES, there has been a subtle shift in the district's 
projects from those works requested by private vested interests to 
broader undertakings for the benefit of the commonweal. Several 
court decisions rendered for the Jacksonville District help demon-
strate the changing philosophy. 
In the United States v. Standard Oil Company, 384 U.S. 224 
(1966), the question before the Supreme Court was whether the 
statutory expression "refuse matter of any kind" included dis-
charges of commercially valuable matter. Standard Oil (Kentucky) 
had spilled 1 00-octane aviation gasoline into the St. Johns River 
and it had been charged under Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors 
Act. The District Court dismissed the charge, believing that valuable 
matter did not constitute refuse. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the 
Supreme Court opinion that the statutory word "refuse" did incude 
valuable matter and reversed the District Court's ruling.1 
In another case, Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (1970), two land-
owners wanted to dredge and fill their land riparian to Boca Ciega 
Bay on the gulf side of Pinellas Peninsula, north of the entrance to 
Tampa Bay. The Pinellas County Water and Navigation Control Au-
thority refused to issue a permit. The Florida Supreme Court re-
versed the lower court and ordered the Authority to issue the permit 
When the owners applied for a Federal permit, Colonel R. P. 
Tabb, District Engineer, recommended that the request be refused. 
He conceded that the permit would not affect navigation, but, be-
cause it was not in the best interest of the public, it should not be 
granted. His decision was upheld by the division engineer, the Chief 
of Engineers, and the Secretary of the Army. 
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st 1 ,500 to 2,000 years, there 
~1. The higher water level sub-
1e to erosion. Some scientists 
believe that the increased water level along the east coast may be 
due to the deceleration of the Gulf Stream. The earth's rotation 
causes the stream's water to be higher on the left side, nearest the 
shore, than on the right side. The deceleration of the river in the 
Atlantic allows more of its high water to escape from the flow along 
the left bank to flood the Florida coast. But, all of these answers look 
to the long-term changes of climate or geography.3 
On a shorter time base, District Engineer, Captain W. M. Black 
and his assistant, Second Ueutenant D. D. Gaillard, rank among the 
pioneers who concerned themselves with the movement of sand 
along the coast. Their report in 1887 occurred long before the 
terms "ecology" and "beach erosion control" entered into the 
engineer's working vocabulary. Gaillard's task was to examine St. 
Augustine for a deep-sea channel on the outer bar, but his survey 
delved deeply into the phenomenon of the movement of sand 
along the shore. Gaillard and Black's final reports became the basis 
for later studies by others concerned with erosion control.4 
Gaillard worked on the site from 23 May to 26 July 1887. He 
was aided by Assistant Engineers F. W. Bruce and J . H. Bacon, and 
he completed his work in Jacksonville in mid-November. During his 
survey, Gaillard noted that, although a strong current flowed directly 
along the sand bank, there was no erosive effect, but, whenever 
there was wave action breaking against the shore, the sand would 
wear away rapidly. He also noted that the ebb flow influenced sand 
movement more strongly than the flood tide. 
After his field work was completed, Gaillard studied earlier 
maps to gain perspective concerning St. Augustine's past condition 
and the long-term changes. He began with a facsimile of an early 
map of St. Augustine showing Francis Drake's assault in 1586. The 
outline of the coast was too imprecise to be of value, but the map 
was important because it indicated that the channel ran close 
aboard Anastasia Island. Next, a facsimile of Herman Moll's map, 
made in London sometime in the seventeenth century, depicted the 
channel in basically the same position as in 1887. A facsimile of 
Thomas Silver's map, made in 1740 during Oglethorpe's siege of 
St. Augustine, had the channel in the same position as in 1882. 
Other maps used by Gaillard were: The Spanish engineers' map of 
1791; Ueutenant Colonel Perrault's two maps, one in 1826 and the 
other in 1829; and the United States Coast Survey maps of 1862 
and 1882. 
Gaillard made a comparative chart of the shorelines and sail-
ing lines from the 1 791 , 1826, and 1887 surveys. This chart showed 
a continual erosion of both the north and south beaches. He con-
cluded that "the wear of the north beach is doubtless due to storms, 
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As they approach a sandy 
beach the situation changes. When the water depth equals the wave 
length (the distance from one trough to the next) the wave begins to 
change shape, becoming more elliptical until, in shallow water, it 
tumbles or breaks. The breaking wave has little or no support be-
neath its crest, causing the water to drop vertically. That portion of 
water rushing forward up the beach is called the swash; the water 
flowing back to the sea, down the slope of the beach, is the back-
wash. The impact of the falling crest dislodges particles from the 
bottom, putting them in suspension. The swash, having more force 
behind it than the backwash, carries the sand up on the beach to 
remain when the water runs back down the slope. Thus, the swash 
can be the beach building portion of the wave. However, this is so 
only if the wave approaches the shore perpendicular. If the waves 
strike at an oblique angle, the swash's energy is not directly up the 
beach, but is glancing so that part of the suspended sand, and 
more, may be carried back to the sea in the refraction. Under this 
condition, the swash erodes rather than builds the shoreline.8 
This refraction is more commonly called littoral drift Most of 
the time, the east coast of Florida is subjected to a southerly drift; 
although, during times of southeast winds, the drift will reverse to 
run northward. Between 9 June and 9 July 1936, an investigation of 
ocean currents and sand movements off Miami Beach revealed a 
northward littoral drift Ueutenant Colonel E. J. Dent, senior mem-
ber of the Beach Erosion Board, noted that this direction was 
contrary to earlier information available to the Board, and to the 
physical evidence revealed by the sand accumulation on the north 
side of jetties and protective works in the area.9 
Jacksonville Beach 
during northeast stonn, 
13th and 14th Avenue 
North, December 1962. 
Courtesy Corps of 
Engineers. 
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)ns planned for Canaveral 
~r plant, if needed, for Hills-
! material will be available 
through routine harbor maintenance, but this source is limited be-
cause many dredged areas are already so deep that the bottom 
material is no longer sand. Therefore, offshore borrow areas are 
being investigated. The Fort Pierce beach erosion control project 
used this latter method during sand replenishment in 1971.12 The 
Virginia Key and Key Biscayne projects called for the construction of 
groins and the use of an offshore borrow area to renew the beaches. 
That project was 47 percent completed by 1975.13 Similar work is 
being planned for Pinellas County on the west coast 
Revetments have been used by the engineers in their all-out 
attack upon erosion. During the Florida land boom of the 1920's, 
extensive bulkheads were built along the east coast as far north as 
Mayport Duval County suffered a severe northeast storm in 1925 
which destroyed many of these walls. They were rebuilt only to be 
demolished a second time in a 1932 storm. With Federal aid, Atlan-
tic Beach, Neptune Beach, and Jacksonville Beach constructed 
concrete seawalls as replacements. Many concrete bulkheads were 
damaged in the hurricane of 1944; others were destroyed in the 
intense northeast storm of 194 7. Until 1962, these battered walls 
were replaced by similar concrete structures. After the storm of 
1962, emergency granite revetments were constructed in place of 
concrete seawalls. These structures were more effective in dissipat-
ing wave energy without creating extensive erosion problems. Fur-
ther, 320,000 cubic yards of sand fill was used to replenish Neptune 
and Jacksonville beaches. At the same time, the Mayport Naval Sta-
tion was given a protective beach from dredged fill removed from 
the carrier basin. The damage wrought by Hurricane Dora in Sep-
tember 1964 resulted in an additional 25,750 linear feet of granite 
revetment along all three beaches.J4 
Beach building, Dade 
County proj ect, 
September 1977. 
Courtesy Corps of 
Engineers. 
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the Central and South Florida Flood Control project, the early efforts 
at flood control were the result of the Corps being asked to rectify 
private and state efforts at land reclamation in the Everglades. The 
more recent flood control projects grew out of this first effort, but 
later projects have been initiated from a broad base to protect the 
commonweal through proper techniques of water management. 
The Four River Basins project encompasses a 6,000-square-
mile area in central and southwest Florida. The heart of this region is 
the Green Swamp, a vast wilderness of swamps, lakes, streams, 
marshlands, and prairies. By Florida's standards, the Green Swamp 
is located at a high elevation- about 200 feet above mean sea level. 
Four major rivers originate in the swamp: Withlacoochee, Okla-
waha, Hillsborough, and Peace. When heavy rainfalls occur, the 
whole region is quickly inundated because the streams are ineffi-
cient at draining off excess water. 
Until this locale had a population boom, the periodic flooding 
did little damage. Earlier settlers developed the better, higher 
ground first. But, with additional people, the lowlands were brought 
into use. Flooding became a serious problem as the population 
density increasedAt first, the solution seemed to be to construct 
drainage ditches to draw off water to the next lower zone. All this did 
was concentrate the flow peaks which accentuated downstream 
inundation. 
The urban sprawl around Tampa added to the problem by 
withdrawing holding areas for excess water. There is no way residen-
tial and industrial areas with roofs, pavements, and parking lots can 
hold rainfall. As the development of the urban regions increased, so 
did the runoff. In fact, the man-made cover actually kept the water 
from entering the underground water table. The result was twofold; 
flooding during the rainy months, and droughts during dry months, 
all because of a decrease in the natural storage capacity of the re-
gion. As more subdivisions were built along desirable shorelines of 
lakes, rivers, and the bay, the problem of flood and drought in-
creased dramatically. The urban sprawl was matched by an agricul-
tural development in the rural areas which removed more lands 
from the water storage role. Finally, the Flood Control Act of 2 Octo-
ber 1962 was enacted to prevent a recurrence of the serious flood-
ing of the past, and to create a storage system for the excess water. 
The result of this act was the Four River Basins project. The 
Jacksonville District's solution was to design a water management 
control around the construction of eight reservoirs, and to improve 
the capacity of several lakes to hold water. The Green Swamp will 
contain three storage reservoirs; the Hillsboro River will have four, 
and the Withlacoochee River will have one. These storage centers 
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began. By 1975, the task 
was 21 percent completed. Emphasis has been placed upon build-
ing the Tampa Bypass Canal, which is designed to bring flood relief 
to this highly urbanized region. 
In the extreme eastern end of the Jacksonville District, there is 
another flood control project being constructed on the Portugues 
and Bucana Rivers in Puerto Rico. These two rivers drain 54 miles 
on the south side of the island. The drainage area varies from 4,000-
foot elevation down to sea level in the short distance of 14 miles 
from peak to sea. Ponce, the second largest city in Puerto Rico, is 
located on the coastal plain of this region. The topography and rain-
fall pattern is such that there is an extremely high water runoff rate 
which produces flooding with very little warning. As was the case 
with Tampa, as Ponce grew in population, the urban spread encom-
passed more land which was subject to damage by the periodic 
floods rushing down from the mountains. 
In contrast to the Florida rivers which flow through flat land, the 
Portugues and Bucana Rivers drop more than 750 feet per mile 
near their source. Even on the coastal plain the fall is 25 feet per 
mile. Overall, the two drainage basins average a descent of 300 feet 
per mile from source to sea. The present project is the first flood 
control program scheduled for the island of Puerto Rico. It is similar 
to the Four River Basins project in that it was brought about by 
urban development 
Flooded residential 
areas, such as this 
neighborhood in 
Tampa, were an almost 
annual occurence prior 
to the Four River Basins 
Proj ect 
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Ierton recommended con-
~ reservoirs to impound ex-
then be available for both 
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diversion canal be built to 
tugues River which flows 
water over to the Bucana 
uld also include improving 
:; to increase their effective-
)nstruction for this project 
rol projects were underway 
.e ecology movement was 
that many people began to 
:mds, and estuaries. These 
vn rainfall runoffs; they per-
:;urface waters; they are the 
al food chain from sea nur-
ocean waters; and they are 
re uses at a rate of 200,000 
eal estate, had removed 51 
estimated to be available to 
1cemed because, although 
1d use at the local and Fed-
IVerall charge of preserving 
oncemed citizens became 
I itself to the question, and it 
s the coordinating agency 
1 Control Act Amendments 
t the Corps would do noth-
)ng, the Natural Resources 
e Federation took the engi-
ued his ruling in the spring 
:iS to assume authority over 
tsts and adjacent wetlands, 
eshwater swamps, even the 
~raJ judicial system put the 
1 in a big way. 
ngineer, made a landmark 
~n assigned its new role. A 
1d purchased Marco Island 
1 Naples, with plans to tum 
the area into a bustling self-contained waterfront community of 
34,000 people. In 1964, the company dug its first canal, after a 
waiting time of only 9 days for its dredge permit from the district 
Deltona intended to lay out its channels so that all lots would front 
on the water, a venture well received by the buying public. The sec-
ond permit was received in 1969, after a considerable wait In 197 4, 
the company was back to the district for a third permit to dredge and 
fill another 2,200 acres of wetlands. By this time the sides were 
sharply drawn between the environmentalists and Deltona. The dif-
ference was that the Corps of Engineers was now concerned with all 
waters in the country, not just navigable waters. 
Colonel Wisdom had the task of deciding whether to grant the 
request. The Jacksonville District Office was flooded with written 
arguments from both sides. Deltona produced enough documents 
to fill a 6-foot long bookshelf. The environmentalists presented an 
impact statement of more than a thousand pages. Both sides had 
experts speak on their behalf. The whole preceding was emotionally 
argued before the district engineer. 
Colonel Wisdom 
examines some wet 
lands. 
Courtesy George Silk. 
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his decision in the spring 
!1ded that the company be 
acres, which included 113 
;tated that dredge permits 
)08 acres, including 2,039 
1ould not be in the general 
m, determined under the 
f 1972. The Chief of Engi-
.ington, upheld Colonel 
)isode. The Deltona Corn-
s, on the grounds that the 
es in the midst of its devel-
>uld not have to suffer for 
; decision was based upon 
1 the well-being of an eco-
;t the 2,000 odd acres on 
·acres still in their primeval 
interview, the colonel suc-
f the Corps of Engineers 
t the two 'e's - engineering 
- environment."22 
CHAPTER15 
Conclusion 
TODAY, THE JACKSONVILLE DISTRICT CORPS OF ENGINEERS is one of 
the subgroups within the South Atlantic Division based in Atlanta, 
Georgia. The district covers all of the Florida peninsula, juts into 
southern Georgia along the lower portion of the Suwannee River 
basin, and reaches 1,150 miles southeast of Jacksonville to include 
Puerto Rico and the American Virgin Islands. The Florida panhan-
dle, from the St. Marks River basin west, is in the Mobile (Alabama) 
District Districts are confined to natural watersheds for their civil 
works activities, while divisions cover broad geographic regions 
containing major river basins. Military construction is a separate ac-
tivity from the civil works groupings. Therefore, not all districts of the 
Corps of Engineers are responsible for military tasks within their 
particular district, and such construction in Florida is now under the 
control of the Mobile District 
Very broadly, the major functions of the Jacksonville District 
consist of navigation improvement projects, flood control, and 
beach erosion control. Among the newer tasks, promising to be 
both exciting and vital to the future, are water pollution control, ur-
ban studies programs, and environmental projects.l 
It will seJVe a useful purpose to divide the district into its natural 
regions and briefly point out a few engineering works in each. Geor-
graphically, the state of Florida may be segmented into five areas for 
easy reference: 
1. Lower St. Johns River and North Coastal area, 
2. Central and Southern Florida area, 
3. Southwest Florida area, 
4. Suwannee River Basin, and 
5. Northwest Florida area (most of this region is in the 
Mobile District). 
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The Lower St. Johns and North Coastal area includes that por-
tion of the St. Johns river basin from Lake Harney to the sea. The St. 
Johns originates in the swampy region west of Fort Pierce, about 
300 miles from its mouth at Mayport. Lake Harney is slightly more 
than mid-way, 164 miles upstream. The principal tributary of the St. 
Johns is the spring-fed Oklawaha River, which lies to the west 
Uke the rest of the peninsula, the St. Johns river valley is a 
relatively level expanse of terrain. The river's fall from origin to the 
Atlantic is only 25 feet; therefore, the river has a perennial tide to 
Lake George, 1 06 miles upriver, and, under certain circumstances, 
tidal affects have been noted as far as Lake Monroe, 161 miles from 
243 

the term "valley" when dis-
~en the river and the coast 
ing the drainage flow; east-
:oastal barrier islands, and 
rn drainage divide is a little 
to 200 feet; only the upper 
tlong its divide. 
lie District in the northeast 
~. the first project encoun-
:tys from Fernandina south 
1cular system was started in 
mel was constructed under 
· 100 years later, and com-
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:ross-Florida Barge Canal 
.ed on the canal in January 
)ncerned about the possible 
dated with its construction. 
New economic and environmental studies are now underway to 
determine the feasibility of the project. Meanwhile, the 30 percent of 
the barge canal completed, remains suspended in limbo while the 
engineers wait for the final determination. 
The Central and Southern Florida area runs south of Cape 
Canaveral-Orlando, down the center and east coast of the penin-
sula, to include the northern portion of the Florida Keys. This region 
is geographically dominated by Lake Okeechobee, which em-
braces the drainage area flowing east of the summit ridge along the 
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1962. The 155-mile water-
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harbors of Port Everglades 
ne and go. Since the Corps 
y, catering to the seagoing 
tourist, has sprung up in south Florida. The spectacular sight of the 
graceful passenger vessels, steaming close by the high-rise build-
ings on the shore, is striking. 
The most impressive work of the Jacksonville District in this 
region is the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control project. 
This is a comprehensive flood protection and water conservation 
program, embracing about 16,000 square miles, and touching 18 
counties. The project has two phases. Phase One calls for a protect-
ive levee from the Homestead area, north to Lake Okeechobee, 
close by the St. Lucie Canal. Phase Two concentrates on the western 
portion, and although it, too, is of a flood control nature, it is more 
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Continuing one's travels around the district, one may utilize the 
Intracoastal Waterway from Caloosahatchee to the Anclote River, 
just north of Tampa Bay. However, Tampa Harbor, about midpoint 
on the peninsula on the gulf coast, serving the second largest met-
ropolitan center of the state, ought to be mentioned. At the present 
time, the channel dredged by the engineers is from 34 to 36 feet in 
depth. In 1970, authorization was granted to deepen the channel to 
44 and 46 feet, while widening it from its present 400 to 500 feet to 
the newly proposed 500 to 700 feet Work has not yet begun on this 
project Already, Tampa Harbor is the largest port in Florida, and it is 
eighth in the nation with respect to tonnage passing through its 
facilities. 
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has been suspended. An economic study has indicated that, with-
out the Cross-Florida Barge Canal, there would be no justification 
for the Intracoastal Gulf Waterway. The channel through Derrick 
Island Gap, created to connect the Suwannee River with the gulf for 
safer navigation, is also considered nonessential, although it is 25 
percent completed. 
In the Antilles, the historic harbor of old San Juan is maintained 
by the Jacksonville District On the south side of the island a new 
flood control project is planned for the Portugues and Bucana river 
basins. This latter task will relieve Ponce, the second largest city of 
Puerto Rico, from the perils of periodic flooding. 
A more detailed study of the Jacksonville District's undertak-
ings shows that the district is undergoing a shift in emphasis. Urban 
studies are in the incubation stage, although the population growth 
in metropolitan areas is a harbinger of its future importance. Water 
pollution control, beach erosion control, and environmental protec-
tion are in early stages of development, and all three will become 
increasingly more important2 Today, it is flood control. Yesterday, it 
was navigational projects. The day before that, in the mid-
nineteenth century, it was coastal fortification. In the earliest days of 
the Corps of Engineers in Florida, it was surveys and map making. 
Regardless of the emphasis, the Jacksonville District and its prede-
cessors have functioned to serve the nation and its citizens. 
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APPENDIX A 
EARLY ENGINEERS WHO PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT 
ENGINEERING ROLE IN FLORIDA 
James Gadsden 
1822-1830 
1831-1839 
Horatio G. Wright 
1846-1856 
Quincy A. Gillmore 
1869-1884 
FORMATION OF DISTRICT AND LIST OF DISTRICT ENGINEERS 
MN.ANDREWN. DAMRELL Cwr.THCI'IASTURTI.E 
Improving: 
Apalachicola Bay 
Apalachicola River 
Suwanee River 
Withlacoochee River 
Manatee river 
Caloosahatchie river 
Pease Creek 
Cedar Keys Harbor 
Tampa Bay Harbor 
Key West Harbor 
Examination or Survey: 
Anclote Harbor 
WekeivaRiver 
Charlotte Harbor 
I 
20 August 1884 
KEY WEST 
1 February 1898 
Capt. Charles Hedges 
McKrtry 
Forts: 
Fort Jefferson 
Fort Taylor 
15August 1884 
I 
Lt. William Trent Rossell 
First District Engineer 
I 
26April1886 
Lt. William Murray Black 
I 
20 November 1891 
Maj.J. C. Mallery 
I 
20June 1893 
Lt. Albert M. D'Arrntt 
I 
15May 1894 
Maj. Thomas H. Handbury 
I 
15July 1895 
Lt. Albert M. D 'Arrnit 
I 
17 August 1895 
Capt. Frederic Vaughn 
Abbot 
I 
21 October 1895 
Maj. Thomas H. Handbury 
I 
4 January 1896 
Lt. James J. Meyler 
I 
8January 1896 
Lt.Col. William H. H. 
Benyaurd 
31 May 1899----31 May 1899 
Capt. Charles Hedges 
McKinstry 
LR:oL QuiNCY A. Gll.L'IORE 
Improving: 
Bar St. Johns River 
Upper St. Johns River 
VolusiaBar 
Examination or Survey: 
St. Augustine Harbor 
Mosquito Inlet 
Canal from St. Johns 
River through 
Mosquito Lagoon 
and Indian River 
to Jupiter Inlet and 
Lake Worth 
30 AU3!_USI 1884 
TAMPA 
I April1899 
Capt. Henry Jetvey 
18Jan ary 1900 
Capt. omas Henry 
Rees 
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I OCALA, FLORIDA, DISTRICT 
lt~~nr;~~0~5 -----lt~"df.t~r;:,~e;nl935 
Somervell 
r-----------1 September 1936 
CANAVERAL 
DISTRICT 
I May 1963 
Col. G. A. Finley 
I 
I September 1964 
Col. W. L. Starnes 
14July 1938 
Col. Lewis H. Watkins 
I 
23 October 1940 
LtCol. Tatnall D. Simkins 
I 
5 December 1940 
Col. W. C. Weeks 
I 
I October 1941 
LtCol. Alvin G. Viney 
I 
16 December 1942 
LtCol. Herbert C. Gee 
I 
3March 1943 
Col. David W. Griffiths 
I 
9 January 1944 
LtCol. L. E. Reed 
I 
II February 1944 
Col. Albert B. Jones 
I 
14 November 1946 
Maj. Blase Nemeth 
I 
IOJanuary 1947 
Col. Willis E. Teale 
I 
17 July 1947 
Col. Richard W. Pearson 
I 
15 February 1952 
Col. Herman W. Schull, Jr. 
I 
8May 1955 
Col. Elmer E. Kirkpatrick 
I 
18June 1957 
Col. Paul D. Troxler 
I 
31 July 1960 
Col. Julian V. Sollohub 
I 
22 December 1962 
Col. Harold R. Parfitt 
I 3June 1965 Col. R.P. Tabb 
May 1966 I 
Col. N. A. Lord 
I 17 May 1968 Col. John F. McElhenny 
27 January 1969 I 
Col. G.H. Newman 
I I January 1970 
Lt~~ry,~~K k_~_;Po_a ____ C_o_I._A__Jr ""'""" 
30June 1971 · 
February 1972 
Col. Emmett C. Lee, Jr. 
I 
8July 1975 
Col. Donald A. Wisdom 
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AppendixB 
The growth of civil works projects within the Jacksonville District can best be 
realized by comparing the projects listed in the first Jacksonville District annual 
report for 1908 with the 1975 compliation. 
1908 
1. St Johns River, Florida 
2. St Johns River, Florida, opposite the 
city of Jacksonville. 
3. St Johns River at Orange Mills flats, 
Florida 
4. Volusia bar, Florida 
5. Oklawaha River, Florida. 
6. Indian River, Florida 
7. Biscayne Bay, Florida 
8. Harbor at Key West, Florida, and en-
trance thereto. 
9. Kissimmee River, Florida 
10. Orange River, Charlotte Harbor, and 
Caloosahatchee River, Florida 
11. Sarasota Bay, Florida 
12. Manatee River, Florida 
13. Tampa Bay, Florida 
14. Hillsboro Bay, Florida 
15. Crystal, Anclote, and Suwannee Rivers, 
Florida 
16. Wtthlacoochee River, Florida 
17. Removing the water hyacinth from 
Florida waters 
1975 
Navigation 
1. Aquatic Plant Control 
2. Arecibo Harbor, P. R. 
3. N.WW Norfolk to St Johns River 
4. Canaveral Harbor, Fla. 
5. Charlotte Harbor, Fla. 
6. Cross Florida Barge Canal. 
7. Fernandina Harbor, Fla. 
8. Fort Myers Beach, Fla. 
9. Fort Pierce Harbor, Fla. 
10. Intracoastal Waterway, Caloosahat-
chee River to An dote River, Fla. 
11. Intracoastal Waterway, Jacksonville to 
Miami, Fla. 
12. Jacksonville Harbor, Fla. 
13. Mayaguez Harbor, P. R. 
14. Miami Harbor, Fla. 
15. New Pass, Sarasota, Fla. 
16. Okeechobee Waterway, Fla. 
17. Oklawaha River, Fla. 
18. Palm Beach Harbor, Fla. 
19. Ponce de Leon Inlet, Fla. 
20. Ponce Harbor, P. R. 
21 . Removing the Water Hyacinth from 
Navigable Waters in the State of 
Florida. 
22. St Augustine Harbor, Fla. 
23. St Lucie Inlet, Fla. 
24. San Juan Harbor, P. R. 
25. Tampa Harbor, Fla. 
26. Navigation Projects on which Recon-
naissance and Condition Surveys only 
were Conducted during Fiscal Year. 
27. Other Authorized Navigation Projects 
28. Navigation Work under Special 
Authorization. 
(1975 Continued) 
Beach Erosion Control 
29. Brevard County, Fla. 
30. Broward County, Fla., Beach Erosion 
Control and Hillsboro Inlet, Fla., Navi-
gation Project 
31. Dade County, Fla. 
32. Duval County, Fla. 
33. Palm Beach County, Fla., from Martin 
County line to Lake Worth Inlet and 
from South Lake Worth Inlet to Bra-
ward County line. 
34. Pinellas County, Fla. 
35. Virginia Key and Key Biscayne, Fla. 
36. Other Authorized Beach Erosion Con-
trol Projects. 
37. Beach Erosion Control Activities Un-
der Special Authorization. 
Flood Control 
38. Central and Southern Florida. 
39. Four River Basins, Fla. 
40. Portugues and Bucana Rivers, P. R. 
41. Inspection of Completed Flood Con-
trol Projects. 
42. Other Authorized Flood Control 
Projects. 
43. Flood Control Work under Special 
Authorization. 
GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS 
44. Surveys. 
45. Collection and Study of Basic Data. 
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Jesup, Thomas S., Gen., 115, 116 
Johnson, Andrew, Pres., 62 
Johnson, Larmar, 99 
Johnson, Lyndon B., Pres., 170, 203 
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Col. Dan Christie Kingman 
1906-1906 
Col. Spencer Cosby 
1920-1920 
Col. W. C. Weeks 
1940-1941 
j 
Lt. Horatio Gouverneur Wright 
1852-1854 
LTC Lansins Hoskins Beach 
1907 - 1908 
Maj. William C. Lemen 
1920-1922 
Col. Alvin G. Viney 
1941-1942 
Col. Juliam V. Sollohub 
1960 - 1962 
BVT Maj.Gen.Quincy Adams Gillmore 
1869-1884 
Capt. George Redfield Spalding 
1908-1911 
LTC Gilbert Albin Youngberg 
1922-1926 
LTC Herbert C. Gee 
1942-1943 
Col. H. R. Parfitt 
1962 - 1965 
Capt. William Trent Rossell 
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Major John Rodolph Slattery 
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